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1
Introduction
THE NATION-BUILDING METAPHOR
Shortly before noon on April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese tanks crashed into the 
South Vietnamese Presidential Palace in Saigon. South Vietnam’s last president, 
Duong Van “Big” Minh, had only just begun his fourth day on the job, and it now 
fell to him to greet the invaders. As the North Vietnamese attack intensified and 
long-serving strongman President Nguyen Van Thieu fled to Taiwan with suit-
cases full of gold, Saigon’s elite had turned to Minh in the hope that he might be 
able to negotiate a cease-fire with the Communists. But with complete military 
victory at hand, the North Vietnamese saw no need to parley.
Many of the top officials of the Saigon regime had already fled or committed sui-
cide. Those who remained were now seated on two rows of chairs inside the palace, 
waiting for the inevitable. When the first North Vietnamese soldiers appeared, Minh 
announced that he was ready to hand over power. One of the Communist officers 
retorted that this was impossible. Minh’s regime had already collapsed, and he could 
not hand over what he did not possess. In case there remained anyone in South 
Vietnam who was unclear on this point, the North Vietnamese conveyed Minh to 
the headquarters of Radio Saigon later that day to announce that the Government 
of Vietnam (GVN) had been formally dissolved at all levels.1 Finally released by his 
president from the impossible task of further resistance, Nguyen Khoa Nam, com-
manding general of GVN forces around Saigon, impassively shot himself dead in 
front of the North Vietnamese soldiers who arrived to take his surrender.2
As American forces were no longer engaged in fighting the war in Vietnam 
after the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, some have argued that the fall of Saigon was 
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not technically a military defeat for the United States. But there is no mistaking 
the fact that it was a dramatic failure of U.S. nation building. The Saigon regime 
would never have lasted for so long if it were not for U.S. support and aid; in 
fact, it might never have existed at all, so reliant was it on its “American power 
source.”3 American currency, military hardware, and combat troops flowed into 
the country for over twenty years, sustaining the Saigon regime. But this flow 
was foreordained to one day stop. When it did, the GVN would need to be able 
to mobilize its own population and national resources to survive the continued 
battle with the Vietnamese Communist movement at a much-reduced level of 
American support. Successive generations of Americans and their counterparts 
in the South Vietnamese regime worked to address this problem of nation build-
ing even as their comrades prosecuted a brutal war. In the words of American 
president Lyndon B. Johnson, their goal was grandiose, even noble—it was “to 
build as well as to destroy.”4
For good or ill, this is an impulse that has continued to animate the military 
ventures of the United States. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight 
both that the United States continues to involve itself in wars where nation build-
ing is necessary for victory and that success remains elusive. But for all the casual 
analogies to Vietnam that are drawn during debates over U.S. military interven-
tion today, these discussions have been impoverished by the lack of any recent 
comprehensive analysis of the American experience of wartime nation build-
ing in South Vietnam.5 Drawing on thousands of pages of previously untapped 
archival collections and new developments in our understanding of the war from 
the Vietnamese perspective, this book provides such an account.6 It stands both 
as a contribution to the history of the Vietnam War and as a case study of nation 
building that ought to guide future strategists in how they analyze and think 
about the problem. Whether as historians attempting to understand a recurring 
pattern in the history of U.S. foreign relations, as officers in staff colleges around 
the world grappling with the issues raised by contemporary conflict, or simply as 
citizens concerned with the wars of our time, we have much to gain from a fresh 
look at wartime nation building in South Vietnam.
Wartime Nation Building in South Vietnam
Measured by the scale of its ambition or the quantity of resources expended, 
the Vietnam War saw the largest U.S. wartime nation-building effort in history. 
Its size was determined by the magnitude of the problem at hand. When South 
Vietnam came into existence in 1954, it was what modern theorists would refer 
to as a “weak state,” one unable to exercise administrative control over much 
THE NATION-BUILDING METAPHOR      3
of its own territory. Like many other newly independent countries across Africa 
and Asia, South Vietnam contained central state institutions of limited power 
and reach. South Vietnam’s first president, Ngo Dinh Diem, faced a dizzying 
array of problems even before the Vietnamese Communist insurgency got seri-
ously off the ground. The GVN’s very weakness created the conditions in which 
the Vietnamese Communist movement could flourish. It also made it difficult for 
the GVN to combat the movement once it began to claim control of large parts 
of South Vietnam for itself. When the insurgency did get seriously under way in 
the early 1960s, the challenges faced by the regime only multiplied.
Drawn into supporting Vietnam as part of the broader policy of Cold War 
containment of communism, the United States set about trying to help the 
GVN overcome this legacy of state weakness and enable it to remain an inde-
pendent, non-Communist nation. Given that the governance of South Viet-
nam was the central issue in the conflict, viewing U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam War as an exercise in nation building greatly aids our understanding 
of the war. The fact that the GVN was unable, because of its own weak insti-
tutions, to mobilize the domestic resources to battle the National Liberation 
Front (NLF, also often labeled “Viet Cong” by their Vietnamese opponents 
and later the Americans) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had led 
directly to the Americanization of the war in 1965. From that point onward 
the United States faced not just a military challenge but also the task of aiding 
the GVN to develop its own domestic institutions and base of popular support 
in rural South Vietnam. These institutions not only had to be effective while 
the United States was expending significant quantities of its own resources to 
battle the GVN’s enemies, but also had to be self-sustaining in the period after 
the U.S. withdrawal. Just as in later wars, nation building was the only U.S. 
exit strategy available.
The main scene of this struggle was South Vietnam’s two-thousand-odd 
villages, divided into some twelve thousand hamlets and concentrated in the 
southern Mekong Delta and the coastal plain along the east side of the country. 
Although the population of South Vietnam living in urban areas rose sharply 
throughout the 1960s as many fled the ravages of war and sought new economic 
opportunities in the cities, over half of South Vietnam’s population still lived 
in the countryside in 1971.7 South Vietnam’s predominantly agrarian economy 
meant that the countryside also contained the majority of the country’s produc-
tive resources, whereas the urban economy was kept afloat largely by American 
largesse. Combined with the limited ability of the Vietnamese Communist move-
ment to develop infrastructure and support in urban South Vietnam, this meant 
the battle for the control and allegiance of these rural citizens of South Vietnam 
was the cutting edge of the nation-building effort.
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From 1967, the main weapon that the United States deployed in this effort 
was the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS). CORDS was a part of the U.S. military mission under the Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), but incorporated staff from civilian 
agencies such as the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CORDS had a 
presence all over the country, from the Presidential Palace in Saigon down to each 
of the rural provinces and districts of South Vietnam. In Saigon and regional 
capitals across the country, its officials worked with South Vietnamese officials 
to design policies and programs aimed at developing the GVN’s institutions. In 
the villages and hamlets lower down the chain of command, CORDS personnel 
then tried to implement these policies and programs in unison with GVN prov-
ince, district, and village chiefs. In sheer size and influence, CORDS was the larg-
est and most comprehensive agency of its type in American history. From 1967, 
CORDS took charge of all U.S. efforts to bolster the GVN’s position in the vil-
lages of South Vietnam, including the raising and development of local security 
forces, village economic development, the reform of village politics, and efforts 
to root out the NLF’s guerrilla and political infrastructure at the grassroots level. 
CORDS did the work of trying to help the GVN extend its administrative reach 
and win the allegiance of its citizens—the key tasks of nation building as defined 
in this book.
Much of the literature on nation building in the Vietnam War has focused 
on the years 1954–1963, when Diem still ruled South Vietnam, or at most on 
the period before the Tet Offensive of 1968.8 But the largest and most conse-
quential U.S. nation-building effort in South Vietnam took place not before 
but after the commitment of American combat troops to the country in 1965. 
CORDS came into existence in 1967, and it was only after the Tet Offensive of 
1968 that it was at its most influential and effective. There were two primary 
reasons for this: the Vietnamese Communist movement suffered a severe blow 
in the offensives of 1968, while President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to begin 
the process of U.S. withdrawal from the war gave an immediate impetus to 
both Americans and South Vietnamese who worried about the future durabil-
ity of the GVN.
Some revisionist authors claim that U.S. nation building in South Vietnam 
after 1968 was a success that was thrown away when the United States “aban-
doned” South Vietnam during the 1975 Communist offensives.9 Such views have 
had an influence not only in academia but also in policy circles. Yet it is only the 
lack of a detailed archival study of nation building in the latter years of the war 
that has allowed this mistaken view to take root. The revisionist argument is based 
on claims that, as this book shows, are simply not backed up by the historical 
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evidence.10 While it is true that the period 1969–1972 was the GVN’s high-water 
mark, this study demonstrates that the fundamental weaknesses of the Saigon 
regime were far from being addressed. Despite the eerie peace that settled over 
the South Vietnamese countryside during this period, true nation building was 
not achieved. There is little reason to suspect that the GVN’s weaknesses would 
ever have been resolved, even had the United States given it another chance by 
intervening in 1975. With American patience in the Vietnam War always limited, 
the GVN had simply not been able to reform and strengthen itself fast enough to 
outrun the clock. This book shows why.
From the Halls of Montezuma
Although of recent vintage, the concept of nation building exists in the context 
of the broader stream of the history of U.S. foreign relations and Western impe-
rial history. American soldiers and civilians have been using American power to 
shape foreign societies since the time of the frontier. During the foreign occupa-
tions the country carried out from the nineteenth century onward and in the 
colonies it acquired at the turn of the twentieth, the United States sought to 
influence local political, economic, and social structures in ways that furthered 
its ends.
Early American expansion across the frontier was based on the idea that the 
North American continent was a vast “unpeopled” area that could be settled 
without moral compunction. The U.S. Army sometimes imposed short-lived 
military rule in territories, such as Florida and Louisiana, that had previously 
been under the jurisdiction of European empires and contained culturally dis-
tinct populations. But as Anglo-Saxon settlement spread, these areas quickly 
became self-governing territories and, in time, equal states in the Union. A belief 
in the unique genius of the Anglo-Saxon people for self-government allowed 
Americans to reconcile the acquisition of a vast continental empire with their 
desire to maintain and extend republican forms of rule.11 Insofar as they figured 
at all in this vision, the role of the existing inhabitants of the continent was to 
be submerged and eventually drowned in the Anglo-Saxon tide. Militarily over-
powered and vastly outnumbered, Native Americans were subjected to brutal 
policies of relocation and concentration. U.S. policy swung toward assimilation 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but these efforts were focused not so 
much on the reordering of existing indigenous society as on its destruction and 
incorporation into the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. It was simply the case, as 
one federal Indian commissioner noted in 1881, that “the few must yield to the 
many.”12 This was not nation building, but nation destroying.
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When American armies of occupation traveled farther afield from the 1840s 
onward, it was they who became the few among the many. Surrounded by a 
foreign populace, they could not always expect to be greeted as liberators—a les-
son that would have to be relearned again and again up to the present day. But 
nor could the American occupiers avoid involving themselves in the affairs and 
grievances of the local population, as Secretary of War William L. Marcy realized 
when he ordered Colonel Stephen Kearney to establish temporary governments 
in such parts of California and New Mexico as he might conquer during the 
Mexican-American War. “It is foreseen that what relates to civil government will 
be a difficult and unpleasant part of your duty,” Marcy wrote, “and much must 
necessarily be left to your discretion.”13 His comments proved prescient. Ameri-
can proconsuls up to the present day have found their duties both “difficult and 
unpleasant,” while their superiors in Washington have been frustrated by their 
inability to manage events from such a great distance.
During the Mexican-American War, U.S. forces under General Winfield Scott 
landed in the port city of Veracruz and struck overland to occupy Mexico City 
itself. The fabled “halls of Montezuma” that U.S. forces captured in the city are 
still celebrated in the United States Marines’ Hymn as the scene of a founda-
tional American military experience. But it was also from within these same 
halls that the U.S. administered its first extended foreign occupation. Scott held 
Mexico City, Veracruz, and points between for nearly ten months. Lacking the 
expansive goals of later American nation builders, he aimed only to maintain 
order and American control so as to bolster U.S. leverage in peace talks with 
the Mexican government. Although the United States was not aiming to trans-
form Mexican institutions or society, American cultural influence was spread by 
the merchants, printers, and theater companies who followed in the wake of the 
occupying army. This roused in at least one American observer the belief that 
the war was “rapidly converting the people over to American notions”—the sort 
of cultural and societal conversion that would become a key ingredient of future 
nation-building efforts.14
In the possessions that America conquered in the Spanish-American War of 
1898, the idea of spreading American notions became central rather than merely 
being regarded as a side-effect of the American presence. The U.S. victory in the 
war immediately raised the question of the political relationship between the 
United States and the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Would the “constitu-
tion follow the flag,” as the contemporary phrase went, with the islands annexed 
as states in the Union and the inhabitants granted citizenship? This ultimately 
proved out of the question. Almost all American opinion regarded Filipinos, 
Cubans, and Puerto Ricans as racially inferior and “unfit for self-government.” 
Just as American Indians had been denied membership of the national political 
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community, thus it was for inhabitants of America’s new insular empire. As his-
torian Paul Kramer has noted, the Constitution ultimately followed only the race, 
not the flag.15
Yet U.S. policy makers still aspired to cling to their new possessions. The 
result was the country’s first foray into overseas empire building. Like so many 
empire builders before it, the United States lacked the resources or the will to 
rule the islands entirely on its own without the help of cooperative local elites. 
American rule hence operated through colonial states, which relied on local 
collaborators. To have attempted to do otherwise would have undermined the 
ostensible purpose of the new U.S. empire, which was to educate these elites 
to one day take over from their American tutors. Meanwhile, the Americans 
and their local allies directed repressive violence against those who resisted the 
new colonial order, especially in the Philippines, where perhaps over 250,000 
Filipinos perished in the initial years of the American presence alone.16 In its 
focus on building administrative and coercive structures for local elites and 
in the “dialectic of violence and attraction” used to encourage acquiescence to 
them, U.S. colonial policy resembled future nation-building efforts.17 But there 
were also crucial differences.
For one, although the United States technically promised future indepen-
dence to its colonies, this was usually conceived as possible only after a gen-
erations-long work of education made them fit to govern themselves. Given 
that the international norms of the day legitimized colonies and that there were 
even times when Filipino elites themselves seemed to equivocate on the issue 
of independence, the United States was able to get away with usurping Filipino 
sovereignty seemingly indefinitely. But in the post-1945 world, with empires 
on the decline and nationalism in the ascendant, the United States could afford 
neither the reputational costs of usurping a country’s sovereignty nor the mate-
rial costs of doing so in the face of widespread armed resistance. This meant that 
even though many Americans might have thought the Vietnamese just as unfit 
for self-government in the 1960s and ’70s as their forebears did the Filipinos in 
the early 1900s, they had to work within the established fact of South Vietnam-
ese sovereignty.18
They also could not count on having generations in which to explore the dia-
lectic of violence and attraction. American empire builders, like their European 
counterparts, often conceived of imperialism as a charitable act performed for 
the benefit of the “natives.” Spreading the benefits of civilization to those less 
fortunate was seen as a way for the United States to claim its rightful place among 
the foremost nations of the world, but it did not respond to an urgent security 
need.19 Considered alongside U.S. nation-building efforts in South Vietnam and 
later in Iraq and Afghanistan, where victory in important wars was dependent 
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on a nation-building effort bearing fruit in a relatively short period of time, it 
was a comparatively leisurely business. “Whereas nineteenth-century imperial 
ventures were conceived as indefinite in duration,” write two recent analysts, 
modern intervenors “want to rebuild self-supporting but politically and eco-
nomically acceptable state structures and then leave as quickly as feasible.”20 And 
although violence simmered in most American colonies, it never matched the 
prolonged intensity of the Vietnam War, which produced levels of casualties that 
the American public would not tolerate for long. U.S. nation builders in South 
Vietnam hence faced a task not only much more difficult than that faced by their 
forebears, given the need to respect South Vietnamese sovereignty, but also one 
much more urgent.
The post–World War II occupations of Japan and Germany also presented 
only imperfect parallels with later U.S. nation-building efforts. In both cases, 
there were powerful—indeed, overly powerful—administrative and coercive 
state structures in existence with which the American occupation authorities 
cooperated. Rather than attempting to build the infrastructure of a state from 
the ground up as in South Vietnam, the U.S. task was to reform and reorient 
existing Japanese and German state structures into more democratic, peaceful 
forms. Both countries proved remarkably pliable in the face of military defeat. 
But even more significantly, as the 1940s rolled on and the Cold War began, the 
United States found it prudent to back off from trying to push dramatic change 
on the elites of these two countries and instead focused on winning them over 
to the global battle against communism. The precise ordering of their domestic 
politics and societies became a secondary issue.
American nation builders in South Vietnam could have profited from 
studying what their predecessors learned in Mexico and the Philippines. 
Some aspects of the mission overseas—the need to maintain good relations 
with the population and the inevitability of involvement in local politics—
remain the same through the ages. But there is little evidence of Americans 
in Vietnam drawing extensively on studies of earlier U.S. interventions while 
designing their nation-building efforts in Vietnam; if anything, discussion of 
earlier conflicts is conspicuous by its absence. The same seems to be true of the 
Americans who went to Iraq or Afghanistan without a true understanding of 
the much stronger parallels between their own mission and that of their fore-
bears in Vietnam. This was even more unfortunate, because in these cases the 
parallels are so strong and the potential for learning is so great. Even though 
acknowledging the similarities between contemporary and future wars and 
America’s defeat in Vietnam may be unpopular, it is nevertheless necessary if 
we are to understand the place of nation building in modern conflict and the 
difficulties of achieving it.
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The Nation-Building Metaphor
Despite enjoying widespread usage, the term “nation building” is the subject of 
competing definitions. Its very ubiquity, and the fact it is used to describe a wide 
range of activity, have contributed to watering down its meaning and making it 
highly context specific. As a consequence, “nation building” as a term has been 
used to describe activities as diverse as America’s exit strategies from wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, United Nations peacekeeping missions in the aftermath of civil 
war, and the domestic policies of countries that seek to develop their national 
identity through educational programs.21 Practices as diverse as educating chil-
dren to forcibly herding their unfortunate parents into resettlement camps have 
fallen under the label.22
This lack of definitional clarity has been enabled by the fact that nation build-
ing is ultimately a metaphor rather than a description of a particular, concrete set 
of processes or actions. Any action that can plausibly be construed as developing 
either the institutions of a state or the sense of national identity and cohesion 
among its population can be classed as nation building. The term is malleable 
enough to refer to either wartime, peacetime, or a postwar period. As a metaphor, 
the idea of “building” implies a programmatic course of action that unfolds pre-
dictably according to a blueprint. It elides the fact that the shaping of state insti-
tutions and the molding of national identity are fundamentally political projects 
that unfold in messy and unpredictable ways, not according to a predetermined 
plan. The building of physical objects unfolds predictably because the material 
being worked with has no agency, whereas politics involves a multitude of unpre-
dictable actors. The metaphor of nation building hence obscures the political 
nature of the actual processes and activities that it describes and gives a false 
impression of tractability and predictability.23
This is especially true when nation building involves an attempt by outsiders 
to shape the state institutions and national identity of a country. This under-
standing of the term is of Cold War vintage, and its widespread usage dates only 
from the Vietnam War. As Henry Kissinger has argued, U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam War “spawn[ed] a new concept not previously found in the diplo-
matic vocabulary . . . the notion of ‘nation-building.’ ”24 The “notion” Kissinger 
was referring to was the idea that the United States could radically reshape the 
domestic politics, society, and economy of a foreign country as part of a military 
intervention.
The emergence of this understanding of nation building at this historical 
juncture served an important function. America’s involvement in the Vietnam 
War occurred as European empires in the so-called Third World were disin-
tegrating. As part of the broader Cold War, a struggle was beginning between 
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the United States and the Soviet Union to shape the political development 
of the newly independent countries. The perceived necessity felt by Ameri-
can policy makers to control the political processes of the postimperial space 
made them highly receptive to the idea of nation building as something the 
United States could perform in the Third World.25 This led to a shift in the 
term’s usage. In the early years of decolonization, nation building was under-
stood as a process that was occurring domestically within the new countries. 
Many postcolonial states possessed weak institutions and divided populations 
who did not share a sense of unified nationhood, and the attempts of their 
new rulers to overcome these legacies had been labeled “nation building.” As 
late as 1962, a key reference work by leading political scientists on the topic 
of “nation-building” made no mention of the idea that it might be something 
accomplished by outside intervention.26 Only with the Vietnam War did the 
concept as we understand it today take its place among the foreign policy tool 
kits of the United States and others, from where it has never subsequently been 
removed for long.
Understood as a metaphorical label for a broad range of foreign policy prac-
tices by the United States and others, the exact scope of activity defined as nation 
building requires careful definition in a historical study such as this. Three aspects 
of the term “nation building” as used in this book require clarification. The first 
is the extent to which nation building should be understood as a domestic or 
international process. The second is what the difference is, if any, between nation 
building and state building. The third is what activities fall under the definition 
of nation building as used in this book.
First, although nation building is now more routinely used to refer to interna-
tional rather than domestic practices, this does not mean that it has lost meaning 
as a term used to refer to domestic policies aimed at strengthening state insti-
tutions and developing a unified national consciousness. In the case of South 
Vietnam, the GVN’s colonial inheritance left it with understaffed, illegitimate, 
and ineffective state institutions and the absence of a South Vietnamese national 
identity except among some of the educated and urban classes of the population. 
Although they addressed these problems with varying degrees of wisdom and 
urgency from the time of President Ngo Dinh Diem onward, the GVN’s ruling 
class had to constantly struggle to strengthen state institutions and establish the 
legitimacy of their rule. Attempts to inculcate a specifically “South Vietnamese” 
national identity often formed part of their efforts. Thus, alongside American 
attempts to reshape South Vietnam through nation building, the country’s own 
rulers were engaged in nation building of their own.
Throughout this work, the term “nation building” is thus used to refer both 
to certain U.S. policies in South Vietnam and also the domestic program of the 
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South Vietnamese government toward the same ends. This is justified because 
the use of a single term to refer to the policies and actions of both Americans 
and Vietnamese focuses attention on the fact that they shared the same goal of 
creating a viable and sustainable GVN that would eventually be able to survive 
at a much-reduced level of American support. It also highlights the fact that 
there was so much disagreement between—and also within—these two sets of 
actors on how to bring about this result. This disagreement about what historian 
Edward Miller has called “the politics of nation-building” forms the central sub-
ject matter of this book.27
A second point requiring clarity is about the difference between nation build-
ing and state building. Whether to differentiate between the two at all is a point 
of contention. Where a differentiation is made, state building is generally taken 
to refer to the development of the state’s administrative and coercive functions, 
allowing it to effectively control both its territory and population, and defeating 
rival entities that would seek to deny it the monopoly on the use of legitimate 
force. Nation building, on the other hand, refers to the formation of a sense of 
national identity among the population of a country. State institutions thereby 
come to be seen as legitimate across a country’s territory and population groups 
because they represent the nation. In one representative definition, state build-
ing is said to refer to the creation of “a political entity or set of institutions,” 
while nation building involves “the creation of a political community.”28 Other 
works combine both sets of activities—strengthening institutions and develop-
ing political community—under the sole rubric of either state building or nation 
building.29
This book makes sole use of the term “nation building” for two reasons. The 
first is that in practice, the distinction between the development of state insti-
tutions and attempts to ensure that these institutions are regarded as legitimate 
is an artificial one. Even the most repressive state cannot function for long if 
its institutions of rule—its police, courts, economic ministries, and local gov-
ernors, among others—are not regarded as legitimate by a sufficient portion of 
the population. The GVN was attempting to impose and consolidate its rule in 
the face of a Communist movement that enjoyed widespread popularity and 
legitimacy among much of country’s population. This made its own struggle 
to be recognized as legitimate even more crucial. Secondly, as a country that 
had only come into existence in 1954, the development of a specifically “South 
Vietnamese” political identity seemed like a prerequisite for the functioning of 
the South Vietnamese state. When the U.S. aid that had supported the Saigon 
regime for so long was withdrawn, the GVN would need to be able to draw on 
its own resources, both economic and human, to sustain itself. It would need 
not just the strong sinews of a coercive and administrative state, but also the 
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support of a sizable section of its citizenry. The extent to which the develop-
ment and use of the raw coercive power of the South Vietnamese state under-
mined its legitimacy was a key point of contention both within and between the 
separate camps of American and South Vietnamese nation builders. But only 
the use of the term “nation building” to encompass the development of both 
effective and legitimate state institutions fully captures the hubris of what they 
set out to accomplish.
A third issue that requires clarification is to define precisely what activi-
ties fall under the rubric of nation building. Rather than applying an abstract 
definition, this book takes a goal-oriented approach to defining nation build-
ing. Those activities that Americans or South Vietnamese undertook with the 
purpose of strengthening either the effectiveness or legitimacy of the GVN 
fall under the heading. It acknowledges, as thoughtful contemporary observers 
did also, that the basic problem for the Saigon regime was to establish mutual 
ties of obligation with its rural citizens that would allow the GVN to survive 
at a much-reduced level of American support. As Roger Hilsman, an adviser 
to President Kennedy, put it in 1962, the GVN needed to “tie the villages into 
the network of government administration and control” so that “information 
of the villagers’ needs and problems can flow upward and government services 
can flow downward.”30 The desired outcome was a country in which a sufficient 
portion of the rural citizenry would align themselves with the GVN, providing 
the manpower, resources, and allegiance necessary to defeat the Communist 
movement. All U.S. and GVN programs that were oriented toward this result 
hence fall under the rubric of nation building. This way of defining what con-
stituted nation building allows for the fact that the individuals working toward 
this end, both American and South Vietnamese, often had radically different 
and contradictory ideas about how to achieve it—and even what to call what 
they were doing.
Nations and Nation Building
Few Americans in Vietnam consistently used the term “nation building” them-
selves, preferring to talk about “pacification” or “the other war.”31 The usage of 
these terms was highly contested, not least because they reflected different per-
ceptions of the best way to strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
GVN. “The other war” seemed to relegate the political struggle in the villages to 
the sidelines of the primary war, the one fought with artillery, aircraft, and divi-
sions of infantry. It defined rural nation building in the negative, without positive 
content of its own.32
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Pacification, on the other hand, was a term with a well-established lineage. 
Inherited from French colonial vocabulary, to pacify implied the extension of 
the GVN’s physical control into hamlets and villages formerly governed by the 
NLF. Soldiers of the Saigon regime would occupy a hamlet, arrest any Commu-
nist cadres they could find, and provide a security screen behind which GVN 
administrators, landlords, and police could return. In theory but not always in 
practice, pacification was combined with efforts to bring social or economic 
benefits to the rural population through small aid projects and the provision 
of services such as schools and clinics. Once local Communist cadre and guer-
rillas showed no further sign of resistance, the soldiers would then move on to 
another hamlet. This approach simply restored the old political and socioeco-
nomic order in the hamlet while doing nothing to address the underlying driv-
ers of support for the NLF; in fact, by returning landlords and abusive officials 
to the positions of power from which the revolution had driven them, it often 
only undermined the image of the GVN. While pacification aimed to strengthen 
the GVN by creating zones of security in which GVN administrators and police 
could govern effectively, it was often actively harmful to the regime’s legitimacy. 
While the establishment of physical control by regime forces and the ejection of 
the armed elements of the Communist movement constituted nation building 
in its most limited form, such measures usually produced only ephemeral gains. 
One American critic described it as “like throwing a giant rock into the ocean. 
Big splash, then nothing.”33 And once Saigon’s soldiers departed, the remaining 
administrators and police were left to face the wrath of the local Communist 
apparatus alone.
Many of the Americans and South Vietnamese whose story is told in this book 
rejected the concept of pacification and sought instead to actively build ties of 
mutual obligation between the GVN and the regime. Through thorough reform 
of the GVN, they hoped to create a solid reservoir of support for the regime that 
would outlast the presence of outside forces. To an extent that has been underap-
preciated by previous historians of the conflict, their attempts at nation building 
often drew on their understanding of the ways in which the Vietnamese Commu-
nist movement mobilized and motivated its own cadres and soldiers. A group of 
Americans including William Colby, John Paul Vann, Stuart Methven, and Frank 
Scotton worked with former Viet Minh like Tran Ngoc Chau and Nguyen Be to 
decentralize power over village affairs to the people themselves. Their ideas were 
most influential after Colby became head of CORDS in 1968 and implemented 
what was called the “village system.” Aiming to create a participative experience 
of self-rule for villagers, much as the Communist movement did, the village sys-
tem aimed to provide them with the authority and resources to implement the 
“three selfs”—self-government, self-defense, and self- development. An analysis 
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of the village system allows us to move beyond the focus on development and 
modernization discourses that has marked much of our previous understanding 
of U.S. nation building in the Vietnam War.34 Based as it was on Communist 
inspiration, the nation-building policy of CORDS in the later years of the war 
owed more to Lenin’s ideas on political organization than Walt Rostow’s vision 
of modernization.
The village system also sought to overcome one of the most significant prob-
lems for American nation builders in South Vietnam, which was the historical 
novelty of the idea of a “South Vietnamese” nation. Both the regimes in Hanoi 
and Saigon claimed to be the legitimate embodiment of the Vietnamese nation, 
which was generally recognized as encompassing the entire Vietnamese people 
who lived on the territory from the Gulf of Siam to the Chinese border. Yet 
from 1954, Vietnam was divided into two halves, north and south. While North 
FIGURE 1. Members of the 101st Airborne Division join children in a game 
of baseball north of Hue during pacification operations, 1970. Such short-term 
goodwill rarely translated into long-term support for the GVN.
National Archives identifier 531465, Photographs of American Military Activities, Record Group 111, National 
Archives II at College Park, Maryland.
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Vietnam shortly set about attempting to unify the country by force, the regime 
in Saigon was occupied with attempting to establish legitimate rule in the south. 
This proved difficult, for although regional rivalry was a strong part of Vietnam-
ese politics, the country created south of the seventeenth parallel at the end of 
the French period had never been considered the object of a specifically “South 
Vietnamese” nationalism. On the other hand, from the 1930s onward, the Viet-
namese Communist movement had been gradually carving out its place as the 
most significant embodiment of Vietnamese nationalism by leading the strug-
gle against the French and sidelining, often brutally, its Vietnamese rivals. The 
Communist movement had always been weakest in the territory that became 
South Vietnam, but it still enjoyed substantial support. Even more important, 
leaders like Ho Chi Minh and rank-and-file fighters in the villagers were widely 
recognized as national heroes for their resistance to the French. Even if this 
perception was not universal, given the violence with which the Communists 
often dealt with their enemies, it was shared by a critical mass of rural citizens 
in South Vietnam. It is true that there were differences in the cultural, political, 
social, and economic legacies of North and South Vietnam, as there were within 
many decolonizing countries in this era. But the pull of unity, centered on both 
the historical basis of Vietnamese civilization in the Red River Delta of North 
Vietnam and the record of the resistance fighters against the French, was also 
strong—at least strong enough to cause the Saigon regime substantial prob-
lems in establishing its own claim to separateness, and probably strong enough 
to doom it from the beginning. A poem written by a North Vietnamese Army 
soldier in his notebook captured the essence of a Vietnamese nationalism that 
existed despite regional differences: “But I am here on foreign soil,” two lines 
read. “And yet the South too is still our country.”35
The Saigon regime could never pose a direct threat to this nationalist 
appeal or offer a unified vision of the future to the entire national space. Many 
of the generals, police, and officials of the Saigon regime had collaborated 
with the French colonists, and after 1965 they stayed in power only with the 
assistance of hundreds of thousands of foreign troops.36 Most Americans were 
unreflective about this problem, and seemed to work on the assumption that 
the creation of state institutions would over time lead inexorably to the cre-
ation of national sentiment attached to those institutions. This accorded with 
then-current theories of development and “modernization,” which held that 
nationalism was an inevitable product of the shift from traditional to modern, 
impersonal forms of governance as represented by modern state bureaucra-
cies.37 But these theories held an excessively materialistic view of what a nation 
is. As Benedict Anderson explained in his own famous theory of nationalism, 
a nation is not the product of purely material forces but is more accurately 
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seen as a cultural construct based on a shared belief of membership in the 
same “imagined community.”38 Such a shared imagined community was sorely 
lacking in South Vietnam.
This book explores attempts by American and South Vietnamese nation build-
ers to overcome this problem by drawing on the lessons of the Communist move-
ment’s success. In its own efforts to organize and inspire South Vietnam’s rural 
citizens, the Communist movement drew on the imagined community of the 
Vietnamese nation without solely relying on it. In fact, in its appeals to the rural 
population in the South, it usually focused on the population’s concrete inter-
ests within their village communities. This principle—which historian Jeffrey 
Race calls “communalism”—accorded with the fact that in a fragmented soci-
ety such as rural South Vietnam, politics was overwhelmingly local.39 Especially 
later in the war, American and South Vietnamese nation builders took the same 
approach to building support for the GVN. Rather than attempting to appeal to 
a South Vietnamese nationalism that had no meaning in most rural communi-
ties, Colby and his allies tried to address the concrete political and socioeconomic 
grievances of rural villagers so that they identified their self-interest with the 
continuation of GVN rule.
Yet the Americans and South Vietnamese who worked to try to tie the GVN’s 
citizens into bonds of mutual obligation with their government were always strug-
gling against the tide. They faced an entrenched system of patronage and corrup-
tion that was extremely difficult to undo, not least because it served the interests 
of so many GVN officials and officers even while being detrimental to the inter-
ests of the peasantry. High officials in the Saigon regime personally profited from 
this structure and also relied on it to ensure their own rule over the longer term. 
They frequently worked to sideline the influence of those South Vietnamese who 
were most focused on empowering the country’s rural citizens. The influence of 
those working to establish a sense of identification and trust between those citi-
zens and their government hence always ran up against sharp limits, and their goal 
remained unachieved at the time of American withdrawal in 1973.
Structure of the Book
This book is divided into seven chapters. Its narrative stretches from the corri-
dors of power in which the framework of nation-building policy was formulated 
in Washington and Saigon down to the individual villages of South Vietnamese 
in which it was implemented. This provides a comprehensive overview of how 
the challenge of nation building appeared to policy makers and practitioners at 
all levels.
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Chapter 1 examines the legacies of French colonialism for South Vietnam 
and the role of these legacies in shaping both the GVN and the Vietnamese 
Communist movement. It then examines attempts by Americans and South 
Vietnamese to strengthen the Diem regime through nation building both in Sai-
gon and out in the countryside, exploring the different approaches they took to 
nation building. The chapter brings the narrative to Diem’s overthrow in 1963.
Chapter 2 examines the evolution of President Lyndon Johnson’s relation-
ship to the problem of nation building in South Vietnam. It argues that Johnson 
entered office with little interest in the problem, but soon came to realize both 
how important it was for the war effort and how it allowed him to portray 
the war as a constructive rather than a destructive activity. Although his initial 
interest was in large-scale development projects, Johnson eventually came to 
recognize that a bottom-up approach based on the provision of local security 
was most appropriate at this stage in the war. As a result, he decided to create 
CORDS and sent his aide Robert Komer to lead it in May 1967.
Chapter 3 returns the narrative to South Vietnam itself, considering the 
impact of Johnson’s two most consequential decisions for nation building: the 
dispatch of American combat troops in 1965 and the establishment of CORDS 
in 1967. It explores the initial functioning of CORDS and the problems that 
arose in Komer’s approach to leveraging change from the GVN. By the end of 
1967, CORDS seemed to have achieved little, and the fundamental weaknesses 
of the GVN and drivers of support for the Communist movement remained 
unaddressed.
Chapter 4 considers the impact of the series of offensives that wracked South 
Vietnam in 1968, beginning with the Tet Offensive. It demonstrates how Presi-
dent Nguyen Van Thieu used the offensive as an opportunity to consolidate his 
authority, a process in which CORDS was instrumental. By allying himself with 
the Americans, Thieu not only eclipsed his rivals but also created the conditions 
for CORDS to finally have greater influence over the GVN.
In chapter 5, the narrative switches back to Washington to explore the Nixon 
administration’s outlook on nation building in South Vietnam. Nixon and his 
key national security aide Henry Kissinger were skeptical of the possibility of 
bolstering the legitimacy of the GVN but had a keen interest in its ability to 
exercise control over its territory and population. Such control, they believed, 
would strengthen their hands in the peace talks that had been opened in the 
aftermath of the Tet Offensive. Kissinger also established a sophisticated system 
for assessing the progress of nation building in South Vietnam, one that far 
surpassed anything the Johnson administration had constructed. The results 
of its assessments suggested the GVN would struggle to maintain its position 
after U.S. withdrawal.
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Chapter 6 explores the evolution of the village system in the period 1969–1972. 
It investigates the lineage of the ideas that came to animate CORDS under Colby, 
and the Thieu regime’s attitude toward them. While the Nixon administration 
was not as interested as its predecessor in the reform of the GVN, this period of 
the war saw the most effective and comprehensive attempt by the United States 
to develop an effective and legitimate GVN.
Finally, chapter 7 explores how the village system unfolded in practice. It 
starts with a consideration of the general problems faced by CORDS advisers in 
understanding and influencing rural South Vietnam. It then examines the effects 
that CORDS was able to have across each of the “three selfs”—self-government, 
self-defense, and self-development. In each case it concludes that the impact of 
CORDS was ephemeral and did not amount to the genuine establishment of 
ties of mutual obligation between the GVN and its rural citizens. As a result, the 
Saigon regime would not be strong enough to stand up to the challenge of the 
Vietnamese Communist movement in the future.
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THE DIEM YEARS
The territory that eventually constituted the country of South Vietnam had a 
rich and complex history, but one scarcely known to most Americans who went 
there as nation builders. Most of the Americans who served as nation builders 
in South Vietnam did so after the downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime, which 
lasted from 1954 until his overthrow and murder in 1963. The challenges these 
nation builders faced were influenced not just by the events of Diem’s rule but 
also by South Vietnam’s colonial inheritance. The socioeconomic problems that 
afflicted rural peasants, the attitudes and foibles of South Vietnam’s rulers, and 
the Communist challenge the country faced were all shaped by the legacy of 
French colonialism. Diem’s inability to overcome these legacies stimulated the 
first American attempts at nation building in South Vietnam. Although unsuc-
cessful in their goal of overseeing the emergence of an effective and legitimate 
GVN before Diem’s overthrow in 1963, these attempts showcased a variety of 
American approaches to the problem of nation building that would influence the 
more comprehensive and organized efforts of CORDS later in the decade.
The French Inheritance
Upon its independence, South Vietnam inherited largely intact the governing appa-
ratus that had collaborated with the French in their rule over Cochinchina and south-
ern Annam. As a tool for nation building, this apparatus had grave deficiencies. The 
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French had always paid lip service to their mission civilisatrice, the quest to transform 
Vietnam into a modern nation-state. But the main aim of colonial governance had 
been to protect the interests of French exporters and investors.1 One consequence of 
running Indochina as a business was that it created an incentive to keep costs down, 
meaning that the French did not develop colonial government beyond the level nec-
essary to maintain order, levy taxes, and secure major towns and communication 
routes. French administration had its grip weakened further by the Japanese occupa-
tion of Indochina during World War II and the subsequent war against the Viet Minh. 
The GVN hence inherited a colonial governmental bureaucracy with little experience 
or tradition of involvement in the South Vietnamese countryside, precisely the area 
that was the source of the Vietnamese Communist movement’s strength.
Recent events aside, the story of Vietnamese history writ large suggested that 
the Saigon regime would struggle to exert its authority over South Vietnam. The 
historic center of Vietnamese civilization was the Red River Delta in North Viet-
nam, and the Vietnamese people had spread south only gradually. The Mekong 
Delta, the heartland of South Vietnam, had held a sizable Vietnamese population 
only from the late eighteenth century. The new settlers in the south developed 
what historian Li Tana calls “a new way of being Vietnamese,” one in which soci-
ety was more fluid and less amenable to central control.2 The Nguyen family 
who ruled southern Vietnam first as princes and then as a dynasty after Viet-
nam was unified under Emperor Gia Long in 1802 did so only through loosely 
controlled intermediaries. An attempt by the emperor Minh Mang—himself a 
southerner—to impose direct rule in 1833 led to a bloody insurrection that was 
quelled only after two years, underscoring how lightly the emperors had to tread 
in ruling the fractious southern populace. The confusing and shifting landscape 
of the delta, where even “the boundaries between water and land are often indis-
tinct,” had hence rarely known the firm hand of state authority.3
As concerned Americans realized, the GVN’s success or failure at a task that 
had eluded the emperors would depend on the effectiveness and outlook of its 
administrators.4 French colonization had interrupted Vietnam’s long tradition of 
mandarin governance, which dated back to the time the country was a Chinese 
dependency. This system had been based on the cultivation of a scholar-gentry 
steeped in Confucian learning, ultimately serving the emperor but responsive 
to the needs of the population in the province or district that they governed. 
Poor communication routes meant that the emperors were perpetually “starved 
of information” about events in their dominion, and the mandarinate provided 
a means to mediate between the imperial state and the tens of thousands of vil-
lages across Vietnam.5 The French transformed this system out of both necessity 
and desire. When the colonialists arrived in Cochinchina, most local mandarins 
refused to collaborate with them, forcing them to rely on parvenus with little 
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knowledge of how precolonial governance had functioned.6 This new class of 
officials owed its position not to the honor and prestige associated with pass-
ing the traditional mandarin examinations, but instead on its willingness to col-
laborate. One member of the traditional scholar-gentry who refused to follow 
suit derided them as acting like “merchant[s] chancing on a pearl,” a particularly 
damning indictment, given that merchants were typically considered to lie at the 
bottom of the Confucian social order.7 Eventually the French abolished the man-
darin examinations altogether and adopted a system of training for civil servants 
fashioned on the European model.
Nevertheless, the French were never able to find enough capable and willing 
local candidates to enter the civil service, and had difficulty trusting them even 
when they did. The result was a disproportionately large corps of French civil 
servants in residence. By 1925 Indochina had five thousand European officials, 
the same number that watched over a population ten times its size in India. Ho 
Chi Minh later complained that they spread “like tropical vegetation.”8 In conse-
quence, there was a severe lack of experienced Vietnamese administrators to staff 
the GVN after independence. Vietnamese had not been permitted to occupy the 
highest rungs of the civil service until 1949, and even after that only 120 were 
given this distinction.9 When French officials were repatriated en masse follow-
ing South Vietnam’s independence, mass promotions of the unqualified were 
necessary to fill the gaps in the bureaucracy. In turn, these newly empowered 
officials also had to be replaced from below. President Diem himself branded his 
civil servants “incompetent,” and most Americans agreed.10
In the lower ranks of the civil service, French colonialism had produced a gov-
erning class drawn from a narrow social stratum and whose cultural outlook dif-
fered from that of the rural population. Almost all the civil servants recruited in 
the years before and after 1954 hailed from the urban middle class and had been 
educated in schools following French, or later American, curricula. The recruit-
ing center and main institutions of higher education were in Saigon, meaning 
that the well-connected children of the Saigon elite predominated.11 Catholics 
were also present in disproportionate numbers. South Vietnam’s administrative 
class was hence drawn from the part of society most associated with French colo-
nialism, and whose outlook and values had shifted much more rapidly than those 
of the rural population.
The GVN’s bureaucracy also inherited a pervasive centralism and formalism 
that discouraged local initiative. This legacy was hard to shake off. In a colo-
nial civil service, it had been natural that French proconsuls wanted to make 
sure that their Vietnamese subordinates were not exceeding their authority. But 
the practice approached absurdity, with district chiefs not even able to officially 
commend a subordinate for a job well done without French approval.12 After 
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independence, many GVN civil servants continued to pass every small decision 
upward. This was not just because they had difficulty assuming responsibility but 
also because the French bureaucratic tradition in which they had been trained 
prized centralization as a virtue. Writing in the 1850s, just before the French colo-
nization of Cochinchina gathered steam, Alexis de Tocqueville had complained 
that French ministers “were seized with a mania for seeing with their own eyes 
the details of every thing, and managing every thing at Paris,” a trait he said dated 
back to the late Bourbon era.13 The GVN still showed the heavy imprint of this 
tendency a century later, which made it all the more challenging to confront a 
Communist movement that was skilled at adapting itself to local conditions.
The French inheritance left the GVN without a substantial connection to 
many of its rural citizens. This was due not only to the cultural outlook of its 
administrators but also to their physical presence, which was overwhelmingly 
concentrated in Hanoi, Hue, Saigon, and provincial towns. As the security situa-
tion worsened toward the end of French rule, this problem was only exacerbated. 
During the independence war, French forces occupied major towns and commu-
nication routes while mostly declining to contest control of the countryside on 
a sustained basis.14 Officials from the French collaborationist regime withdrew 
from many rural areas in the face of Viet Minh assassination campaigns, leaving 
the GVN with what future President Nguyen Van Thieu once referred to as a 
“huge head and small buttocks problem.” Over 80 percent of the regime’s person-
nel were stationed in the Saigon area, with the remainder mostly clinging to the 
safety of provincial capitals.15
Despite its relatively small size, the French colonial regime confronted Viet-
namese peasants with an oppressive state of unprecedented efficiency, which his-
torian David Marr writes “had capacities to control and to coerce never dreamed 
of by previous rulers.”16 Whereas the emperors had shown significant deference 
to local interests, the colonial state was powerful enough to enforce its will with-
out the need to do so. Above all else this meant maximizing rice exports to gen-
erate profits while enforcing the maintenance of the socioeconomic order that 
made this possible. Those who collaborated with the French were rewarded with 
large tracts of land, while poorer peasants increasingly found themselves work-
ing as tenant farmers or sharecroppers. By 1930, 57 percent of the rural popula-
tion in Cochinchina did not own any land, transforming tenancy into what one 
Vietnamese historian calls “a ubiquitous fact of life.”17 After the 1954 partition of 
the country, 2 percent of the population controlled 45 percent of the land, while 
72 percent held only 15 percent.18 Village authorities, who had once performed 
the function of representatives of their commune’s interest, were increasingly 
placemen who defended this unequal socioeconomic order on behalf of land-
owners and the French. Village heads often had to pay for their positions, and in 
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turn they squeezed villagers through myriad petty forms of corruption to gen-
erate the cash needed to maintain them.19 The introduction of new legal codes 
and French notions of private property meant that those poor and uneducated 
Vietnamese who were slowest to adapt and had the least access to power were 
often dispossessed of their land.20 The result was the breakdown within several 
generations of the inherited social order in the villages, and increased polariza-
tion between different classes of villagers. In turn, this did much to fuel the rise 
of the Viet Minh and later the NLF as the vehicle for the aspirations of poorer 
peasants.21
The grip of the French colonial state remained strong until the outset of World 
War II. A rebellion in the province of Quang Nam in 1908 and a larger uprising 
in the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in 1930–1931 had been brutally sup-
pressed by the colonial state. These local rebellions never coalesced into national 
movements able to challenge French power. It would take a national movement 
with the ability to sustain its effectiveness and legitimacy over a long period to 
undermine and eventually overthrow this regime. This challenge to French impe-
rialism eventually arrived in the form of the Vietnamese Communist movement.
The Rise of the Vietnamese Communist Movement
Sometime in the mid-1940s, two Vietnamese sisters from Saigon were on a trip 
with their father when he became embroiled in a road rage incident with a French 
driver. Nguyen Thi Thu-Lam and Nguyen Thi Tuyet Mai watched in horror as 
their father remonstrated with the Frenchman and then slapped him across the 
cheek. As they sped away from the scene, both girls understood that their father 
had violated one of the central taboos of the colonial state. The concept of a 
Vietnamese laying his hands on a Frenchman was so scandalous that it generated 
outraged coverage in colonial newspapers. The authorities tried to force the girls’ 
father into apologizing, something he refused to do. Looking back on the inci-
dent in their memoirs over forty years later, both women remembered experienc-
ing the mixture of pride and foreboding that filled many Vietnamese when they 
challenged French authority in those years.22 But decades later, they were also in 
a position to see that this incident came at a pivotal moment for French rule in 
Vietnam. A colonial state whose grip seemed so absolute that it could trouble 
itself with minor incidents of road rage would soon be unable to maintain its 
position even with nearly a half a million troops at its disposal.
The rise of the Vietnamese Communist movement was instrumental in bring-
ing about this change. The movement’s success lay in its ability to attract an 
effective base of rural support and then build an enduring administrative and 
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military machine on top of that base. Previous uprisings against the emperors 
and the French had mostly been limited in their scope and aims, directed more 
at addressing specific grievances in the context of existing Vietnamese society. By 
contrast, the Communist movement aimed to overthrow that society entirely in 
a revolution. “Thus, a rebellion reacts to facts,” wrote the Vietnamese historian 
Huynh Kim Khanh, “whereas a revolution involves principles.”23 The national, as 
opposed to local, orientation of the movement also made its leaders aware of the 
need to marshal their resources for a long struggle. From their humble begin-
nings in the 1920s the Communists eventually built a nationwide movement that 
could reconstitute itself after waves of repression and mobilize the resources to 
defeat the French colonial state in battle. The Communist leadership made many 
missteps along the way, but their movement’s remarkable regenerative properties 
allowed it to eventually achieve victory. Along the way, the Vietnamese Commu-
nist movement’s leaders successfully transformed themselves from nationalists 
into nation builders.
The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was founded in 1930 under the 
guiding hand of veteran revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. After playing a role in the 
Nghe-Tinh uprising that began that same year, the party suffered the first of 
many waves of repression that nearly drove it into oblivion. The party’s leaders 
learned from these early experiences that if they were to avoid the fate of previous 
anti-French movements, they needed to learn to carefully marshal their resources 
and avoid premature rebellion until victory was assured. Ho and other leaders 
eyed their chance when the Japanese occupied French Indochina in 1940 as part 
of their war effort in the wider Pacific. At an ICP meeting in May 1941, the party 
founded the League for the Independence of Vietnam, commonly referred to as 
the Viet Minh. While key anti-Communist Vietnamese nationalists such as Vu 
Hong Khanh and Nguyen Hai Than bided their time in southern China waiting 
for the moment when Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang could sweep them into 
power, the Communists began the hard work of building their organization in 
Vietnam itself. As a front organization, the Viet Minh was designed to mobi-
lize nationalist sentiment across all of Vietnamese society while eliding the role 
of the Communists, whose social and economic agenda risked alienating key 
groups. Despite this front, the Communists occupied all leadership roles in the 
Viet Minh and dictated its strategy. This was the model of a broad-based move-
ment directed by an ideological hard core that would impress many Americans 
and South Vietnamese and inspire their attempts at emulation.
The ICP planned to launch their revolution when the Pacific War came to an 
end, judging that this would be the moment of the colonial authority’s maximum 
weakness. Conditions developed even further in their favor owing to a devastat-
ing famine that struck northern Vietnam in 1944–1945. Both the Japanese and 
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the French stood by as millions died; in fact, the Japanese continued to requisi-
tion rice for their war effort, spreading outrage and revolutionary fervor in the 
wake of death.24 With perhaps 10 percent of the population of Tonkin and upper 
Annam perishing, peasant anger was directed not just at the two foreign occupi-
ers but also the network of native provincial and district officials and notables 
whose circumstances shielded them from the worst effects of the famine. The 
situation became even more fragile in May 1945, when an uneasy coexistence 
between the French colonial authorities and the Japanese occupation forces came 
to an end as the latter launched a coup d’état, dismantling the French administra-
tion in Vietnam altogether. Seeing their erstwhile masters swept aside by fellow 
Asians had a profound psychological impact on many Vietnamese, for whom the 
myth of white superiority had formed a powerful bar in the cage of colonial rule. 
Amid the chaotic summer that followed, the Viet Minh seized Hanoi and many 
other urban centers in what came to be known as the August Revolution.
Yet as the leaders of the Saigon regime would later discover, ruling a coun-
try was much more difficult than merely occupying its capital. By the time of 
the August Revolution, the Viet Minh had established a presence in every prov-
ince of Vietnam, but it was in a far from dominant position throughout most 
of the country. The movement was strongest in Tonkin and northern Annam, 
whereas in Cochinchina—the future heartland of South Vietnam—it was only 
one  political actor among many. When France attempted to regain control of its 
colony by force from 1946 onward, the movement was driven out of the urban 
centers it had seized during the August Revolution and fell back onto a strategy 
of rural mobilization. From remote base areas beyond the reach of French power, 
the leaders of the movement directed a nationwide infrastructure that prevented 
the French from ever reestablishing a firm grip on rural Vietnam. The degree 
to which the Communists were able to organize and mobilize the rural popula-
tion continued to vary throughout the country, but with Chinese Communist 
aid from 1950 onward, they were able to build a formidable politico-military 
machine that defeated France at the battle of Dien Bien Phu and finally forced 
Paris to sue for terms in 1954.
While other Vietnamese rulers such as the emperors, the French, and the 
Diem regime attempted to impose their state from the top down, the Vietnamese 
Communists built theirs from the bottom up. They were able to accomplish the 
essential tasks of nation building—constructing a state apparatus with admin-
istrative, coercive, and extractive functions while ensuring it enjoyed enough 
popular legitimacy to run smoothly—because their effort was organic to rural 
society in a way that the French or Diem regimes never were. The Viet Minh did 
not enjoy the support of all classes of rural peasants or all regions of the coun-
try, and it used violence as well as persuasion to enforce its will. Especially after 
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the initial patriotic wave of the August Revolution passed and French repression 
returned, it came increasingly to rely on the support of poorer peasants.25 But 
even though the movement was directed by distant leaders, and the weapons its 
members carried were often manufactured in foreign lands, its animating force 
was the ability to motivate and organize a sufficient portion of rural society to 
struggle and suffer in the name of the Viet Minh. After using this system to beat 
the French, the Vietnamese Communist movement later reconstituted it in the 
battle against the Saigon regime and its American allies.
The basic unit of Viet Minh administration was the village. In this respect, 
the Viet Minh were no different from every other Vietnamese regime stretch-
ing back into time immemorial. A village was a collection of hamlets with sev-
eral thousand inhabitants that enjoyed substantial autonomy and performed 
all-encompassing governmental functions for its inhabitants. The competence 
of the village authorities extended “beyond insurance or welfare to include 
law and order, property rights, courts, and self-defense.”26 Although peasant 
mobility was increasing in the twentieth century, it remained the case that “for 
the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese population, ‘government’ has 
always meant simply the village council—the peasant has little experience of 
any other.”27 An old adage on communal autonomy holds that “the emperor’s 
authority stops at the village gate,” although this reflected an idealized form of 
a more complex reality. During the colonial period, the French had increasingly 
transformed village authorities into placemen whose function was to collect 
taxes and defend the interests of a colonial socioeconomic system that margin-
alized the majority of peasants. The Communist movement was so successful 
at mobilization because it did not attempt to turn all these peasants into true 
believers in the national revolution, but rather to address concrete grievances 
against the existing structure of village government. Jeffrey Race called this the 
principle of “communalism.”28
The advent of Viet Minh village rule was announced by the overthrow of the 
traditional governing council, which the Viet Minh decried as a “French puppet 
administration,” and the establishment of a new council.29 After the new body 
convened, members would mete out revolutionary justice to members of the 
previous regime, form village committees to deal with various issues, and orga-
nize a militia.30 The Viet Minh’s front strategy meant that all social and economic 
classes were initially welcomed as part of the new regime, and in parts of the 
south where the ICP was weak it appears that local landlords and notables often 
simply reconstituted themselves as the new council. While this allowed the Viet 
Minh to claim nominal control of much of the area that would later become 
South Vietnam, many of these landlords and rich peasants were happy to trans-
fer their allegiance back to the French when the colonial authorities reoccupied 
THE DIEM YEARS      27
their areas. A similar trend occurred when forces aligned with the Diem regime 
reoccupied the South Vietnamese countryside after the Geneva Accords, and the 
upper strata of rural society flocked back to the banner of a regime that would 
protect their interests. The inherent unreliability of members of the front meant 
that over time the Communist movement came to rest on a much narrower 
but more reliable socioeconomic base of landless, poor, and middle peasants. 
Socioeconomic conflict within the village, and the differing bases of support for 
the GVN and the NLF, would prove key factors in the course of U.S. and GVN 
nation-building efforts.
The Viet Minh village administration, like its NLF successor, had two main 
functions. The first was to win support for the movement within the village 
and to inoculate the population against government appeals. This was achieved 
through a mixture of propaganda, socioeconomic reforms, and targeted coer-
cion. As a Communist publication from the early 1960s explained, cadres should 
“choose the right moment to act . . . when the people’s rights have been endan-
gered” by actions such as “corruption, high taxation, forced money donations, 
land robbing, military draft.” The cadres could then organize the people to agitate 
for their rights and ultimately seize power, focusing their appeals on precisely 
those individuals the regime had oppressed.31 Show trials were sometimes held 
to condemn landlords and regime officials to harsh punishments, and cadres 
would make sure that the villagers participated in these events to dramatize their 
break with the old regime and to serve pour encourager les autres. By taking these 
concrete actions that affected peasants within their own sphere of interests in the 
villages, the party and its fronts were able to establish a reservoir of supporters 
and accomplices. Even if government forces briefly reoccupied the area, all those 
who had benefited from the Communist seizure of power would have little rea-
son to give the authorities their active support.32
The second function of the Communist village administration was to use this 
base of durable support to mobilize resources for the war effort. Rather than 
staffing its political and military apparatus with outsiders who then attempted to 
impose their authority on the village, the Communist movement built its struc-
tures of authority from the village upward. Its system of military recruitment 
had three levels. The first was the village militia, a group that in theory included 
every able-bodied adult member of a village, although only some were armed. 
After gaining experience in the armed militia, some members would graduate 
upward into the regional forces, full-time guerrillas who fought primarily in their 
own district. In turn, the regional forces served as the recruiting pool for main 
force regiments, which were both more heavily armed and more mobile. At each 
level the military and ideological elite was favored for promotion into the higher 
echelons, with the village militia serving as the start of the conveyor belt. Like-
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wise on the political side, the Communist hierarchy consisted of six echelons, of 
which the village council was the bottom. Each layer drew some of its members 
from the secretaries of the layers below and had the primary task of adapting 
directives received from above to local conditions. A large degree of autonomy 
was built into the system, with a Communist village secretary having more power 
over matters like land reform than a province chief had in the highly central-
ized GVN.33 The autonomy, power, and opportunities for advancement that this 
system afforded to previously marginalized members of the village gave them a 
strong interest in providing the taxes and manpower needed to maintain the new 
order. “It can be explained very simply to the peasants,” a veteran Communist 
told a Western observer in the late 1960s, recalling this earlier time. “If you want 
to keep your land, you must fight the imperialists, and if you want to fight the 
imperialists, your son must go into the army and you must pay taxes. That is the 
strategic line of the Party.”34 In this way, the movement stitched together thou-
sands of disparate village rebellions to make its revolution.
During the Franco–Viet Minh War, Tonkin remained the hub of Viet 
Minh power and recruitment. It was also the scene of most of the fight-
ing. In Tonkin and Annam the movement ultimately deployed six combat 
divisions, whereas in Cochinchina it was never able to field forces larger 
than battalions.35 The south was also beyond the reach of the Chinese sup-
plies that eventually made Viet Minh divisions in the north equal or even 
superior to their French rivals in firepower.36 The Communists also faced 
a more complicated political situation in Cochinchina, where two popular 
grassroots religious groups—the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao—held sway over a 
considerable part of the rural population, and were deeply distrustful of the 
Viet Minh. The latter’s murder of the Hoa Hao’s spiritual leader, Huynh Phu 
So, turned distrust into hate. Given these problems, the Viet Minh effort in 
Cochinchina during the war against the French had focused on protecting 
its core infrastructure, collecting taxes, and carrying out low-level harass-
ment of the colonists. The division of Vietnam into two halves at the Geneva 
Conference reflected this balance of power, with the Communist movement 
strongest in what eventually became North Vietnam and weakest in the 
south. In line with the accords, Hanoi ordered the majority of its political 
and military cadres in South Vietnam to relocate north in the years imme-
diately after 1954. Most of those who relocated came from southern Annam, 
reflecting the party’s greater presence in that region. While it is unclear how 
many cadres remained undercover in South Vietnam, estimates settle on 
about ten thousand.37 Doubting that the GVN would hold the national uni-
fication elections scheduled for 1956, the Communist leadership in Hanoi 
wanted to focus on domestic affairs in North Vietnam.38 But given the Com-
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munist movement’s demonstrated strengths at mobilization and expansion, 
the skeletal party infrastructure remaining in the south could also serve as 
the basis of an anti-GVN uprising if circumstances required it.
The Diem Regime
Ngo Dinh Diem arrived in South Vietnam in June 1954 to become prime minis-
ter of the State of Vietnam (SVN). The SVN was a French colonial creation that 
claimed sovereignty over all of Vietnam but whose authority was circumscribed 
both by the de facto control of much of its territory by the Viet Minh and by 
French restrictions on its power and autonomy. Just weeks before Diem arrived, 
the guns had fallen silent at Dien Bien Phu. When the Geneva Conference con-
cluded in July, Vietnam was split into two countries, with the Vietnamese Com-
munist movement setting up the government of North Vietnam in Hanoi, and 
Diem’s SVN limited to the territory south of the seventeenth parallel.
Diem’s primary challenge became consolidating his government’s authority 
over this attenuated territory, which after a 1955 referendum came to be known 
as the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), widely referred to as South Vietnam. Diem 
faced challenges not just from non-state politico-religious groups who held a 
third of South Vietnam’s population and territory in their grasp, but also from 
the remnants of French influence and, later in the decade, a resurgent Commu-
nist movement. But Diem also had formidable assets on his side. Despite missteps 
that would eventually bring about his downfall, he proved he could be a wily and 
capable political operator who had a vision for how to build and consolidate the 
power of the GVN. For most of his tenure he could draw on the support of the 
world’s most powerful country, the United States, which funneled over $2 bil-
lion in military and economic aid to his regime between 1955 and 1961.39 Diem 
could also rely on the support of a succession of U.S. presidents, who dispatched 
aid workers, military advisers, and covert political operatives to assist him in the 
consolidation of his rule.
Until recently, many historians portrayed Diem as either an unthinking 
American puppet or a hopeless reactionary who lacked a vision for South Viet-
nam. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that neither of these views is true.40 
Diem served in a series of positions in the French colonial regime in the 1920s 
and ’30s, reaching the position of interior minister in the imperial court of Hue 
in 1933. But he resigned soon after when France rejected his proposals to grant 
more political power to the Vietnamese, a move that burnished his nationalist 
credentials. At the same time, Diem was developing his ideas for the future of 
Vietnam. Violently opposed to the Communist movement that began to gather 
30      CHAPTER 1
strength in the 1920s, Diem instead based his vision on an idiosyncratic blend of 
Catholicism and Confucianism. Rather than a reactionary retreat into tradition, 
as it has often been understood, Diem’s governing philosophy was based on an 
activist and even revolutionary understanding of both his Catholic faith and his 
country’s Confucian tradition. Diem sought to fashion a “third force” out of these 
two belief systems, one that could offer a vision of the Vietnamese future that was 
both anticolonial and anti-Communist. In particular, he was influenced by Viet-
namese nationalist Phan Boi Chau, a thinker at the forefront of early nationalist 
meditations on how Vietnam’s traditions could become the basis for the coun-
try’s path into modernity. In the early twentieth century, Chau had been one of 
the writers leading the way in introducing terms such as “revolution,” “nation,” 
and “citizen” into Vietnamese political discourse, displacing an earlier discourse 
based on the link between the emperor and his subjects rather than the people 
and their nation.41 Chau, a long-term mentor of Diem, had come to believe that 
“only a sweeping reorganization of Vietnamese society would guarantee the true 
liberation of the Vietnamese people” from both French colonialism and inherited 
tradition.42 A flexible, modern Confucianism would nevertheless be a key part of 
this postcolonial Vietnamese renewal, which Diem himself often described as a 
“revolution.”43
In keeping with his search for a “third force,” Diem refused to take a side 
in the Franco–Viet Minh War, rejecting both the French and the Communists. 
Eventually fearing his life was at risk in the polarized climate of the war, he left 
the country in 1950 to enter self-imposed exile, much of which was spent in the 
United States. When he returned in 1954 to take over the reins of the SVN on 
the invitation of the aging emperor Bao Dai, he finally had the chance to put 
his ideas for a “third force” into action as he sought to consolidate the Saigon 
regime’s power. In this effort he was joined by his brother and counselor Ngo 
Dinh Nhu. Nearly a decade younger than Diem, Nhu had spent the 1930s in 
France, where he developed an interest in the teachings of the Catholic philoso-
pher Emmanuel Mounier. Mounier advocated a belief system known as Person-
alism, which rejected both liberal capitalism and communism as overly materi-
alist and neglectful of the social and spiritual needs of individuals.44 As Diem’s 
closest confidant and a powerful figure in the GVN in his own right, Nhu would 
also be influential in the development of the regime’s nation-building vision.
Yet both Diem’s “third force” and Nhu’s Personalism proved vague and opaque 
in practice. The GVN under Diem never managed to articulate a vision of the 
Vietnamese future that resonated with enough of its citizens to allow the regime 
to spread legitimate power across South Vietnam. All too often, the high-minded 
promises of social, political, and economic reform that Diem and the Nhu made 
turned into coercive and regressive policies when implemented on the ground. 
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Diem and Nhu’s erratic personalities, their authoritarian and intolerant natures, 
and both the instruments of rule that they inherited from the French and those 
they developed themselves undermined their attempt at anti-Communist nation 
building in South Vietnam. By the early 1960s their rule had sparked peasant 
uprisings across the country, and when they were ousted in a 1963 coup, they left 
behind a regime that had little to show for nearly a decade of attempts at rural 
nation building.
Faced with the diffusion of power and loyalty across South Vietnam when 
they took power in Saigon in 1954, Diem and Nhu had stressed nationalism as 
a unifying force. The need for unity across regional and sectional groups had 
been a recurrent theme of Vietnamese nationalism under the French, and it 
now became a tool in the hands of the GVN. Local and sectional groups were 
commanded to subordinate their interests to that of the new South Vietnamese 
nation-state. “The interests of the nation at large must take precedence over the 
local interests,” wrote Nghiem Dang, an influential thinker in Diem’s regime, 
allowing that “the local population can always make itself heard, and indicate its 
wishes, demanding that measures be taken in the local interest, but only provid-
ing those measures do not hinder the putting into effect of the national policy.”45 
The problem, according to one assessment by Diem’s officials, was that because 
the GVN lacked a presence in most rural areas, the population delivered their 
loyalty to “whatever party, religious sect or local warlord . . . seemed to care for 
their welfare.”46 The long legacy of indirect rule practiced by both Vietnamese 
and French rulers in South Vietnam, combined with the territorial fragmenta-
tion caused by the war of independence, had done much to produce this situa-
tion. The forging of a South Vietnamese nation-state would mean centralizing 
governance in Saigon and displacing these groups, who might speak of pursuing 
the national interest but in reality looked after their sectional interests.47
Straightaway, this set the Diem regime on a collision course with the politico-
religious groups the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao who held sway across large areas 
of South Vietnam, and also with countless peasant communities who were 
unprepared to take up the standard of South Vietnamese nationalism. It was this 
obstacle that would prove the most enduring. Diem succeeded in crushing the 
organized military power of the politico-religious groups in the first few years of 
his rule, earning him the title “America’s Miracle Man in Asia.” But he was now 
faced with the more difficult problem of stepping into the power vacuum left by 
their demise, and rallying the peasantry around the South Vietnamese flag.
This first meant creating a network of strong provincial and district govern-
ments who would owe their allegiance to the regime in Saigon rather than local 
political forces. Although the number of provinces in South Vietnam fluctuated 
as Diem combined and split them according to his whim, in 1962 it stood at 
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forty-one. Each of these provinces was further subdivided into a number of dis-
tricts. Aside from village heads, the district chief was the official who had the 
most contact with the local population, as had been the case since the Chinese 
first used a system of districts to rule Vietnam.48 Diem appointed loyalists to 
these positions, and as the Communist insurgency grew he increasingly relied on 
officers from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to fill them. In doing 
so he was following in the tradition of a long line of Vietnamese rulers who had 
tried to use military government to pacify the wild south.49 By 1962, thirty-six 
out of forty-one province chiefs were from the military, as were the majority of 
district chiefs.50
This coercive and administrative apparatus now had to be used to establish 
bonds of mutual obligation with the peasantry across the country. Dang, who 
headed Saigon’s National Institute of Administration (NIA) for much of its exis-
tence, believed that a key task for the GVN was “developing communication with 
the people” so that the latter could make demands on the former and see the 
benefit of submitting to GVN rule.51 At the NIA, Dang attempted to develop a 
new generation of GVN administrators who would throw off the colonial inheri-
tance and concern themselves with the well-being of the rural population. He 
believed that the French colonial regime’s reliance on administrators from a nar-
row, urban social class had caused a profound rupture between the government 
and the population. Like Diem, he saw the answer in a new governing philosophy 
that would draw on certain aspects of Vietnam’s Confucian inheritance while 
reinterpreting them in a modern context. In Dang’s view, Confucian administra-
tors had been tasked not so much with executing central policy as with resolving 
local problems and achieving consensus within a broad purview. The fact they 
received a humanist education tended to enlarge their field of vision. By contrast, 
French-educated Vietnamese administrators were trained in the law. They lim-
ited their scope of action to enforcing colonial law, abandoning the paternalistic 
concern for the people’s general welfare that had been part of the mandarin ide-
ology. The fact that this law dealt mainly with extracting labor and taxes, com-
bined with the lack of cultural identification between the rulers and the ruled, 
produced what Dang described as “a breach between the new attitude of the civil 
servant who withdraws more and more behind the passivity of legal texts and 
rules and the traditional behavior of the people who persist in seeing in him the 
proxy of the Son of Heaven.” In Dang’s view, this explained “the relative effec-
tiveness of the colonial administrative machine in that it tended to exploit the 
country to the profit of the colonial power and, on the other hand, the complete 
failure of that same machine in promoting the well-being of the population.”52
The solution, according to Dang, was to inculcate graduates of the NIA acad-
emy with a philosophy inspired by his understanding of the old mandarinate. 
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These graduates were encouraged to see government as a two-way process in 
which local administrators had a responsibility to communicate the wishes of 
the population up to the central government, as well as imposing the whims 
of Saigon. As Dang explained, using the example of the district level of govern-
ment: “The district chief is responsible for presenting to the people the policies 
of the government and for communicating to the central government the wishes 
of the population.”53 “Anh” (a pseudonym), an NIA graduate who worked in a 
number of local government positions, explained how he saw his position: “I am 
appointed, and as an appointee I am responsible to the central government. Yet, 
I am a Vietnamese administrator who has an obligation to serve the people. But 
suppose there is a conflict of interest between the government and the people. 
What position should I take? I serve my people. Sometimes the government is too 
far from the people, and I’m close to them and know their aspirations.”54
Yet the overall influence of the NIA was limited. While the NIA produced a 
corps of administrators who had a socially conscious and expansive view of their 
role, the absolute number of graduates of the academy was small. In the early 
1960s it was training about one hundred administrators a year at a time when the 
GVN civil service had about 140,000 employees.55 NIA graduates also tended to 
serve in subordinate positions as deputies, while real power in local government 
continued to be wielded by captains and majors of the ARVN. Diem remained 
reliant on the military for consolidating his rule, especially when the Communist 
insurgency began to pick up speed. The decision to ally himself with the particu-
lar strata of the population who were most identified with French colonial rule 
and most influenced by its social and cultural legacy was perhaps inevitable but 
made it difficult for him to change the dynamics of relations between the GVN 
and its rural citizens.
The bulk of the GVN’s officials had come of age serving a French governing 
apparatus whose main means of intercourse with the rural population had been 
the use of force, not the two-way exchange of ideas. There was little communica-
tion between villagers and local government officials, and little active support for 
the GVN. Most GVN officials had spent the past decade battling the Viet Minh. 
This gave them a security-oriented approach to their jobs and also meant that 
they tended to view all former sympathizers of the struggle against French rule 
as potential threats, even though the Viet Minh enjoyed wide support for their 
nationalist credentials.56 After Diem launched an “Anti-Communist Denunci-
ation Campaign” in 1956, province officials cast the net widely over their old 
enemy, targeting many former Viet Minh. One province chief told a Western visi-
tor in 1957: “When you have an official who will deal sternly with the Viet Minh, 
it is of secondary importance whether he is honest or otherwise capable. It is bet-
ter to have a district chief who steals than a district full of Communists.”57 Tran 
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Ngoc Chau, a South Vietnamese official who was unusually sensitive to the plight 
of villagers, complained that those who had formerly had connections with the 
Viet Minh were automatically assumed by GVN officials to be Communists.58 
Villagers who had supported the Viet Minh found it incomprehensible that they 
were now supposed to side with former collaborators against the resistance. It is 
not surprising that a widespread rumor held that when Ho Chi Minh heard that 
a large contingent of pro-French officials had fled Hanoi to seek refuge in the 
South, he remarked: “Good! That is the best news I have heard in a long time. 
With that crowd in the South, how can we lose?”59
Given their backgrounds, training, and predilections, most South Vietnamese 
officials lacked the ability to understand rural society, and especially the strengths 
and motivations of the Vietnamese Communist movement. These facts proved 
difficult to grasp for a class of administrators and soldiers who had benefited 
from French rule and experienced it mostly from the vantage point of the pros-
perous cities. Tran Van Don, who was a leading general under Diem before turn-
ing against his regime, would later write of this period that Vietnam had “no 
peasants exploited by rich landowners,” and “the bulk of the land was held by 
individual Vietnamese who owned only small parcels on a highly democratic 
basis.”60 This comment rates as frankly bizarre, given that large-scale landlordism 
in the south dated at least to the Nguyen, who had ruled the region through pow-
erful landholding intermediaries. This tendency had only increased under the 
French, and by the 1930s only a third of the land in Cochinchina was owned by 
those who farmed it.61 But Tran’s belief was widely shared among his colleagues.
Diem and Nhu were aware of the shortcomings of the GVN’s traditional civil 
service and military and never fully trusted their nationalist zeal, given that so 
many had been trained under the French. They accordingly attempted to supple-
ment their regime’s political base of support by building organizations and para-
militaries that owed their loyalty directly to the Ngo family itself. Both Nhu and 
Diem admired how proficient the Communists were at political mobilization, 
and they attempted to emulate the Communists’ techniques in setting up these 
extra-constitutional organizations.62 Just as the Communists had done through 
the Viet Minh, the Ngo brothers sought to construct a series of fronts, mass 
movements, and associations that would mobilize support for their rule and 
allow them to spread their influence throughout rural society. At the heart of this 
network was the Can Lao, a clandestine party headed by Nhu whose members—
like those of the Communist Party—were the ideological and political elite of 
the regime. The party’s members even penetrated the military and governing 
institutions of the South Vietnamese state inherited from the French, where they 
attempted to steer policy in the direction desired by the Ngo brothers and sniff 
out disloyalty. The brothers sought to use the Can Lao and its fronts to create 
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a broad network of loyal supporters and agents throughout South Vietnamese 
society, just as the Communist Party had done.
Yet lacking a clear ideology beyond boosting the power of the Ngo brothers, 
the Can Lao and its fronts had little success at achieving pro-regime mobilization. 
Tram Kim Tuyen, one of the early architects of the Can Lao who later became dis-
illusioned with the Diem regime, commented later that “those who want to build 
parties like the Can Lao . . . start from the premise that the Communist Party 
is the source of strength in communist regimes, and that this example should 
be copied. Whereas the Communist Party is created first, develops, then seizes 
power, and finally establishes an administration as an extension of its power, 
those who established the Can Lao . . . think they can reverse the sequence.”63 
Rather than following this bottom-up process of mobilization and organization, 
the Can Lao instead became an instrument of top-down coercion. In the words 
of an official CIA history, the true aim of the Can Lao was not to win popular 
support, but to “act for the new government where the bureaucratic legacy of the 
colonial regime was found inadequate.”64
With the Can Lao as its steel spine, Diem’s regime maintained the essentially 
coercive relationship with the rural population that had typified the colonial 
period. One aspect of this was the brutal crackdown he directed against alleged 
Communists and their fellow travelers, which culminated in the infamous Law 
10/59 prescribing capital punishment for any “offense to national security.”65 The 
regime also embarked on a number of ambitious schemes to remake rural society 
altogether and make its rural citizens easier to control. Diem began by abolishing 
village elections and appointing what his critics called “hand-picked henchmen” 
to oversee village affairs instead.66 These attempts at controlling rural society 
through coercion would eventually culminate in the Strategic Hamlet Program 
of 1962–1963, in which a large part of the population was to be relocated to 
new villages where they could be physically separated from anti-regime guerrillas 
and locked into ties of mutual obligation with the GVN. Although the program 
called for the reinstatement of village elections and a social and economic reform 
agenda intended to take the wind out of the NLF’s sails, the officials who imple-
mented it found it easier to forcibly regroup the population behind a barbed wire 
fence and declare their job done.67
Even as Diem seemed to score successes at increasing the coercive and admin-
istrative powers of the GVN, his failure at the other side of nation building—
ensuring that those powers enjoyed legitimacy and popular support—was prov-
ing to be his undoing. His repression of anyone perceived to be an opponent 
of his regime was generating huge rural discontent and providing fertile con-
ditions for the Communist movement to reconstitute itself. Those who feared 
GVN repression understandably turned to Communist cells for protection. 
FIGURE 2. President Diem receives a loyalty oath from personnel of the 
Vietnamese Air Force, 1962. Diem’s regime relied heavily on police and security 
forces to impose control over the countryside.
National Archives identifier 542330, Color Photographs of U.S. Air Force Activities, Facilities and Personnel, 
Domestic and Foreign, Record Group 342, National Archives II at College Park, Maryland.
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More broadly, the millions of villagers who had experienced rule by the Viet 
Minh councils during the war against the French chafed at the return of the old 
socioeconomic order to their villages. These events, as well as the pressure being 
placed on the remnants of the Communist movement in South Vietnam, caused 
Hanoi to reappraise its policy of restraint. Diem’s anti-Communist campaigns 
did grave damage to the remaining party infrastructure in South Vietnam, and 
the late 1950s have often been called the “darkest” period for the Communists 
in the South.68 The leadership in Hanoi was split over how to respond to Diem’s 
repression and refusal to hold reunification elections, but faced mounting pres-
sure from its lower echelons to take the offensive against the GVN. Facing anni-
hilation at the hands of Diem’s security forces, cadres in the South began to arm 
themselves and commit targeted acts of violence against GVN officials. While 
this initially went against the party line being promulgated from Hanoi and 
angered some party elders, it also demonstrated how the party’s decentralized 
decision-making procedure provided internal checks and balances. Attempting 
to follow Hanoi’s line had led to absurdities such as party members with guns 
in their hands refusing to fire on GVN agents pursuing them. After the Com-
munist cells began fighting back out of necessity, Hanoi gradually changed its 
line to reflect local realities. From 1957 onward, official armed units began to 
form, and an “elimination of traitors” campaign claimed the lives of hundreds 
and eventually thousands of GVN officials. In response, Diem ratcheted up his 
repressive measures. By 1959, the Politburo in Hanoi was reporting that Diem’s 
regime had “increased the reactionary quality” of local authorities, and was even 
“consolidating [governing] organs” in the villages, staffing them with security 
personnel, Catholics who backed the regime, and anti-Communists who had fled 
North Vietnam following the Geneva Accords.69
In 1959–1960, a popular uprising swept much of South Vietnam, encour-
aged by the Communists but spreading further and wider than their own 
damaged infrastructure could ever have reached on its own. In late 1960, 
Hanoi directed the creation of the NLF in an attempt to harness the wave and 
transform the rebellions into a revolution once more.70 As in the war against 
the French, party cells began to replicate themselves by recruiting cadres and 
attracting support to the new front, which like the Viet Minh aimed to “unite 
all people who can be united.”71 As the countryside rang to the sound of the 
wooden tocsins that had long announced the arrival of rural uprisings in Viet-
nam, the Communists worked to painstakingly reconstitute the revolutionary 
village councils, the militia, and the politico-military structures that sat atop 
them.72 As they did so, their apparatus, which had already driven the French 
from the country, became the bane not just of the Diem regime but also of its 
superpower ally.
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American Nation Building under Diem
On May 11, 1962, a forty-two-year-old American named Albert J. Fraleigh 
stepped off a cargo plane in Saigon. This was only his latest posting in a long 
career for the U.S. government and the United Nations. In World War II, Fra-
leigh had supervised the construction of airfields in Alaska and on the Aleu-
tian Islands before working as part of U.S. Navy civic action teams persuading 
Japanese civilians to refrain from committing suicide after the defeat of their 
armed forces on Saipan and Okinawa. Managing UN port facilities in Shanghai 
after the war, Fraleigh become a close friend of future Chinese Communist 
premier Zhou Enlai. When the Communists took over the city in 1949, he was 
held under house arrest and harshly interrogated, escaping only with the aid of 
Zhou. Fraleigh then moved to Taiwan, where he worked for an American aid 
mission and became an adviser to future Taiwanese president Chiang Ching-
kuo. Recognized as a result of this experience as the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development’s “most experienced man in civic action, rural develop-
ment and Asian communism,” Fraleigh had now been summoned to Saigon to 
help strengthen Diem’s embattled government. It was his first time in South 
Vietnam.73
When Fraleigh arrived in South Vietnam in May 1962, the Diem regime was 
floundering. The Communist movement had reconstituted its politico-military 
infrastructure and spread its influence across much of South Vietnam, and was 
taking the armed offensive. A few weeks after Fraleigh arrived, NLF attacks 
reached an all-time high, targeting “health workers, teachers, and minor officials 
as well as village guards, local militia and the regular military.” These attacks on 
anyone associated with the regime were forcing the retreat of GVN authority 
from much of the countryside, prompting military counteroffensives that did 
little to restore it. American officials were anticipating a long war against what 
they conceded to be “experienced, well-organized, and competently led guerrilla 
fighters.”74
In response to this challenge, Fraleigh and his partner, a former CIA officer 
named Rufus Phillips, created the framework around which the wartime nation-
building effort would eventually be built.75 In late 1961, President Kennedy had 
dispatched former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor and 
deputy national security adviser Walt Rostow to the country to assess the U.S. 
effort there. One of their recommendations was for a new push to develop links 
between the Diem regime and the rural population by strengthening and legiti-
mizing local governments. The United States Operations Mission (USOM) was 
to be the vessel for this effort, and Fraleigh and Phillips—who had worked on 
a similar program in Laos—its catalysts.76 As so often throughout the war, this 
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new nation-building push accompanied an increase in the U.S. military effort. 
The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was created in 1962 to 
coordinate military activity in the country, and American military advisers were 
assigned to all ARVN units of battalion size and above, and also to South Viet-
namese province chiefs.77
The extension of a permanent official American presence into the South Viet-
namese countryside, where it would remain until the American withdrawal in 
1973, dates from the Taylor-Rostow report. Although USOM had deployed per-
sonnel to the provinces to help with the resettlement of refugees from North 
Vietnam in the 1950s, Diem had forced its withdrawal in 1958.78 It was only the 
deteriorating military situation that led the president to reverse his stance. From 
late 1961 onward, the number of Americans deployed throughout the coun-
try increased steadily, their involvement in its political life growing along with 
the military presence. Phillips and Fraleigh’s USOM personnel jostled for 
attention alongside Americans from other agencies, especially the CIA, who also 
began to become increasingly involved in rural affairs in the Diem period. This 
diffusion of agencies led William Colby to complain that Americans operated in 
“autonomous baronies,” with little coordination between their activities. “Like 
the blind men around the elephant” he later wrote, “the [Americans] . . . gathered 
about the Diem Government, each dealing with different pieces and sections of 
its problems and defining the animal accordingly.”79 This was problematic not 
only because it made it difficult for the Americans to speak with a single voice 
to the GVN, but also because each American agency had its own ideas about 
what that voice should be saying. This diffusion of effort and lack of agreement 
over the correct approach to nation building would continue to afflict U.S. efforts 
until the creation of CORDS.
The Washington policy makers who directed this nation-building effort 
provided little guidance on specifics. The Kennedy administration was full of 
officials who claimed expertise on guerrilla warfare and nation building in the 
abstract without having much knowledge of Vietnam in particular. One such 
official was Roger Hilsman, a close Kennedy adviser who served as head of the 
State Department’s intelligence arm and afterward as assistant secretary of state 
for Far Eastern affairs. During World War II, Hilsman participated in guerrilla 
operations behind Japanese lines in Burma. He then returned to the United States 
and obtained a PhD in international relations before holding a series of academic 
posts. He met Kennedy while working in a senior position at the Congressional 
Research Service and was brought into the new administration in February 1961. 
Regarded as an expert on guerrilla warfare because of his service in Burma, Hils-
man was called on to contribute to the administration’s understanding of the 
emerging insurgency in Vietnam.
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In a major report in 1962, Hilsman assured his colleagues that the basic desire 
of the peasants was that the GVN provide “security” against the NLF. But this 
was a simplistic view that ignored the extent to which many Vietnamese peas-
ants viewed the GVN and not the NLF as the primary threat to their security 
and socioeconomic interests. A misunderstanding of how deeply the conflict 
was rooted in Vietnam’s colonial legacies also led American officials to produce 
wildly inaccurate estimates of the strength of NLF support. Hilsman wrote that 
the organization had only one hundred thousand “supporters and sympathiz-
ers,” but both the documented reach of the Viet Minh and the fact that the GVN 
claimed to be killing twenty thousand members of the NLF a year indicated this 
number was undoubtedly too low.80
Lacking clear guidance from Washington, American nation builders diverged 
in their approaches. American attempts at nation building in South Vietnam in 
this period can be split into three broad categories. The first category of project 
addressed itself to the central institutions of the Saigon regime. These nation 
builders took a top-down perspective, working on national plans for internal 
security forces, the training of civil servants, and the running of government min-
istries. Personnel concerned with these issues were drawn from the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (known locally as the United States Operations 
Mission, or USOM) and from a group of experts and technicians from Michigan 
State University (MSU) who operated under a contract with USOM. Diem had 
met the leader of the MSU group, Wesley Fishel, while in exile and had subse-
quently requested that Fishel head up a program of technical assistance to GVN 
ministries. The MSU group provided advice on public and police administration 
to the regime, as well as helping to run the NIA.
The MSU team’s ability to have a meaningful impact on nation build-
ing was limited both by the narrowness of its aims and the approach that it 
brought to its work. MSU team members were experts in public administra-
tion in the abstract and not Vietnam itself; furthermore, their expertise lay 
specifically in Western public administration. This led them to attempt to graft 
lessons from the United States inappropriately onto the Vietnamese context, 
as historian Jessica Elkind has shown.81 Dang, who frequently received their 
advice, complained that although their reports “were written by experts, some 
of whom had long practical administrative experience, in most cases their 
value was largely academic, because they brought out theoretical and techni-
cal problems, and lacked factual knowledge of the Vietnamese context.”82 The 
MSU team was constantly frustrated by its inability to persuade the Diem 
regime to introduce what it considered professional standards into the GVN 
civil service. Eventually, after a falling out with Fishel, Diem ejected MSU from 
the country altogether.
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The second group of Americans who worked to strengthen the Diem regime 
were CIA officials who worked with province chiefs to attempt to increase the 
efficiency and legitimacy of GVN rule. Agency personnel had a keen interest in 
what they called “political action,” the countering of the Communist movement’s 
rural apparatus and the building of support for the GVN in its place. Colby, who 
served as deputy chief and then chief of station in Saigon between 1959 and 
1962, was typically bullish about the CIA’s expertise in this area. “Uniquely in 
the American bureaucracy,” he later wrote, “the CIA understood the necessity to 
combine political, psychological, and paramilitary tools to carry out a strategic 
concept of pressure on an enemy or to strengthen an incumbent.” Colby and 
his colleagues closely studied both the deficiencies of the GVN and the organi-
zational strengths of the Communist movement and modeled their remedies 
accordingly. Colby believed that the GVN needed to copy the Communist model 
by “organizing the population into political groups, articulating a cause that 
would attract their participation and support, developing leadership and cohe-
sion at the local rural community level, etc.”83 This was in contrast to MSU, who 
focused on pushing the central regime in Saigon into economic and political 
reforms. Instead, CIA officers began to work with local South Vietnamese offi-
cials on a joint rural nation-building agenda.
Tran Ngoc Chau, a former Viet Minh battalion commander and political offi-
cer who had rallied to the anti-Communist cause, did more to influence the CIA’s 
efforts than any other individual. Born in 1924 into a mandarin family in Hue, 
Chau had joined the Viet Minh to oppose the Japanese occupation of Vietnam 
in the 1940s and then participated in the war against the French. Taken in by 
the Viet Minh’s front policy, it was only as he was promoted through the ranks 
that he came to understand—and despise—the Communist ideology that lay 
at the core of the movement. After being the subject of repeated unsuccessful 
attempts to recruit him into the Communist Party, he defected to Bao Dai’s pro-
French government in 1949. He transferred his allegiance to the GVN when it 
was created in 1955, and by the early 1960s had attained the rank of major in the 
ARVN.84
In 1962, Diem appointed Chau chief of Kien Hoa, a province in the Mekong 
Delta. Chau’s sympathetic participation in the Viet Minh had given him a largeness 
of vision that was unusual among other individuals in his class, as Americans who 
met him soon realized. Chau had seen firsthand how the Communists operated 
and how they responded to the genuine grievances of the rural population to win 
support for their movement. While he had been turned off when he realized that 
the Communists ultimately planned to establish a “dictatorship of the proletariat” 
that would abolish all property and religion—something rarely mentioned in their 
propaganda to the peasantry—he continued to see the value of their approach to 
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local mobilization and politics. He also felt sympathy and “compassion” for rural 
villagers who felt it necessary to take up arms against their own government, “peo-
ple whose duties were to provide them security and peace.” This “villager-enemy” 
was one who should be won over to the GVN’s cause rather than targeted in a 
brutal security crackdown, as the Diem regime did. “Since I always preferred to win 
over a living person than a dead one,” Chau later wrote, “my ideas basically were 
aimed at converting the enemy, thus eliminating the need to kill him.”85
To convert the enemy, Chau drew heavily on his experiences in the Viet Minh. 
His nation-building idea was based around the concept of the cadre, and what 
Stuart Methven, one of the Americans who learned from him, would later call 
“parapolitics.” In the Viet Minh and the NLF, the word “cadre” (can bo) referred 
to an operative in a revolutionary organization, not necessarily a party member. 
While cadres had different functions, Chau focused on those through whom the 
Communist movement attempted to solidify its influence among the rural popu-
lation. Mobile groups of specialist agitprop cadres toured the countryside, mak-
ing contact with sympathetic villagers and combining to orchestrate the over-
throw of the old village authorities and the installation of ones allied with the 
front. They had been instrumental in consolidating the revolutionary wave that 
swept South Vietnam in the early 1960s. Because of their temporary but decisive 
political presence, Methven referred to their activity as parapolitical, or “politi-
cal action.”86 A witness to the same methods when they had been deployed on 
behalf of the Viet Minh, Chau now hoped to replicate them for the benefit of the 
GVN. “It was, in my understanding,” he later wrote, “a revolutionary process to 
build the power from the grassroot peasants to change the colonial and mandarin 
system that most of the Vietnamese leaders, military and civilian inherited.”87
Chau set about recruiting mobile cadre teams from among the local peasantry. 
This made a stark contrast to Diem’s rural mobilization teams which were usually 
composed of moonlighting civil servants.88 Chau’s cadres formed what he called 
Census-Grievance (CG) teams. Like the NLF agitprop teams, they roamed the vil-
lages of the province, inquiring about rural grievances. Chau was adamant that the 
teams inquire about grievances caused by local GVN officials as well as the NLF, 
and in the early stages of the program about 70 percent of complaints concerned 
the Saigon regime. Chau could then use his power as province chief to address 
GVN abuses, and USOM contributed material aid in response to grievances. In 
addition, the CG teams also took a census in the villages, attempting to discover 
who was working for the NLF. A mixture of persuasion, cajolery, and attempted 
compromise would then be used to persuade them to defect to the GVN. In the 
last analysis, “counter-terror” teams could be sent to kidnap or assassinate them.89
Chau’s methods were based on an assumption that the traditional GVN 
bureaucracy would never be able to win over and mobilize the peasantry as effec-
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tively as the Communist movement did. This was a belief shared by the CIA 
officials who learned from his methods and later attempted to replicate his pro-
gram beyond Kien Hoa.90 The paradox of Chau’s position was that although he 
denigrated the GVN bureaucracy and hence constructed parapolitical structures 
to circumvent it, his influence depended on his position as province chief within 
this same bureaucracy. For the Americans, it hardly constituted a nation-build-
ing strategy to hope that similarly talented leaders amenable to American advice 
would emerge in all forty-four of South Vietnam’s provinces. As Daniel Ells-
berg, another American influenced by Chau, ruefully recalled, there were barely 
a handful of like-minded individuals across the GVN.91 Chau complained that 
“the Saigon generals ignored my success in Kien Hoa,” and without the involve-
ment of higher-ups in the GVN, the program could not be extended to other 
provinces.92 Neither did Chau possess the resources or personnel to have a deci-
sive impact even in Kien Hoa, where the Communist movement continued to 
advance. Both the replicability of Chau’s efforts and their ability to have a decisive 
impact were in doubt, and as late as 1964, the CIA’s efforts consisted of only a few 
dozen officers trying to do “something, anything” to bolster local government.93
The third group of Americans who worked toward nation-building goals in 
South Vietnam under the Diem regime were those who worked out in the villages 
in daily contact with Vietnamese peasants, often focusing on economic devel-
opment projects. The first Americans to do so on a sustained basis were those 
working for International Voluntary Services (IVS), an NGO that placed young 
Americans into development projects throughout the world. While MSU focused 
on the GVN’s central institutions, IVS volunteers—or “IVSers,” as they were 
known—lived and worked deep in the South Vietnamese countryside. Although 
the IVS presence in South Vietnam was fully funded by the U.S. government, 
many of those working for it saw their mission as separate from that of both 
the United States and the GVN. Don Luce and John Sommer, two prominent 
IVSers, were so focused on stimulating economic development for the sake of 
rural inhabitants that “even as late as 1963 and 1964 it often seemed” to them “as 
though the war itself hardly existed.” They likewise felt remote from the Diem 
regime, seeing themselves as “more observers than participants in the affairs of 
the Vietnamese government.”94 IVS personnel worked on tasks such as helping 
villagers build agricultural improvements and spreading improved seed and crop 
strains. Many IVSers did not perceive their work as political, while those who did 
were often surprised to find that their assistance and material aid rarely trans-
lated into support for either the GVN or the U.S. presence. Such small efforts 
might help individual farmers, but they did nothing to address the reality of 
systemic political and socioeconomic repression that fueled resentment of the 
GVN and support for the NLF.95
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After the 1962 arrival of Fraleigh and Phillips, USOM itself began to develop 
an official network of American representatives that would match and eventually 
exceed the reach of the IVSers. Prior to that year, USOM had run a “traditional” 
economic aid mission that focused on advising central political and economic 
policy-making institutions in Saigon, much like MSU. Even though the local gov-
ernments that actually had contact with the rural population seemed to be the 
GVN’s weakest link, USOM officials resisted involvement in the provinces. As for 
the guerrilla crisis, they believed that was best left to the military.96 Instead, Fra-
leigh and Phillips pushed for the permanent deployment of American representa-
tives in each province of South Vietnam, where they could act as conduits for U.S. 
influence over province chiefs. Although Diem had previously been opposed to 
having American representatives influencing civil government in the provinces, 
the deepening guerrilla crisis eased his reservations. Diem was also reassured by 
his trust in Phillips, whom he had met when the latter was deployed in Saigon as 
a military adviser in 1954.97 Phillips and Fraleigh’s efforts amounted to a revolu-
tion in the way USOM operated. When the pair arrived in Saigon, USOM had 120 
employees, and only 3 were stationed outside the capital. They set about recruiting 
a new breed of provincial representatives who would act as American eyes and 
ears in the provinces, as well as providing advice to province chiefs on matters 
of civil government. Unable to elicit any volunteers from within USOM, Phillips 
and Fraleigh recruited a diverse bunch of Americans from outside the agency. The 
group included former military officers, personnel from other American agencies, 
and Peace Corps volunteers who had served in other countries. The first provin-
cial representative was a former IVS volunteer who was dispatched to Phu Yen, a 
province on the central coast, in September 1962. Another early recruit was David 
Hudson, an NBC stringer who fancied his hand at rural reform. Duly hired, he was 
dispatched to the southern tip of the delta, a redoubtable NLF stronghold.98 Some 
of the Americans who worked in the program would later go on to storied careers 
in the executive branch of the U.S. government, including Richard Holbrooke, 
John Negroponte, Hamilton Jordan, and Anthony Lake.
The new organization was known as the Office of Rural Affairs, and it even-
tually grew to have a representative in every province. Unlike the CIA, whose 
cadre program attempted to emulate the Communist movement’s focus on pro-
paganda motivation, the Office of Rural Affairs focused on the provision of social 
and economic benefits to the rural population. But while USOM had tradition-
ally operated by attempting to influence the GVN in Saigon, Phillips and Fraleigh 
believed that “the best plans in the world dreamed up in Saigon or Washington, 
won’t mean a thing unless they really reach the rural population.” After gain-
ing the trust of the province chief to whom they were accredited, the represen-
tatives were supposed to influence him to explore the “felt needs” of the rural 
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population and then respond to them. Ideally there should be a “two-way street,” 
with top-down projects such as the Strategic Hamlet Program and agricultural 
improvements being imposed from above, and suggestions for “hamlet self-help 
projects” being passed up from below. A special fund, which could be signed off 
at province level without reference to the interminable bureaucracy in Saigon, 
was set up. The aim was to decentralize the power and resources needed to carry 
out local development projects. As the Provincial Representatives Guide put it, 
the “hamlet people must and can be convinced by your quick action that their 
government has become responsive to their needs.”99
While the CIA effort was based on a specific doctrine and idea of the role 
of Americans in supporting GVN officials who were particularly insightful and 
energetic in battling the insurgency, Fraleigh and Phillips built their effort on 
what they referred to as the American “ ‘Can Do’ spirit.” Rather than being dis-
patched with detailed instructions on what they were supposed to accomplish, 
the Office of Rural Affairs representatives were exhorted to use their “dedication, 
common sense and imagination” to improve the lot of the rural population.100 
Fraleigh explicitly modeled what he wanted in a recruit on the young “BA gener-
alists” favored by the Peace Corps, which he would later claim to have had a hand 
in founding.101 The focus of the representatives was overwhelmingly on fulfill-
ing the perceived material needs of the population; indeed, it is as a provider of 
“barbed wire and other materiel for community efforts” that Colby remembers 
the Office of Rural Affairs in his memoirs.102 Representatives could act as a con-
duit to the central GVN and USOM agencies in Saigon, expediting the delivery of 
agricultural inputs, technical advice, and aid with schools and dispensaries. With 
this material backstop, they were exhorted to “feel proud of yourselves as Ameri-
cans” and “make the seemingly impossible work successfully.”103 This early group 
of young and idealistic representatives became known as “the Tigers” because 
of Fraleigh’s stock motivational phrase: “You can do it, Tiger!”104 Through this 
combination of American élan and materialism, the Office of Rural Affairs aimed 
to make the GVN’s local organs a match for those of the NLF.
Although USOM’s provincial representatives had a broad remit to attempt 
to make provincial government both more effective and more legitimate, like 
the IVSers before them they had little ability to alter the fundamental dynamic 
between it and the rural population. The Communist movement’s success did 
not derive simply from the provision of material benefits to the villagers. Instead, 
it had a political strategy to win them over, and offered them opportunities to 
achieve their own local aims as part of the movement. It cultivated local leaders 
and promoted peasants into positions of responsibility. Increasing the material 
resources available to GVN province chiefs could not alter the fact that they con-
tinued to treat the peasants as objects rather than subjects of governance. Most 
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FIGURE 3: Children gather at a market built with the help of USAID. Villagers 
might appreciate such projects, but they delivered few long-term political 
benefits to the GVN.
National Archives identifier 541851, Miscellaneous Vietnam Photographs, Record Group 306, National Archives 
II at College Park, Maryland.
province chiefs were field-grade ARVN officers who were unlikely to change their 
behavior or views simply because an enthusiastic young American came into 
their orbit. Even when USOM representatives were successful in prodding GVN 
officials to carry out limited economic development projects, their involvement 
was unlikely to change the basic structure of relations between the GVN and the 
peasantry. Nor were the Tigers in a particularly good position to assess the impact 
of their own efforts. Although some of them stayed in one province for years 
and came to know it well, in general they were recruited and dispatched without 
any specialized knowledge of South Vietnamese history, governance, or politics. 
As we shall see when we turn to consider the experiences of CORDS advisers in 
subsequent chapters, this severely handicapped their ability to make a meaning-
ful contribution to nation building. And like their counterparts in the CIA, what 
exactly the USOM representatives could accomplish was ultimately determined 
by the province chief to whom they were accredited.
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This problem of comprehending and influencing rural society would bedevil 
American nation builders for the entire conflict. Americans who considered 
the position of the rural peasant during the Diem years frequently came to the 
 conclusion that, as one put it, “lack of rapport between him and the central gov-
ernment” was the crucial problem facing the country. The solution, they believed, 
was to “strengthen the political and administrative bases of the government.”105 Yet 
few Americans in South Vietnam had the language skills or understanding of rural 
South Vietnam to be able to accurately observe how “strong” these “bases” were, 
let alone to strengthen them. In 1959, only 9 of the 1,040 Americans working for 
government agencies in the country could speak Vietnamese.106 Despite an ever-
growing number of military advisers, the United States lacked its own network of 
agents who understood South Vietnamese rural society. As a result, U.S. officials 
complained that all they knew was “what the government of Vietnam knew that we 
wanted [to know].”107 John Vann put it more colorfully to an American visitor in 
1962: “Hell, I don’t even know what is going on across the river at night.”108 Ameri-
can officials hence complained of a “shadow of uneasiness” when they turned their 
thoughts to popular attitudes toward the GVN, conceding that it was “difficult, if 
not impossible, to assess how the villagers really feel.”109 A CIA report on the atti-
tudes of peasants in fifteen provinces was unable to establish much beyond their 
hatred of province, district, and village officials.110 Washington officials reported 
not finding field reports on the topic “particularly informative or encouraging.”111
American observers had initially been hopeful that the Saigon regime might 
make a concerted effort to gather support in the villages and construct a genuine 
mass basis for the regime. But they soon concluded that the Ngo brothers only 
intended to use their parties and fronts as instruments of control, not to widen 
political participation. As career advancement and even survival became depen-
dent on joining the Can Lao, it became clear that it and similar organizations 
were “actually formed by coercion—that is, people join because they are afraid 
not to—rather than being genuine organizations rooted in the hearts of the Viet-
namese people.”112 Even worse, heavy-handed, top-down schemes like the Stra-
tegic Hamlet Program failed to achieve political mobilization for the GVN or to 
bind the population into ties of mutual obligation with the regime. In fact, they 
were mainly successful at mobilizing support for the NLF, driving more peasants 
into the arms of the front than they suppressed.113 Rural communities had been 
given little reason to identify their interests with a regime composed of colonial 
holdovers and Diemist parvenus, and Saigon’s attempt to reshape rural society in 
its own interests had paid little heed to the desires of the peasantry.
This points to yet another problem in early U.S. efforts: it required the 
resources and active interest of the central government in Saigon to carry out 
such a sustained nation-building effort across South Vietnam. There was only 
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so much that province chiefs or other local figures could do on their own with-
out national support. The situation became even more dire after the overthrow 
of Diem. Local officials and their schemes were subject to the capriciousness 
of national politics, as there was always a risk that each new junta would feel 
the need to appoint its own loyalists to positions in local government. A case 
in point was the Force Populaire, an extensive cadre program run by Diem’s 
brother in northern South Vietnam, which was summarily disbanded after the 
1963 coup and the Ngo family’s fall from grace.114 Parapolitical efforts such as 
those of Chau could look suspiciously like attempts to build local power bases 
when viewed from Saigon. Indeed, the frequent turnover in Saigon did encour-
age the emergence of such bases. Given the weak institutional basis of the Saigon 
regime, local politics in South Vietnam were prone to warlordism, as they had 
been throughout Vietnamese history. After the 1963 coup, the four command-
ers of South Vietnam’s military regions—known as corps commanders—took 
over responsibility for civil government as well as military matters within their 
area. This included the hiring and firing of province chiefs, giving them the abil-
ity to build up local fiefdoms that were generally free from central oversight.115 
Centrifugal tendencies made it even more difficult to construct a nationwide 
effort to reform local governance. Colonel Robert M. Montague, a key figure in 
the creation of CORDS, castigated the resultant “44 separate province wars” as 
“ridiculous” because “you didn’t have the leadership down at the province; you 
didn’t have the resources to go around; and the enemy could have defeated you 
piecemeal, because he was operating under a centralized strategy.”116
Diem, who remained a hardheaded nationalist even as his own government’s 
incapacity to deal with its problems became clear, refused the deep collaboration 
with the Americans that would have been necessary to create such a central-
ized strategy. To do so would necessarily have increased the influence of the for-
eigners over the GVN, diminishing its claim to independence and validating the 
Communist propaganda that labeled him “My-Diem”—American Diem. Those 
Americans who managed to influence Diem the most were ones who developed 
a personal connection with him, such as Fishel and Phillips. But much like the 
CIA’s relationship with Chau, theirs were temporary and partial arrangements 
that never managed to change the fundamental dynamic of the GVN’s relations 
with its rural citizens or to provide an effective counterpoint to Communist rural 
mobilization. After Diem’s overthrow and murder in 1963, the GVN collapsed 
into even greater chaos as the civil service was purged of his loyalists and a suc-
cession of coups rocked Saigon. Under these difficult circumstances, the John-
son administration set out to reorganize America’s nation-building machinery 
in South Vietnam in search of an effective and centralized strategy that might 
change the dynamics of the conflict.
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THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION  
AND NATION BUILDING
Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency just three weeks after Diem’s overthrow 
in November 1963. He could hardly have been more different from the man 
he replaced. Whereas John F. Kennedy had oozed youthful, even naïve, opti-
mism about America’s capacity to do good through an activist role in the world, 
Johnson’s priorities were domestic. He pursued the most ambitious legislative 
program since Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, advancing civil rights, federal aid 
to education, and health-care programs for older and poor Americans. Despite 
his desire to stay focused on this domestic agenda, which was dubbed the Great 
Society, Johnson was tormented by the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Faced 
with a choice between allowing the collapse of South Vietnam and paying a steep 
political price at home or risking becoming mired in an unwinnable conflict that 
would undermine his domestic agenda, Johnson chose the latter.1
Johnson came eventually to leave a heavy imprint on U.S. nation-building 
efforts in South Vietnam. But his appreciation of the importance of the GVN 
developing strong and legitimate institutions developed only slowly over time. 
He also came to realize that nation building enabled him to frame the war at 
least in part as a constructive, positive activity—one in which the United States 
would strive, as he told his aides, “to build as well as to destroy.”2 Although some 
critics have argued that Johnson interfered with the war effort by attempt-
ing to export his Great Society domestic programs to Vietnam, it was in fact 
an inescapable part of U.S. strategy to focus on the GVN’s relationship with 
its rural population.3 As the war ramped up in the period 1963–1966, Johnson 
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and his aides orchestrated a nation-building escalation alongside the military 
buildup. Although the president had initially pictured the nation-building effort 
as focused on meeting the material needs of the Vietnamese poor, he and his close 
aide Robert Komer eventually came to focus on what the French had dubbed 
pacification—the spreading of GVN control and coercive power across as much 
of the South Vietnamese countryside as possible. It was this agenda that led to 
the decision by the administration to create CORDS in May 1967, setting the 
stage for a unified and comprehensive nation-building effort for the remainder 
of the time that American forces were in South Vietnam.
Embracing the “Do-Gooders”
When Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963, he was by no means an 
ardent crusader for increased U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of South Viet-
nam. At the first meeting Johnson held on Vietnam, Defense Secretary Robert McNa-
mara brought up the topic of economic aid to South Vietnam. Johnson said that he 
supported aid, “but at the same time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he 
did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. . . . He was anxious 
to get along, win the war—he didn’t want as much effort placed on so-called social 
reforms.” CIA director John McCone noted afterward that he detected a “President 
Johnson tone” that contrasted with the “Kennedy tone” in that the new president had 
“very little tolerance with our spending so much time being ‘do-gooders.’ ”4 McNa-
mara came away with the same impression.5 Johnson believed the coup against Diem 
had been an example of unwise U.S. meddling in South Vietnam, and instead wished 
to focus on taking action against North Vietnam. His first significant policy initiative 
was to order stepped-up covert action against the North.6
Johnson’s concern about the post-Diem situation in South Vietnam was well 
placed. After the November coup, Saigon entered an era of profound political 
instability that would not come to an end for nearly two years. Coup and coun-
tercoup were launched by various factions in Saigon, each distinguished not by 
its nation-building vision but by its plan to divvy up the spoils of office to its 
followers. Lacking any central impetus, rural nation-building efforts remained 
marginal or nonexistent. Meanwhile, the U.S. military effort to seek a partner for 
nation building in the GVN’s central institutions was providing little relief. In 
1964, the U.S. military command prodded the GVN to adopt a military pacifica-
tion plan called Hop Tac, aiming at reasserting a GVN presence in the provinces 
around Saigon. It is illustrative of the disjointed efforts of the U.S. agencies in 
South Vietnam, and the limitation of their efforts to areas where they happened 
to find talented South Vietnamese partners, that Kien Hoa, the scene of the CIA’s 
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most promising effort, was not viewed by Westmoreland or by the ARVN as a 
priority province at that time.7
The Hop Tac campaign itself achieved results that can be described as minimal 
at best, and which in turn showed the ARVN’s unsuitability as a nation-build-
ing partner at this time. ARVN generals remained absorbed in Saigon politics, 
an obsession that both fueled and was a by-product of the repeated coups that 
occurred throughout 1964. At least one Hop Tac mission was aborted only for 
the forces assigned to it to next be spotted back in Saigon participating in a coup.8 
Most Vietnamese military commanders considered the campaign to be American 
in conception and hence showed little interest in making a success of it, exposing 
the limits of American influence. The commanders of the units involved in Hop 
Tac saw few benefits in risking the wrath of their superiors by incurring casual-
ties in pursuit of a cause that was valued by the Americans but of little apparent 
interest to any of the rotating cast of generals sitting in the Presidential Palace 
in Saigon. In November 1964, the director of the U.S. office supporting Hop 
Tac reported frustration at “the general lack of motivation and drive” shown by 
ARVN officers who saw the war as “a way of life rather than something to finish 
off quickly.” Because the slow progress of the program was determined by the 
national political situation and the general attitude of ARVN officers, factors the 
United States did not have sufficient leverage to alter, a “marked increase in [the] 
rate of progress” was believed “beyond the control of the U.S. unilaterally.”9
Meanwhile, the overthrow of Diem led to a decisive shift in policy in Hanoi. 
In early 1964, the Communist Party adopted Resolution 9, which shifted North 
Vietnam from a posture of assistance and aid to southern revolutionaries to one 
of a full-out push for victory. The NLF, which by now had mobilized substantial 
military might, began driving ARVN forces out of large areas of the countryside. 
A far greater number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) advisers arrived to pro-
fessionalize the guerrillas, along with draftees to buttress their numbers. In late 
1964, Hanoi decided to deploy and maintain multiple NVA regiments in South 
Vietnam for the first time. By the time they entered combat at the end of the year, 
the Communist movement had already established a “liberated zone” stretching 
from the Central Highlands down to the northwestern reaches of Saigon. About 
half of both the population and territory of South Vietnam were under some form 
of Communist control.10 “Throughout the countryside, we moved to consolidate 
our control in liberated areas and accelerate the establishment of NLF govern-
mental entities in disputed regions,” an NLF guerrilla later wrote. “The object of 
this effort was not to take land, but to create a strong and continuous NLF admin-
istrative presence, which villagers would accept as their valid government.”11
As the Communists consolidated their own administration, minds were 
focused in Washington on the weakness of their ally in Saigon. For Johnson, 
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this included a quick realization that “getting along and winning the war” was 
inseparable from addressing the perennial ineffectiveness of the GVN. Doing so 
did not require remaking it in America’s own image, but it certainly seemed to 
require doing something. “From all that I have heard,” Johnson cabled Saigon in 
January 1964, “I could not be more in agreement that political energy is at the 
center of the government’s problem in South Vietnam.”12 Again later that year he 
reemphasized “the importance of economic and political actions having imme-
diate impact in South Vietnam,” which was “governed by a prevailing judgment 
that the first order of business at present is to take actions which will help to 
strengthen the fabric of the Government of South Vietnam.”13
What exactly to do was less clear. The period between the fall of Diem and 
the final decision to dispatch U.S. combat forces in 1965 was characterized by 
a growing frustration with the state of drift in South Vietnam and the inability 
of U.S.-based officials to influence the situation.14 Their counterparts in South 
Vietnam pointed out in response that there was little they could do unilater-
ally under present conditions to change the marginal character of their efforts.15 
Frustrated and facing increasingly bold Communist attacks on American instal-
lations in South Vietnam, Johnson returned to his starting place: attacking the 
North. From February 1965, the U.S. launched air strikes in North Vietnam. As 
well as deterring attacks against American assets, the aerial campaign had the 
goal of strengthening the morale of a GVN by finally taking the war to the North. 
But such a psychological fillip could go only so far, especially if it provoked Hanoi 
into greater escalation in the South in response.16 Increasingly on the brink of 
military collapse and further than ever from being a viable nation-state, South 
Vietnam needed radical American intervention if it were to be saved.
From the middle of 1965, Johnson directed just such an intervention. Along-
side the military escalation that began with Marines splashing ashore at Da Nang, 
he also launched an escalation of rhetoric and action aimed at reforming the 
GVN. Johnson’s initial thinking on the issue was closest to the materialist and 
developmentalist USOM view, and this affected how he approached the problem. 
In a famous speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965, Johnson made 
clear that he considered economic and social development in South Vietnam 
a necessity on par with the war effort. “In areas that are still ripped by conflict, 
of course development will not be easy,” he declared. “Peace will be necessary 
for final success. But we cannot and must not wait for peace to begin the job.”17 
This was in contrast to an earlier draft of the speech that he had rejected, which 
relegated development to a task that would follow the war.18 The Johns Hopkins 
speech has often been dismissed as rhetoric, given its call for large-scale develop-
ment projects—such as constructing a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) on the 
Mekong—which were incompatible with the escalation in the war that Johnson 
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND NATION BUILDING      53
was about to launch. Its claims were indeed fanciful. But it ought to be seen 
as one component of a broader nation-building push by the president and his 
subordinates. This push would eventually give birth to CORDS, which would 
have a much greater influence on the war than the stillborn idea of a TVA on the 
Mekong.
But in the chaotic conditions of mid-1965, neither the Americans nor the 
GVN was in the position to launch a nation-building push in any realm beyond 
that of rhetoric. In May, Johnson asked National Security Adviser McGeorge 
Bundy if there was “anything we can do with land reform at all.” “Yeah, we can do 
land reform, but we can’t do it until the government will say it,” Bundy replied. 
“And . . . the government’s goddamn busy doing other things.”19 The Americans 
were busy too, and they had few concrete ideas about nation building anyway. 
The debate over nation building at this time took place at a high level of abstrac-
tion without being enriched by detailed knowledge of the actual situation in 
South Vietnam, much as it had under the Kennedy administration. While John-
son stressed the importance of social and economic measures to improve the 
lives of South Vietnamese peasants, his advisers stressed alternative—but equally 
broad-brush—approaches. McNamara, Bundy, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
all agreed in September that it was necessary to stress “pacification,” using the old 
French colonial term for establishing governmental control of the rural areas. As 
McNamara explained, this primarily meant helping the GVN develop an effec-
tive internal security apparatus: “You can’t win it [the war] with American troops 
going out after Viet Cong terrorists—it just isn’t going to be done that way.”20 
U.S. proposals for pacification had in the past focused on the need to control the 
population through police measures, not by providing them with material goods 
or winning their active participation against the Communist movement.21 Frank 
Scotton, an architect of the early cadre programs who visited Washington on 
leave from Vietnam around this time, remembered that “when I raised the need 
for political development from the ground up, eyes glazed.” The priority now, 
he was told, was “stability at the top.”22 The Communist offensive of 1964–1965 
had some administration principals wondering if it was premature to worry 
about anything but how U.S. divisions were faring in battle. Writing to Johnson 
in December, Bundy admitted: “We do not have a complete and fully developed 
political, economic and social program to match the major new military deploy-
ments proposed for 1966.” Such a program could be developed in the fullness of 
time, he continued, “but we have to understand that unless and until there can 
be military victories, this program is irrelevant.”23 This was a stark but accurate 
assessment of priorities in wartime Washington in 1965.
As Johnson pressed for more focus on his “development” agenda, he was ill 
served by the bureaucratic system he had established for running the war. The 
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main forum for the discussion of wartime strategic issues in the Johnson admin-
istration was the “Tuesday lunchtime” meeting of Johnson and his senior advis-
ers. In keeping with the president’s informal but demanding style, the meetings 
usually took place without the preparation of either a detailed agenda or minutes. 
The principals present were bound by the fierce loyalty that Johnson demanded 
of his subordinates to follow the path set out at the meeting, but their own sub-
ordinates were often in the dark about what had even been discussed. Conversely, 
the scope of views expressed at the meetings was strictly limited by their secre-
tive and tight-knit nature. Johnson discouraged dissent, and he did not provide 
a forum for the discussion of detailed policy papers prepared lower down in the 
bureaucracy, as President Nixon’s National Security Council system would later 
do. Management of the war was also hampered by the fact that throughout 1965, 
there was no individual in Washington above the rank of colonel (or its civilian 
equivalent, GS-15) who was working full time on the issue of Vietnam.24
In this system, nation building was a bureaucratic orphan. The regular attend-
ees at Tuesday lunchtime were Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, CIA Director 
William Raborn (succeeded by Richard Helms), and the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Earle Wheeler.25 USAID, which was overseeing Phillips and Fra-
leigh’s fast-expanding provincial advisory network, was unrepresented at the 
meeting. And while the CIA had assets in Vietnam that were working on the task 
of strengthening the GVN, under Johnson the agency was relegated to the role of 
a provider of intelligence rather than shaper of policy. Helms recalled that there 
was “no occasion in all the meetings I attended with him” that Johnson asked for 
his opinion on policy.26 The relatively small size of both CIA and USOM assets 
in South Vietnam made it difficult for them to contribute to a policy discussion 
that was dominated by military voices. As the military had come to dominate the 
American presence in South Vietnam, McNamara was Johnson’s most important 
adviser on the war. But McNamara was consumed by the military effort, and to 
a lesser extent by “pacification.” Both USOM and CIA personnel who got the 
opportunity to brief McNamara about their own nation-building approaches 
found him unresponsive and uninterested in following up.27
With other administration principals uninterested, the president was a key 
catalyst in pressing the national security bureaucracy to focus on nation building. 
Even if his own idea of “development” was a diffuse and unfocused starting point 
for a discussion of nation building, he continued to press the issue. The very day 
after Bundy sent his pessimistic memo about the “irrelevance” of such efforts, 
Johnson was again telling his aides that he demanded “more non-military action/
leadership of more senior rank and energy.”28 This presidential predisposition 
would soon be encouraged by Johnson’s political needs to shift the domestic 
debate over the war onto more positive ground. Combined with the emergence 
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of new and more stable leadership in the GVN, the ground was set for the cre-
ation of a comprehensive U.S. nation-building effort in South Vietnam.
The GVN and the Honolulu Conference
“On Thursday, February 4 [1966] I left the White House area for my first lei-
surely lunch in many weeks,” recalled Chester Cooper, one of Bundy’s deputies. 
“I returned to the West Basement at about 2:30 to find Bundy desperately try-
ing to reach me.” A summit between the American and South Vietnamese heads 
of government—the first time these two figures would meet—had been hastily 
called in the time it took Cooper to have lunch. It would begin just two days later. 
Cooper worked furiously to patch together a quick agenda for the meeting and 
reserve the required hotel rooms in Honolulu, which was at the height of tour-
ist season. It was only late in the day that it occurred to one of the Americans to 
inform the South Vietnamese ambassador of what was about to take place. When 
they decided to invite him to travel with the presidential party at the last minute 
on Saturday morning, the ambassador “raced madly from his home in Chevy 
Chase to Andrews Field and barely made the plane.”29
Despite its significance for the war, the Honolulu conference emerged in this 
chaotic fashion because it was conceived as little more than a short-term political 
expedient for Johnson. In early 1966, he was facing mounting domestic criticism 
of his war strategy. A Christmas pause in the bombing of North Vietnam and 
a related “peace offensive” had generated no results, leaving the administration 
red-faced as it resumed bombing. On February 3, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee announced it would hold televised hearings into the war, promising 
many news cycles of discomfort for the administration. Trying to find a way to 
divert media attention with a dramatic gesture, Johnson telephoned Rusk and 
suggested that the American and South Vietnamese presidents meet for the first 
time at Honolulu.30 When Daniel Inouye, a senator from Hawaii and member 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked to attend the conference, Johnson 
rejected his request and declared that the meeting was only being held anyway 
because of the committee and its “goddamned report” on the war.31 Cooper’s 
lunch was interrupted shortly afterward.
Given how little preparation the American side made for the conference, it is 
unsurprising that during it they continued to talk about the need to strengthen 
the GVN in the same abstract and vague terms they had used so far. Henry 
Cabot Lodge Jr., the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, spoke of an “economic 
and social revolution, in freedom,” while Johnson spoke of “better methods for 
developing a democracy.” The president warned both the Americans and the 
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Vietnamese present that he would demand to see progress on these amorphous 
goals by the time of the next summit, including wanting to know “how have 
you built democracy in the rural areas? How much of it have you built, when 
and where?” The bizarre demand to quantify democracy was in keeping with 
an abstract American discourse on South Vietnam that did not engage seriously 
with either the inherited problems of the GVN or the roots of the NLF’s appeal 
in the rural areas. Nor did the conference address the thorny problem of how to 
bring together the different approaches taken by the various agencies in South 
Vietnam, which were as divided and fragmented in their efforts as ever.32
However, the conference came at a particularly opportune time for the GVN, 
even if—given the meeting’s origins in American political machinations—this 
was purely by chance. The U.S. military escalation ordered by Johnson from mid-
1965 had finally brought an end to the revolving-door coups that had character-
ized GVN politics since the fall of Diem. In June 1965, a new junta had seized 
power, headed by Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen 
Van Thieu. The two men could hardly have been more different. Ky, initially the 
dominant figure in the twosome, was not yet thirty-five years old. Flamboyant 
and impulsive, Ky, with his signature lavender flying scarf and ivory-handled 
pistol, was instantly recognizable. He had served for several years as commander 
of South Vietnam’s air force, a politically sensitive position given its potential to 
swing the balance in the frequent coups that beset the capital. One of the first 
pilots to fly covert missions against North Vietnam, Ky still managed to get air-
borne every day by commuting the two miles to his office by helicopter. Politically 
naïve and hence malleable in the hands of the more experienced, he worked hard 
to cultivate a daredevil public image. His efforts were aided by his glamorous wife 
Dang Thi Tuet Mai, an air stewardess who was nicknamed Miss Air Vietnam and 
was reported to be just as handy with an ivory-handled revolver as her husband.33 
Thieu was older than Ky at forty-two years, was “married to Nguyen Thi Mai 
Anh, a shy and modest housewife,” and was a much more cautious speaker and 
political operator. He had risen through some of the most prestigious combatant 
commands in the ARVN and cultivated a network of support in the lower and 
middle ranks during a long stint as superintendent of the Dalat military academy 
after South Vietnamese independence.34 Considered by other personalities in the 
GVN as more conservative and less dynamic than Ky, Thieu, with his methodical 
style, would eventually eclipse his partner and rival.35
When Ky and Thieu first emerged at the forefront of the South Vietnamese 
regime, many Americans regarded them as “absolutely the bottom of the bar-
rel.”36 Vietnamese observers were skeptical too. Bui Diem, who served Ky some-
what skeptically as an aide, reported that a common joke held that if Ky and 
Thieu were put in a blender, then “what came out would be a good deal better for 
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FIGURE 4. The Honolulu Conference. Seated around the table clockwise from 
right foreground: Nguyen Cao Ky, Robert McNamara, Nguyen Van Thieu, and 
Lyndon Johnson.
National Archives identifier 192497, Johnson White House Photographs, White House Photo Office Collection, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
the country than what went in.”37 The two ruled through a directorate of gener-
als. In a further example of Saigon’s aping of the techniques that had allowed 
the Vietnamese Communist movement to become so successful, Ky created an 
Armed Forces Council with sixteen hundred members down to the rank of colo-
nel. The idea, Ky claimed, was to allow ideas to flow upward from those closest 
to the impact of decisions, much like the Communist movement’s structure. Ky 
privately referred to the directorate as the “politburo,” and boasted that it was 
“similar to that of the Communist party, which had proven remarkably durable.” 
However, in deference to staunchly anti-Communist colleagues, he referred to it 
as his “politburo” only in private.38 Apart from this organizational innovation, 
coming to power just as the United States began its military escalation also had 
distinct advantages for the new regime. American officials had made clear their 
displeasure at Saigon’s repeated coups in recent years, but only now did they have 
the political leverage to discourage them. As the influx of American forces began 
to blunt the effect of the Communist offensive in mid- and late 1965, the political 
situation in Saigon also stabilized. There would never again be a coup against the 
regime’s leadership.
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By committing the United States so publicly to the regime of Thieu and Ky, 
the Honolulu Conference was instrumental in this political stabilization. The two 
were exhilarated to be summoned at such short notice to receive the American 
stamp of approval—unsurprisingly, given how effectively this reinforced their 
domestic authority. They and other members of the GVN delegation made sure 
they told the Americans what they wanted to hear, even when it became clear how 
detached from the realities of South Vietnam some Washington-bound Ameri-
cans were. Ky “thought it strange” when Johnson pressed the GVN to put NLF 
defectors on the radio to denounce the movement, and when he suggested they 
“develop better contacts with the communists to gain increased understanding 
of the movement.” As Ky knew but declined to explain to the president, “few Viet-
namese, and fewer Vietcong, owned radios.” Nor did Ky, whose father-in-law had 
been assassinated by the Communists, feel that he needed a lecture on under-
standing the movement. Nevertheless, he nodded along with the president.39 
Meanwhile, other GVN representatives made a host of highly specific promises, 
including building 913 kilometers of roads, encouraging village handicrafts, and 
promoting rural electrification.40 These were expertly tailored to appeal to John-
son’s desire to focus on rural “development” and show a benign side of the war to 
the American people, even if they bore little relation to the capabilities and inten-
tions of the GVN in the rural areas. As Ky later wrote, the conference showed that 
the GVN and American “views of the world were quite different,” a point echoed 
by Bui Diem.41 Outside critics were also quick to point out that little would result 
from the conference. Dismissing the high-sounding words about reform spoken 
at Honolulu as nothing but a smokescreen, the NLF issued a statement noting 
how the United States had “summoned their servants in Saigon” for a “farce of a 
conference” aimed only at “further intensification and expansion of their aggres-
sion in South Vietnam.”42 The veteran French journalist Bernard Fall likewise 
predicted that the promises made at Honolulu would amount to little.43
More consequential was the communiqué issued by both parties at the end 
of the conference, which committed the junta to eventually promulgating a new 
constitution and instating civilian rule in Saigon. How seriously the South Viet-
namese leadership took this commitment is unclear. Bui Diem, whose skepti-
cism of working for Ky was partly fueled by his own desire for a return to civil-
ian rule, was delighted to find both Ky and Thieu “too euphoric” about dealing 
with the president of the United Sates as equals at an international summit to 
worry too much about the specifics.44 Although no timeline was provided for 
this transition—something the duo would have been unlikely to agree to—this 
represented a black-and-white commitment that both Americans and South 
Vietnamese could hold the regime to. In the short term, the disconnect between 
abstract American demands for “democracy” and “social revolution” and the 
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GVN’s intentions meant the conference had virtually no impact on the GVN’s 
activities in the rural areas. But in the long term, the regime was now committed 
to an activist agenda that would gradually—whether they liked it or not—take 
concrete form.
Robert Komer and the Origins  
of CORDS, 1966–1967
In early 1966, Robert Komer was a deputy to Bundy on the staff of the National 
Security Council (NSC). Born in 1922, Komer had escaped what he seems to 
have considered an uninspiring future in Saint Louis by means of a scholarship 
to Harvard, where he completed undergraduate studies and an MBA. Along the 
way he was drafted, entering the war in Europe as a private assigned to write 
operational histories of the war in the Mediterranean theater. In January 1944, 
he was stranded on the Allied beachhead at Anzio in Italy, enduring months of 
heavy bombardment before a successful breakout. Rising steadily through the 
ranks, Captain Komer was discharged after the war and entered the employ of 
the newly formed CIA in 1947. As a midwesterner of modest means in the patri-
cian and refined environment of the early CIA, Komer relied on intellect and 
brashness in equal measure, much as he had in the similar social environment 
at Harvard. Throughout his career, he proved adept at cultivating his politically 
and socially better-connected mentors. His success as an intelligence analyst led 
to his being assigned as the CIA’s liaison to the NSC, and at the start of the Ken-
nedy administration he was asked to join its staff full time. Here he came to know 
Johnson, who recognized him as an able and reliable subordinate. For his part, 
Komer showed the same affection and fierce loyalty to Johnson as he had to the 
other mentors who had catapulted him from the banks of the Mississippi to the 
heart of American policy making.45
After the Honolulu Conference, when Johnson wanted to appoint an aide to 
drive progress on the ambitious agenda agreed there, he turned to Komer. The 
president was not picking Komer because of his expertise or enthusiasm for the 
war. Komer was—in his own words—a “tabula rasa on Viet Nam,” and he had 
discouraged more junior colleagues from getting their careers entangled in what 
he saw as a distraction for the United States.46 Rather, Johnson valued Komer’s 
loyalty and reputation as a brash expediter, the latter of which earned him the 
nickname “the Blowtorch.” In the aftermath of Honolulu, Johnson continued to 
conceive of nation building in South Vietnam as primarily involving economic 
development that would win the allegiance of the rural population through 
addressing their material needs. He told Komer that henceforth he would be in 
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charge of “the other war . . . a war to build as well as destroy.” Komer was told to 
focus on “generating a massive effort to do more for the people of South Viet-
nam, particularly the farmers in the rural areas.”47 Komer recalled that Johnson 
continued to see this “other war” as “largely being a sort of building of TVA 
[Tennessee Valley Authority] and REA [Rural Electrification Administration],” 
transplanting his knowledge of large-scale American development initiatives to 
Vietnam.48
Johnson had a rhetorical preference for these “high modernist” development 
schemes that promised sweeping transformations through centralized plans.49 
But despite the president’s focus, U.S. personnel on the ground continued to 
favor decentralized approaches that sought incremental change through alliances 
with province chiefs and village communities.50 The fragmentation and decen-
tralization of resources still prevalent among U.S. civilian agencies in South Viet-
nam made any other approach impossible. Lacking high-level relationships with 
members of the new junta in Saigon and eclipsed many times over in resources 
by the growing American military machine, the efforts of the civilian agencies 
seemed more marginal than ever. American civilians also seemed out of touch 
with the war effort and unsure of the relationship between the military effort and 
their own activities. In January 1966, U.S. officials from the agencies interested in 
nation building had reached a consensus that it would take “several years’ more 
fighting at least on the current scale before the GVN will be in a position to exer-
cise effective control over substantially all of South Viet-Nam except over Viet 
Cong base areas.” But even Ky had recently told McNamara that he expected to 
control no more than 50 percent of the country’s population in two years’ time.51 
U.S. nation builders in South Vietnam were as far as ever from a comprehensive 
and coordinated plan to strengthen the GVN and come to grips with the NLF’s 
hold on the countryside. Richard Holbrooke, who joined Komer’s staff in the 
White House, reported as late as February 1967 that a visitor to South Vietnam 
could “visit ten provinces and you will get as many concepts and methods for 
pacification; not field expedients being tested but just different concepts about 
what the program is about.”52
Komer pronounced the situation to be “a mess!” and pledged to bring “order 
out of chaos.”53 Komer later said that the nonmilitary aspects of U.S. involve-
ment in South Vietnam—what was then called “the other war”—had “never 
really been satisfactorily defined.” “So I worked up my own definition,” he 
recalled. “After all, nobody else knew what it was either.”54 His lack of back-
ground knowledge does not seem to have overly perturbed him. Instead, the 
Harvard MBA focused on what he later called the “fascinating” issues of bureau-
cratic management involved.55 As for the intrinsic problems of nation build-
ing in South Vietnam, Komer “borrowed liberally from the people and studies 
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which impressed me.”56 These included Sir Robert Thompson and Victor Kru-
lak, the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. But Komer’s 
desire for quick results, reliance on others for policy ideas, and unfamiliarity 
with the situation in South Vietnam could sometimes get him into trouble. Not 
long after starting his job, he conceded to Johnson that he had “just pushed the 
town [Washington] hard on the new land reform program Lodge so enthusiasti-
cally endorsed till I found it so vague and half formed that it will require com-
plete redoing.”57 Komer’s efforts would continue to be dogged by an enthusiasm 
that was often not tempered by knowledge.
As he began to travel frequently to South Vietnam and learn more about the 
situation there, Komer was quick to realize that Johnson’s grand developmen-
tal schemes were unrealizable. Instead, Komer had to focus much of his early 
attention on trying to cope with the monetary inflation and port congestion 
that accompanied the U.S. military buildup.58 Beyond that, he saw that the Com-
munist movement’s military offensives had eroded even the pretence of a GVN 
presence across much of the country. Having been launched into the job because 
Johnson wanted to stress transformative rural reform in South Vietnam, Komer 
instead came to focus on the much narrower topic of establishing the GVN’s 
physical control of the countryside.59 By May 1966 Komer was reporting that he 
had “progressively lowered my sights from the desirable to the do-able.”60 He told 
Johnson in the same month that “I have on my desk many imaginative ideas for 
urban reconstruction, industrial development, people-to-people projects, educa-
tional schemes. These make sense in time, but not until we control inflation and 
pacify more of the countryside.”61 This brought Komer to the conclusion that 
it was a “military failure” to loosen the Communist movement’s military grip 
that was the most immediate problem, not the failure of the civilian agencies to 
strengthen the GVN. In September, he told McNamara that “60–70% of the real 
job of pacification is providing local security.” “If the military will only clear and 
hold the hamlets,” he told Johnson, “I’ll produce plenty of lollipops.”62
Komer had arrived at a view of nation building that blended elements of the 
military and USOM approaches. Like McNamara, he had come to see “pacifica-
tion”—the physical control of the countryside—as primarily a coercive task. It 
would be accomplished by soldiers and police, not CIA agents or USOM person-
nel whispering in the ear of a GVN province chief. But Komer also conceived of a 
role for “lollipops,” the provision of social and economic aid to the rural popula-
tion, in the aftermath of the imposition of control by GVN security forces. With 
this emphasis he was fulfilling the mandate originally given to him by Johnson, 
even if he did so in a way that was more commensurate with the realities of the 
conflict. The result was a sequential “clear and build” policy that tied the U.S. mil-
itary and civilian efforts in South Vietnam together into a coherent whole. Even 
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so, Komer did not engage with the broader problem of how exactly the United 
States was supposed to prod the GVN into overcoming the deficiencies that had 
led to the birth of the NLF and the explosion of the conflict to begin with.
Having formulated this understanding of the conflict, Komer took the next 
logical step: advocating for the absorption of the responsibility for nation build-
ing by the military. Early on in his new role, Komer had worried that “we are 
not thinking big enough.” He reached the conclusion that giving the job to the 
military, with its vast resources in South Vietnam, would force an enlargement 
of vision.63 He was determined, he told McNamara, on “bringing the military 
fully into the pacification process.”64 Komer had also come to see the military 
as a more promising vessel for implementing the presidential will. “Soldiers go 
where they are told,” Komer complained to Johnson, “but about three key civil-
ians turn us down (funny how they develop physical disabilities) for every one 
who accepts.”65 Especially with difficulties getting the right personnel, Komer 
believed it could “take at least eighteen months in my judgment to get a civilian 
management structure which might handle pacification as effectively as MACV 
could today.”66 By October, Johnson seemed to have come around to this point 
of view and now recognized the immediate primacy of security in South Viet-
nam, and of the military’s role. “I don’t think AID can run anything anywhere,” 
Johnson told McNamara. “I don’t think they have personnel. I think what per-
sonnel they have is generally not too competent—ex-schoolteachers and things 
of that kind. They’re a third of their people short out there. They advertise and 
trying [sic] to get them—I don’t think they have the type that can take over when 
the troops move out.” Johnson went on to add that “I do have a respect for the 
military, or I would have respect for a chief of police that’s had some training in 
protecting people from coming in with terror at night and things of that kind.”67
Komer’s vision of nation building as a combination of security and lollipops 
sat uneasily with CIA, USOM, and State Department personnel who had been 
focused for years on the problems of nation building on the ground in South 
Vietnam. Having watched the NLF grow from its origins as a popular uprising 
against Diem, many of these Americans had been uneasy with Johnson’s military 
escalation. The idea that their nation-building efforts might now be subordi-
nated to the soldiers made their heads spin. The CIA, whose efforts had focused 
on painstakingly cultivating South Vietnamese leaders like Chau and supporting 
them through cadre programs patterned on the NLF, believed any attempt to 
scale up their efforts could only be accomplished at the expense of the political 
sensitivity and local knowledge that made them successful. George Carver, who 
was special assistant for Vietnam affairs to the agency’s director, Richard Helms, 
was particularly scathing of Komer’s proposals in a memo to his boss. Criticizing 
Komer for his “gee whiz” style and “tone of activist omniscience which masks 
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some fundamental misconceptions,” Carver argued that although management 
and resources were important, “the essential aspect of pacification is one of doc-
trine.” Carver believed that the CIA’s cadre programs had found the right formula 
for success, and needed time to show it. To “give this program a military cast . . . 
would ruin its chances of success.”68 Helms emphasized this himself to Komer, 
saying that greater MACV control could threaten the “irregularity, local charac-
teristics and individuality of leadership” that were “the essentials of our pacifica-
tion effort.” Stressing “the political heart of the pacification program” as opposed 
to a narrow focus on “security,” Helms was keen to point out that the goal of 
the program was a “motivated population, not merely an administered one.” An 
overemphasis on “statistical successes” and standardized organization, especially 
when it interfered with the work of “political motivation” that the CIA claimed to 
know so well, would threaten the program. But ominously for his own argument, 
Helms admitted that he “cannot contest your statement that we cannot match the 
MACV presence throughout the districts.”69
Opposition to Komer’s proposal from the State Department and USAID pri-
marily contended that placing all nation building under MACV would under-
mine the prospects of stable, civilian government appearing in South Vietnam. 
Dean Rusk’s own Vietnam experts were concerned about the “impression” the 
move might make, making it look like pacification had “become a civil affairs / 
military government matter, with all the overtones of the US taking over in an 
occupied country.” They also feared that the move might impact the balance of 
forces within the Saigon government itself, complicating efforts to move toward 
civilian rule. They worried that putting American military officers in charge of 
strengthening the GVN would only reinforce the ARVN’s dominance over the 
GVN, and particularly its rural governance. It would also reinforce the position 
of the four ARVN corps commanders, who had come to exercise far-reaching 
control over rural government in their zones. Rusk wrote to McNamara that his 
“principal problem” with the proposal “was that we seem to be moving toward 
military govt.”70 AID director William Gaud shared this reservation.71 State and 
AID believed that a civilian central government would be more responsive to the 
needs of the South Vietnamese populace and thus better able to establish the ties 
of mutual obligation between state and citizen that were at the heart of nation 
building, and that civilianization should therefore be encouraged over the long 
term. At the CIA, Carver viewed the point as “valid,” although, perhaps in defer-
ence to the bureaucratic division of labor that he was in the midst of chastising 
Komer for not respecting, he advised Helms that “we feel it is a consideration we 
should let them [State] argue.”72
Komer, backed by McNamara and ultimately by Johnson, did not view any 
of these objections as decisive. His need to demonstrate tangible success to the 
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president was too great to place his faith in South Vietnam’s national political 
process, which was not due to produce a civilian government through an elec-
tion for over a year. As he told McNamara, “the fact remains that the bulk of 
GVN pacification assets are under military control.” As for the nefarious role 
of the corps commanders, “I agree, but doubt it will be politically feasible to 
push the ARVN corps commanders out of the picture for a while. If so, let’s 
use them, not deplore them.”73 Even though Komer later told Johnson that “the 
political plus from an elected government would far outweigh any likely loss of 
administrative efficiency,” encouraging such an outcome was not his short-term 
priority. He remained wedded to pragmatically working with the current, mili-
tary-dominated GVN.74 Indeed, Komer believed that military personnel on the 
U.S. side would be more effective at motivating and advising ARVN personnel 
than civilians could be, a belief that seemed more compatible with maintaining 
ARVN influence within the GVN, given that the bulk of resources and personnel 
on the U.S. side were also from the military.75 Komer’s view stemmed from his 
belief that it was essential to begin a much more comprehensive push to increase 
GVN control of the population imminently. This desire for quick progress was at 
odds with the careful incrementalism that underlay the objections of the civilian 
agencies.
Nor did Komer share the CIA’s preoccupation with doctrine and the concep-
tual underpinnings of nation building. Komer did not believe that a successful 
program relied on “a sophisticated concept centrally orchestrated,” but rather 
on “good” local GVN leadership that was provided with “adequate resources.”76 
By eliding what was meant by “good” government in the context of South 
 Vietnam—a problem that had clearly vexed the GVN itself—Komer placed his 
faith in an increase of scale. Unwilling to wait for the chance emergence of excep-
tional Vietnamese leaders like Chau, Komer hoped somehow to substitute Amer-
ican resources and know-how. Holbrooke, who had worked for USOM in South 
Vietnam, worried that his boss did not appreciate the difficulty of turning local 
policies that had been found to work in one area into larger, national schemes 
without a commensurate loss of quality.77 Unlike officials in the civilian agencies, 
Komer was more concerned about quantity than quality. Though acknowledging 
that there was “great confusion, and widely differing views, on what pacifica-
tion . . . means and how to carry it out,” he was more impressed with the “mas-
sive” resources that would be available in 1967. “By sheer weight alone, this mass 
application cannot help but produce significant results in 1967,” he told Johnson.78
Johnson was won over, and had decided by October 1966 that nation build-
ing should be placed under MACV.79 Yet he was still reticent to ride roughshod 
over the civilian agencies or to make it appear that he was rushing to militarize 
nation building. Johnson therefore mandated that civilian agencies be given a 
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ninety-day trial period from November to consolidate their own operations in 
South Vietnam and show results before nation building would be turned over to 
MACV. There is little evidence that anyone in Washington saw this arrangement, 
known as the Office of Civil Affairs (OCO), as more than a sop.80 Johnson had 
come to understand that MACV’s involvement and an emphasis on local security 
were necessary prerequisites to his larger ambitions, and to demonstrating prog-
ress in the war to the American public. General Harold K. Johnson, the secretary 
of the army, astutely judged the direction the political winds were blowing in this 
regard when he cabled Westmoreland to say that “the more I ruminate about the 
rate of progress in Vietnam and the inevitable relationship to our own elections 
in 1968, the more convinced I am that you will be given full responsibility for the 
program sometime after the first of the year [1967].”81
General Johnson turned out to be correct. In January, after the OCO had 
been in existence for several months, Westmoreland reported that detailed paci-
fication planning, ARVN involvement in pacification, and the coordination of 
military and civilian assets in the field were all still problems.82 By April, Major 
General William DePuy, Westmoreland’s special assistant for pacification, was 
still reporting that pacification was “regressing” in I Corps, showing only “limited 
progress” in II and II Corps, and at a stalemate in IV Corps.83 In late February, as 
the civilian agencies continued to fight what seemed an inevitable drift toward 
military control, Helms had the CIA prepare a paper for the State Department on 
the prospects for nation building in 1967. While again criticizing the “adminis-
trative, imposed connotation” of MACV’s approach to nation building as against 
the more politically minded doctrine of the CIA, the paper warned against 
“undue expectations of rapid success” and stated that the goals set for 1967 were 
“modest,” with a further million civilians to be added to “secure areas.”84
With this implicit confession that although the CIA disapproved of the mili-
tary’s approach, it was not able to promise success either, Johnson took the final 
step and placed nation building entirely under MACV in May. He also decided to 
dispatch Komer to Saigon to head the new organization, and later in the month 
Komer followed Fraleigh and so many Americans before him in stepping off a 
plane into the Saigon heat. It had taken nearly two years since the war started, 
but America finally had a dedicated nation-building agency—and a man to run 
it—in South Vietnam. It now remained to be seen what it was capable of.
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SETTING UP CORDS
When briefing the interminable stream of visitors who came from the United 
States to hear about the progress of the war effort in 1967, Brigadier General 
William Knowlton liked to show them a map. It depicted in red and green shades 
the areas of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Minh and the French colonial 
regime at the time of the Geneva Accords in 1954. “Every Vietnamese govern-
ment since 1954,” he told one delegation, “has had to deal with the aftermath 
of this map.” In parts of what used to be northern Annam—now the South 
Vietnamese military district of I Corps—children had grown to be adults while 
knowing nothing but rule by the Communist movement and its fronts. Even 
when Diem had the movement on the ropes in the late 1950s, there had still 
never been any effective GVN authority in these areas. Other large, densely popu-
lated provinces on the central coast—places like Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Quang 
Ngai—remained Communist bastions. Farther south, the Mekong Delta was 
a patchwork of red and green, and a menacing band of red hung like a noose 
around Saigon, from where ARVN’s Hop Tac operations had failed to dislodge 
the Communists. And no map based on a concept as crude as physical control 
could account for the hidden allegiances of the rural population or the places 
where an underground Communist infrastructure still owned the night.1
It was telling that Knowlton could use a map from 1954 to illustrate the situ-
ation at the time of his briefing in late 1967. Despite the U.S. military escalation 
and a stabilization of the political situation in Saigon, the GVN had still made 
few inroads in the country’s rural areas. But 1967 also brought the final cre-
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ation of the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CORDS), which many American nation builders hoped would allow them to 
overcome the fragmented nature of their previous efforts to assist the GVN. An 
American nation-building agency that mirrored the GVN’s own governmental 
organs from Saigon to the remotest district, CORDS was designed to allow the 
United States and the GVN to work together on joint plans to strengthen the 
South Vietnamese regime, build links with the rural population, and undermine 
the Communist movement’s grip on the villages. But as 1967 drew to a close, it 
became increasingly clear that even as the Thieu-Ky regime proved more effec-
tive than its predecessors and the Communist movement was under pressure like 
never before, both the Americans and Vietnamese most committed to reform 
faced tough—and perhaps insurmountable—challenges.
War Comes to South Vietnam
When American combat units first arrived in South Vietnam in the summer of 
1965, their immediate task was to stave off an imminent Communist victory. 
Both the NLF and regular North Vietnamese Army units had carried out increas-
ingly audacious operations aimed at inflicting serious defeats on ARVN forces. 
Despite South Vietnamese operations around Saigon, the NLF military machine 
had continued to mobilize manpower in the area. In the waning days of 1964, 
it unleashed its newly created Ninth Division in the battle of Binh Gia near the 
capital. For four days the NLF occupied a government stronghold, repulsing 
counterattacks by the ARVN’s strategic reserve, made up of elite ranger, airborne, 
and marine units. The South Vietnamese suffered hundreds of casualties, leaving 
two ranger companies and a marine battalion operationally ineffective. The NLF 
claimed to have suffered only a few dozen casualties, and they did not leave a 
single body on the battlefield. After achieving the NLF’s greatest victory yet over 
the ARVN, the Ninth Division melted back into the countryside. An attempt to 
pursue them, named Operation Nguyen Van Nho after the slain commander of 
the marine battalion, turned up nothing.2
Although the Ninth Division was equipped with heavy weaponry infil-
trated from North Vietnam, its manpower was drawn from Cochinchina. With 
the NLF’s own forces capable of annihilating entire formations of the ARVN’s 
strategic reserve, the entry of NVA units into the battle in the South promised 
even worse to come. As 1965 progressed, the NLF and NVA launched a general 
offensive. Le Duan, the Communist movement’s paramount leader in Hanoi, 
hoped that the movement’s forces could cause the collapse of the ARVN before 
the United States would have a chance to react and intervene. The movement’s 
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administrative infrastructure in South Vietnam moved into high gear, mobilizing 
peasants into the NLF’s main force units. In a series of large operations in and 
around the Central Highlands, the NVA and NLF moved to force the govern-
ment to deploy its strategic reserve and then annihilate it. Once these reserves 
had been worn down, the path would lay open for Communist forces to enter 
Saigon, hopefully accompanied by a mass civil uprising against the GVN and the 
Americans. By early June, Communist offensives were chewing through multiple 
ARVN battalions per week, presaging the imminent collapse of the force’s cohe-
sion and will to fight.3
These were the conditions in which the first American combat units arrived 
in 1965 under General William Westmoreland. U.S. forces had to spend con-
siderable time establishing their bridgeheads, constructing an enormous logisti-
cal system, and managing the influx of troops before they were able to go on 
the offensive. By October 1966, there were about 350,000 American military 
personnel in theater. While the arrival of U.S. forces stiffened the resolve of the 
ARVN and allowed for spoiling operations to be launched to stave off imminent 
defeat, it was not until late 1966 that Westmoreland was equipped for a nation-
wide offensive. The search-and-destroy operations he launched throughout 1966 
were mainly intended to keep Communist forces off balance and prevent them 
from massing for attacks on American or GVN strongholds. Nevertheless, poor 
American intelligence—compounded by the GVN’s lack of supporters in the 
rural areas where battles were fought—meant that the Communists controlled 
the tempo of the fighting, and American units nearly always fought on the tacti-
cal defensive after suffering ambushes.4
The political situation in Saigon likewise settled into a stable but inconclu-
sive and uninspiring pattern. The Thieu-Ky regime brought an end to the era of 
revolving-door coups, but there were few initial signs it would be able to restore 
even naked physical control of much of the country, much less win the complic-
ity of the rural population. GVN local authorities had largely retreated to district 
towns and other fortified positions in the face of the Communist movement’s 
growing administrative and military might. As James C. Scott has pointed out, 
the tendency of landlords and officials to flee and seek the protection of a distant 
state power that was so despised in many rural communities underscored their 
distance and alienation from the peasantry.5 Even to reassert its presence suffi-
ciently to rebuild the reviled apparatus of local government that had existed prior 
to the coup against Diem would be a huge task for the Thieu-Ky administration.
Between the start of the U.S. buildup and the creation of CORDS, Ameri-
can nation builders in Vietnam continued to operate in their previous stovepipe 
fashion. Governmental stability in Saigon, an increased availability of resources, 
and slightly improved coordination between military and civilian efforts enabled 
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American actions to have greater impact. But there continued to be widespread 
disagreement among Americans in different agencies about whether the impact 
they were having was the right one. These disagreements had only grown more 
heated in the precarious environment of the last few years. The analysts who 
wrote the Pentagon Papers, who were intimately familiar with American policy 
debates, noted that those interested in what was called pacification were “often 
in such violent disagreement as to what pacification meant that they quarreled 
publicly among themselves and overlooked their common interests.”6 As we saw 
in the previous chapter, this made the creation of CORDS controversial. But it 
also affected how pre-CORDS nation-building efforts developed, something that 
had an impact on the eventual workings of CORDS itself.
After 1965, nation-building efforts took place in a new military context. As 
American forces established themselves and began to push outward from their 
bases, they took on most of the burden of fighting large enemy units. ARVN 
forces, meanwhile, adopted the tasks of providing static defense to populated 
areas and—at least in theory—“pacification.” As Westmoreland explained in 
July 1965, the United States would focus on “large, well organized and equipped 
[enemy] forces,” which they would locate through search-and-destroy operations. 
Westmoreland hoped the United States could do most of its fighting in remote, 
sparsely populated areas, like the Ia Drang Valley, in which the first major clash 
between the United States and the NVA occurred in November 1965. Meanwhile, 
it fell to the ARVN to provide South Vietnamese villagers in the populated areas 
with security “from the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer.” 
Westmoreland was cognizant of the need for nation building, but his concept 
of operations left undefined how exactly it was supposed to be achieved behind 
the military shield provided by the United States. As the military emergency of 
mid-1965 eased, both the CIA and USOM attempted to work with the GVN to 
provide an answer to this question.7
The CIA sought to capitalize on governmental stability in Saigon to transform 
the local cadre efforts discussed in chapter 1 into a national effort. In doing so, it 
worked with a number of key figures in the GVN. The first was Chau, who became 
head of a national cadre program established in November 1965 on Thieu’s ini-
tiative.8 The second key Vietnamese figure was Nguyen Duc Thang. Born in Cao 
Bang Province, a traditional home of rebels and independence fighters on the 
border with China, Thang entered a Viet Minh youth organization at the age 
of sixteen. Like Chau, he claimed to have left after the awe he felt toward his 
Communist superiors turned to unease and then disgust at their brutal actions. 
His family’s social status was high enough to allow him to enter the University 
of Hanoi, and in 1952 he graduated from a French officer-candidate school as a 
classmate of Ky. After independence, Thang rose to the rank of major general in 
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the ARVN, and Ky made him head of the GVN’s Ministry of Rural Development 
(MORD) in late 1965. At Ky’s insistence, MORD then assumed responsibility for 
the cadre program, with Thang as Chau’s superior.9
The nucleus of the GVN’s new cadre program was a training center at Vung 
Tau, a beach town near Saigon. By centralizing training and direction of the 
numerous local cadre programs that had sprung up over the previous years, 
both the Americans and Vietnamese involved in the effort hoped to produce 
a program with nationwide impact. Thang hoped to overcome the problems 
inherent in the patchwork nature of previous, local initiatives, arguing that “the 
principal problems in the situation are the lack of clear doctrine and definition 
of pacification; lack of a pacification plan since 1963, with military plans backing 
up a nonexistent pacification plan; no clear chain of command for pacification; 
and lack of clearly defined techniques for pacification.”10 Control by the central 
government also meant that Saigon would not have to fear that the cadres were 
being used to create local political bases or undermine the central state. As a 
result, existing local cadre programs were ordered dissolved and their personnel 
screened for aptitude and loyalty before being sent to Vung Tau to be molded into 
instruments of the GVN’s nation-building agenda.11
The first class of what came to be known as the Revolutionary Development 
(RD) cadre matriculated at Vung Tau in February 1966, around the time of the 
Honolulu Conference.12 Like their predecessors in Kien Hoa, the RD cadres were 
charged with befriending the villagers whom they served among, carrying out 
agitprop for the GVN, directing small-scale economic aid projects, and ferreting 
out NLF cadres and supporters. As an American who worked closely with the 
major Vietnamese figures behind the RD program said, they were “quick to admit 
that they have adopted and adapted to the RD Program much of the dogma and 
techniques of the Vietnamese Communists.”13 ARVN chief of staff Cao Van Vien 
himself described the RD concept as “Communist-inspired,” whereas Don Luce 
and John Sommer called the cadres “imitation VC.”14 In this, the RD program 
followed the example of Chau’s cadre effort in Kien Hoa.
On the one hand, the emergence of the RD program signaled that with the 
military and central political situation becoming less desperate, the GVN was 
ready to begin an effort to establish a rural political base. As the U.S. Mission 
wrote in its campaign plan for 1967, “Revolutionary Development is the inte-
grated military and civil process to restore, consolidate, and expand government 
control so that nation-building can progress throughout the Republic of Viet-
Nam.”15 The RD cadres were to be the “vanguard elements” of this process.16 But 
on the other hand, attempting to achieve this goal via a cadre program modeled 
on the NLF was paradoxical. Chau had designed his cadre system in Kien Hoa 
on the assumption that the regular GVN bureaucracy was irredeemable. Like the 
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NLF, he aimed not to improve that bureaucracy, but to supplant it. The result had 
been the system of “parapolitics” described by Chau’s CIA handler Stuart Meth-
ven, who became an acolyte of the approach he learned from his Vietnamese 
colleague. According to Methven, parapolitics was an emergency measure taken 
when the regular government could not be reformed quickly enough to deliver 
necessary results, as was the case in South Vietnam. Although it was hoped that 
the cadres would “provide the bridge for the government to cross over so that 
it can establish itself among the broad base of the population,” this was by no 
means guaranteed, especially if the government remained unreformed. In fact, 
the recourse to parapolitical measures could actually delay the reform of the reg-
ular government because the province and district leaderships were not them-
selves required to build support among the people.17 As an emergency measure, 
parapolitics could hence retard the ultimate goal of nation building.
A further problem with the RD program was the relationship of the cadres to 
local GVN authorities. The Communist movement’s cadres became the leaders 
of the villages in which they served, and were at the bottom of a chain of com-
mand that passed through NLF district and province leaderships until ultimately 
terminating in Hanoi.18 This created a structure of authority that paralleled the 
GVN and competed with it for the complicity of the peasantry and to mobilize 
their resources for the war effort. Like the NLF, the RD cadres also paralleled the 
regular GVN authorities at the villages and hamlet level. But this made much 
less sense when their ultimate aim was to reform and proselytize for the GVN 
rather than to destroy it, as the Communists sought to do. Furthermore, the 
parapolitical structure of an RD cadre was extremely shallow, having no pres-
ence above the village level. RD cadres were ultimately responsible to the local 
GVN province chief, meaning they had little practical authority or capacity for 
independent action. There was no guarantee that the province chiefs would be 
interested in addressing GVN abuses that the RD cadres reported, which were 
mostly the result of the province chief ’s own actions. This system had worked in 
Kien Hoa because Chau was the province chief, providing the cadre with a link 
to an individual who could address the grievances of the population. But Chau 
had been a rare kind of province chief, and mostly the RD cadres were either 
ignored or used as a regular paramilitary without any political function. At best, 
they might build sympathy for the GVN through their personal actions, but they 
could not systematically reform it.19
The RD program was riven by disagreements, both between the Vietnamese 
and the Americans and on the GVN side itself. Chau was convinced that nation 
building in South Vietnam could be successful only if the idea of South Vietnam-
ese nationhood was fostered. He had learned from his time observing how the 
Viet Minh functioned that there needed to be a “sense of nationalistic conviction 
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and motivation on the part of everyone involved” to rival the impetus provided 
by the Communist movement. Only then could the “colonial and postcolonial 
legacy” of the GVN be overcome.20 Like Colby and Methven, he placed a high 
premium on the indoctrination of cadres and the ideas they would espouse in 
the villages. Chau wanted the cadres to operate in teams of eighty each, with 
half dedicated to the political work of proselytizing for the GVN, mapping out 
the aspirations and allegiances of local villagers, and reporting grievances. The 
remaining forty would provide paramilitary functions, both protecting the team 
and training village militia after the fashion of the NLF’s local guerrillas. But 
with Colby back in Washington, Chau found that the local CIA leadership had 
different ideas. Chief of Station Gordon Jorgenson pushed for fifty-man teams, 
with forty assigned to paramilitary duties and only ten carrying out the political 
tasks that Chau considered the heart of the program. The CIA’s offer to house his 
headquarters in their own facility in Saigon also convinced Chau that the Ameri-
cans did not understand the GVN’s need to protect its nationalist credentials. 
The figure of fifty-nine-man teams was eventually agreed, but this was much 
closer to the American position and led Chau to react angrily by attempting to 
marginalize Americans involved with the effort.21
Chau and the CIA managed to maintain a working relationship, however 
fractious. But Chau eventually fell victim to the still-unstable political situation 
within the South Vietnamese government itself. Although Thieu and Ky had 
brought an end to the era of continuous coups, their regime remained beset by 
internal fissures and conflicts of personality. Chief among them was the conflict 
between Thieu and Ky themselves. The two men both suspected that the other 
was attempting to build a personal power base and relationship with the Ameri-
cans in order to eventually sideline his rival and emerge as the paramount leader 
of South Vietnam. Chau’s position at the forefront of an effort to build a rural 
political base for the GVN made him a natural target of suspicion for Ky loyal-
ists, who suspected that this base might ultimately serve the interests of Chau’s 
patron, Thieu. The situation took a surreal twist when Chau discovered that 
Vung Tau’s commander, Captain Le Xuan Mai, was an adherent of the Dai Viet, 
an anti-Communist Vietnamese political party that had been involved in the dis-
putes and coups of the post-Diem years. The party was much more radical even 
than Chau in its desire to overthrow the Vietnamese social and political order, 
and vehemently opposed to Ky, whom it considered corrupt and licentious. Like 
most non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists, the Dai Viet had never been able 
to advance beyond its urban, educated base. Now it appeared that Captain Mai 
and a band of like-minded instructors had been using the Vung Tau center to 
indoctrinate cadres to spread not only anti-Communism but also the Dai Viet’s 
heavily antigovernment and anti-Ky beliefs in the rural areas. Chau and John 
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Paul Vann believed that CIA personnel, having never bothered to translate the 
training material used at the center into English, had not noticed.22
Whether this was true or not, the issue blew into the open when Chau 
attempted to have Mai dismissed and take over the operations of the center him-
self. In response, a large number of instructors at Vung Tau distributed weap-
ons and organized their students to put up armed resistance to Chau’s appoint-
ment. Perhaps hoping he would mishandle the situation and so could then be 
dismissed, Thang placed a battalion of paratroopers at Chau’s disposal and told 
him to do whatever was necessary to restore order. Chau instead managed to 
restore order peacefully and persuade Mai to move on through unclear means. 
Shortly afterward, he quit the government to seek office as a legislator, appar-
ently in disgust at political infighting in the GVN. The affair showed that even 
if the ARVN generals had stopped launching coups against each other, political 
and personality clashes still hampered the emergence of GVN institutions at the 
center, much less in the rural areas.23
The Office of Rural Affairs started by Rufus Phillips and Bert Fraleigh was 
also afflicted by conflict in the years prior to the creation of CORDS. The duo’s 
attempt to transform USOM by building up a network of provincial government 
advisers had run into opposition among more traditional USAID personnel who 
believed the aid mission should focus its efforts on the central government in Sai-
gon. In 1964, James “Big Jim” Killen, former head of USAID’s mission in South 
Korea, became head of USOM. In Seoul, Killen had pushed hard for USAID to 
avoid taking on too many of the functions the South Korean government should 
have been performing for itself, and he brought similar priorities with him to Sai-
gon. Questioning whether provincial agents tended to sap the autonomy of GVN 
local government by “institutionalizing an excessive dependence on the USOM 
representative to do things they should be doing for themselves,” he took steps 
to reduce the influence of Fraleigh’s young Tigers in the provinces.24 Somewhat 
paradoxically, Killen also took aim at the system of providing province repre-
sentatives a per diem to live off the local economy, arguing that they should be 
provided with a higher standard of living as a means of inducing respect from 
the Vietnamese. He eventually launched security investigations against a num-
ber of Tigers—including, in some cases, on the spurious grounds that they had 
homosexual relationships with their Vietnamese counterparts—and in late 1964 
had Fraleigh and thirty of the Tigers recalled to Washington.25 Fraleigh eventu-
ally resigned from USAID altogether in 1967, disgusted by what he viewed as the 
gutting of the program he had helped establish. Back in Washington, one Tiger 
penned a ballad titled “The Legend of James D. Killen” to lament the changes. 
“The moral of the story, is plain with A-I-D,” it read, “You don’t work for the 
people, you work for bureaucracy!”26
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Although Killen’s moves seemed to go against the trend of increased Ameri-
can involvement in South Vietnamese rural affairs, his opposition to the Tigers 
won him support in some quarters. Both the philosophy behind the program 
Fraleigh had established and the personnel he had recruited to staff it came in 
for criticism as American involvement in South Vietnam grew and the problem 
of nation building drew the attention of other agencies. As we saw in the previ-
ous chapter, Fraleigh had sent his young charges forth into the provinces with 
a general remit to make provincial government run more smoothly, develop 
links between it and the rural population, and enthuse the Vietnamese with 
American can-do spirit. But other Americans increasingly began to question 
whether “BA generalists” recruited from the Peace Corps and IVS could effec-
tively advise the grizzled ARVN majors and colonels who made up the majority 
of South Vietnamese province chiefs. “You couldn’t get a province chief to lis-
ten to a boy of 22 or 23,” said one USOM official who served in South Vietnam 
in 1966, summing up a common perspective. “He knew he wouldn’t have the 
experience.”27 Chau remembered that the first time he saw the American sent 
to be his adviser in Kien Hoa Province, he thought “I don’t need any babies 
down in this province; I’ve got enough problems.”28 One adviser even wrote 
a ditty that mocked the pretensions of his youthful colleagues. “Now Colonel, 
you’re forty, I’m just twenty-two,” it began, “but I’ve been to college, so I’ll 
advise you!”29
Others took aim at the materialistic philosophy that lay behind USOM’s 
activities, focusing as they did on hoping that villagers would be so grateful for 
minor economic aid projects that they would abandon a Communist move-
ment whose bread and butter was nationalism, revolution, and social empow-
erment. One older American who worked alongside the Tigers was openly con-
temptuous of what he regarded as a “pathetic reliance on the belief that good 
works like fertilizer and improved rice seed are an end in themselves without 
regard to the political implications these things involve.”30 Colby was likewise 
concerned with having USOM involved in village cadre efforts, believing they 
were “technical adviser[s] . . . [and] not, as a rule, operationally oriented.”31 As 
the war escalated, more and more Americans were in a hurry to see concrete 
results from their nation-building efforts, and dismissive of the idea that sim-
ply providing economic goods to the villagers was enough. While Fraleigh had 
stressed that the Tigers’ goal was to help the Vietnamese people, the genera-
tion of advisers who served during the military buildup were more inclined to 
believe that, as one put it, “your primary purpose in going overseas is the inter-
est of the United States government. It is not the interest of Vietnam—this is 
our foreign policy that we are implementing.”32 Altruism would not be enough 
to achieve U.S. goals.
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In the northern reaches of South Vietnam, the U.S. Marine Corps was carry-
ing out its own program to attempt to strengthen the GVN. These were known 
as the Combined Action Platoons, or CAPs. The CAPs aimed to expand a zone 
of security around Marine installations and populated areas in I Corps, the 
Marine Corps area of operations in South Vietnam.33 Integrating closely with 
an ARVN unit and living in close proximity to South Vietnamese villagers, 
the Marines trained the GVN soldiers and carried out civic action projects 
in an attempt both to provide security and to win over the villagers to the 
GVN’s cause. One recent writer has declared CAPs to have been “the conflict’s 
best example of American COIN [counterinsurgency],” and other authors have 
argued that they should have been extended beyond I Corps to other parts of 
South Vietnam.34
But while the CAPs had limited success as a tool of counterinsurgency, they 
were no more capable of nation building than any other U.S. initiatives in the war 
to date. William R. Corson, the Marine Corps officer who was in charge of the 
CAP program at its height, considered the CAPs mainly a means of protecting 
Marine bases. It was explicitly not a program that aimed at preparing the GVN 
to be self-sufficient in the event of U.S. withdrawal, or to establish ties of mutual 
obligation between the GVN and its citizens that would enable the GVN to meet 
the challenge of the Vietnamese Communist movement. Corson viewed the GVN 
as a predatory institution that it was best to cut entirely out of the process of pro-
viding for local security and economic benefits to the Vietnamese people. Instead, 
he focused on direct interface between Marine units and Vietnamese villagers, and 
on winning support through manipulating what he called the “acquisitive bent of 
the Oriental.”35 The CAPs hence combined the “parapolitical” weaknesses of the 
RD program with the excessive materialist focus that marked USOM’s efforts. As 
Colonel Robert Montague, Komer’s military aide and later an official in CORDS, 
pointed out, the impact of the CAPs was not “permanent” because “everyone 
knew the Marines weren’t going to be there very long.”36 Lacking any answer to the 
problem of reforming the GVN in a holistic manner, Corson was instead reduced 
on one occasion to punching a corrupt district chief in the face.37
The deficiencies and failures of these previous American nation-building 
efforts formed the background for the creation of CORDS. The bureaucratic 
rivalries and ideological disagreements that had afflicted them did not disappear 
when they were amalgamated into the new agency. And despite CORDS’s clever 
bureaucratic structure, mirroring as it did the GVN at every level from Saigon to 
the districts, there was no guarantee that Americans and Vietnamese would be 
able to work together in harmony, or that they even ultimately shared the same 
goals. A punch in the face was unlikely to improve matters, but would CORDS 
do any better?
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Setting Up CORDS
By May 1967, many of the individuals who would be key players in the U.S. 
nation-building effort until the end of the war were in Saigon. At the begin-
ning of the month, Ellsworth Bunker arrived to take up the post of ambassa-
dor, and General Creighton Abrams arrived to serve as Westmoreland’s deputy, 
charged with overseeing the development of the ARVN. Komer arrived to take 
over as head of CORDS, which was established in late May.38 In Saigon, Komer 
became a civilian deputy to Westmoreland with the personal rank of ambassador, 
equivalent to a four-star general. As the deputy for CORDS (or DepCORDS) 
to  Westmoreland, he had at his disposal the resources of all civilian U.S. agen-
cies concerned with nation building, and a sizable military contingent as well. L. 
Wade Lathram, who had been director of the transitional Office of Civil Opera-
tions, became Komer’s deputy. His deputy in turn was Knowlton, who had been 
head of MACV’s Revolutionary Development Support division.39 Komer also 
obtained responsibility for U.S. efforts to develop local militia forces to counter 
the NLF, and for rooting out the NLF’s administrative and political infrastructure 
in the villages. CORDS hence took responsibility for the war in the villages in all 
its civil and military components. Such an organization was unique in American 
history. As an official history noted: “To have civilians fully operating in a mili-
tary chain of command was extremely rare in the history of the United States; it 
had certainly never before occurred on such a scale.”40
At the level of each of the four military corps commands in South Vietnam, 
the OCO director for each region became the corps DepCORDS, charged with 
overseeing advice to the GVN’s civil government. He then assumed control of an 
integrated military/civilian staff that paralleled that of CORDS in Saigon, along 
with the ability to supervise the chief U.S. adviser to ARVN forces in the corps 
areas on matters pertaining to the support of nation building.41 At the province 
level, the current civilian and military teams were consolidated into one orga-
nization with a single manager. Either the senior civilian or military officer was 
elevated to the position of overall manager, known as province senior adviser 
(PSA), with the other as his deputy. This led to a “sandwich” management struc-
ture in which a civilian boss always had a military deputy, and vice versa. The 
decision as to which arrangement to adopt in each province was taken on “the 
basis of security in the province, civil-military balance in the RD effort and [the] 
qualifications and experience” of the personnel involved.42 In areas where secu-
rity was poor, the PSA was more likely to hail from the military, and the initial 
balance saw twenty-five military PSAs versus twenty-two civilians.43 Finally, the 
arrangements at the district level largely mirrored those at province, with the 
exception that owing to the severity of the security situation in 1967 and the fact 
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that not all districts had OCO representatives at the time CORDS was created, in 
most cases the officer serving as MACV district adviser was appointed the district 
senior adviser (DSA), with a civilian deputy.44
The result was a nation-building organization of unparalleled reach and size. 
Tens of thousands of Americans would join CORDS to work on nation-building 
tasks during the remainder of the war. Although it has often been alleged that the 
United States failed at nation building in South Vietnam because key figures failed 
to be interested in the problem, the CORDS system won the full support of Bunker, 
Westmoreland, and Abrams. Komer had no complaints about his relationship with 
Bunker, which he characterized as “intimate.”45 Using a phrase that would later be 
associated with Abrams’s tenure as commander of MACV, Bunker told both U.S. 
civilian and military leaders in South Vietnam in May 1967 that he favored a “one 
war” approach to the conflict that combined military and civilian assets both to fight 
the war and strengthen the GVN. Though his call to facilitate the GVN in carrying 
out a “social revolution” was vague and contrary to Komer’s focus on local security, 
he gave Komer wide latitude to work as he wished.46 Bunker’s backing was impor-
tant, as under a system that had first been established by a grant of authority from 
President Johnson to Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in 1964, the ambassador was the 
senior American in South Vietnam, to whom even the commander of MACV was 
subordinate. Bunker chaired the Mission Council, a policy-making body that con-
sisted of the local heads of the various American agencies in the country along with 
the ambassador’s deputy and the MACV commander. With the creation of CORDS, 
Komer took a chair in the council, and he also attended Westmoreland’s leadership 
conferences with his top subordinates. Despite the allegation by Lewis Sorley that 
Westmoreland was uncomprehending of nation building, Komer found Westmore-
land highly supportive and believed that “the way Westmoreland handled the thing 
was one of the basic reasons why CORDS worked.”47
As well as giving all of the Americans interested in nation building one high-
ranking voice in American councils, CORDS also finally eliminated the problems 
created by the “autonomous baronies” of the various U.S. agencies that Colby 
had described. The U.S. presence in the provinces and districts was now unified 
under one chain of command and spoke to its South Vietnamese counterparts 
with one voice. With the inclusion of military assets, CORDS was also able to 
have a presence in every district throughout South Vietnam. This was of particu-
lar importance to Komer, who had brought with him from Washington his belief 
in the importance of the primacy of local security for nation building. There was 
now a single organization, stretching from Saigon to the remotest districts, which 
had the capacity to coordinate all necessary resources on the U.S. side in support 
of nation-building plans and programs and then to work with the GVN to see 
them implemented.
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Komer set to work on the same “fascinating” management problems that had 
captivated him in Washington. For CORDS to work, the GVN would need to 
develop central institutions capable of conceiving a nation-building strategy and 
implementing it throughout the country. The ministry would develop national 
concepts for nation building, decide on priority areas for their implementa-
tion, and then allocate the resources accordingly and direct the local personnel 
involved. As well as helping conceive the plans at the center, CORDS would also 
help to execute them at each level of government down to the district. In theory, 
this top-down cooperation between Americans and South Vietnamese would 
allow for sweeping reforms of the GVN directed from the center.
CORDS could be viewed as a bureaucratic scaffold erected around the GVN’s 
organs of governance, allowing American workmen to access all parts of the 
regime from top to bottom. In theory, they would work in harmony with their 
South Vietnamese counterparts in the structure itself to improve the regime. It 
would also make it easier for Saigon to control and reform its own structure of 
rural government, as the central regime could work with the Americans manning 
the scaffold to intervene in district and provincial governance. This would allow 
the United States and the GVN to jointly move beyond the stopgap measures of 
the RD cadre program, which after CORDS was set up came to be viewed as a 
“transitional” step. RD had led the way by being “the first GVN program that had 
truly national scope,” but now the focus was on developing the GVN’s “normal 
processes of government.” Parapolitical emergency measures would become a 
thing of the past as CORDS enabled a wholesale, top-down reform of the GVN.48 
As Frank Scotton later wrote, “reform, unlike revolution, must start at the top.”49 
But as we shall see, there was always the potential for disagreements between the 
American and GVN workmen scurrying around the scaffold, and no guarantee 
that the measures CORDS pushed would be beneficial in any case. However well 
designed in theory, CORDS in practice would require a complex process of com-
promise and negotiation to work.
Making this work involved avoiding a number of pitfalls of which the Ameri-
can nation builders who had come before CORDS, and their Vietnamese coun-
terparts, were well aware. One was ensuring that the new, more muscular Ameri-
can organization did not undermine the very GVN capacities it was designed 
to develop. CORDS was, as its name implied, a support organization. CORDS 
officials were not supposed to run village governments, distribute rice to refu-
gees, or personally root out the NLF’s political cadres. Rather, they were to help 
develop the GVN’s capacity to do these things for itself. As Komer put it, the 
nation-building effort had “room to breathe behind the military shield” created 
by Westmoreland’s offensives in 1966–1967, but it was a “GVN responsibility, 
with the U.S. providing advice and resources.”50 This made the sustainability of 
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any strengthening of the GVN critical. As Montague had pointed out in his cri-
tique of the Marine CAPs, CORDS was not going to be around forever. Bunker 
put it like this in January 1969: “My yardstick of success here is what the Vietnam-
ese can do themselves, because that eventually is the ultimate test. They’ve got 
to take over someday. It’s quite clear that we’re not going to be here forever. And 
what we can get them to do—through instruction, through persuasion, through 
pressure, in whatever way—to do the job themselves is the ultimate yardstick of 
success.”51 Yet this was not the whole story. CORDS personnel did not generally 
perceive their role as merely to unthinkingly support whatever the GVN wanted 
to do, but rather to influence the GVN to reform in ways the Americans believed 
conducive to its long-term survival. In this respect, CORDS had more of the 
spirit of Fraleigh and his young Tigers than of the traditional USAID bureau-
crats represented by Killen. According to Fraleigh, an off-color joke that did the 
rounds among more action-oriented Americans in South Vietnam concerned a 
bull brought in by USAID for “stud purposes” who “refused to perform because 
he was there as an ‘advisor’ only.” It is no wonder this joke was popular among the 
province and district advisers of CORDS, many of whom came from the military 
and believed along with Fraleigh in the need to offer “positive solutions” to the 
GVN’s problems.52 This meant that CORDS aimed to influence and change and 
not just “support” the Saigon regime. Few Americans in South Vietnam had any 
illusions about the deficiencies of the GVN by 1967, and there was widespread 
understanding that reform might often involve making the South Vietnamese 
act in ways they did not want to. As Chau had discovered in the conflict over the 
size of his cadre teams, the fact that the United States was providing resources 
for a program often gave it a lot of influence over its design. As Komer described 
in 1970:
The Vietnamese ran every single operating program. Pacification was 
and is 99 percent pure Vietnamese in its staffing. Now, we did an awful 
lot of advising, managing, prodding, cajoling, and where necessary, pres-
suring from behind the scenes. We were the bankers. We provided the 
bulk of the logistics support. We were the shadow management. Most 
of the new initiatives in pacification, most of the program design, the 
management techniques, were ours, but transferred to the Vietnamese. 
I think that pacification stands as a model of U.S.-Vietnamese rapport.53
In this passage, Komer describes many of the different ways that U.S. officials 
interacted with their GVN counterparts. Because CORDS staff were not directly 
in the GVN chain of command, they always had to operate via the indirect 
exercise of influence. “The totality of our U.S. effort is inserted into the society 
of [South Vietnam] at thousands of key points—each one is referred to as a 
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 Vietnamese counterpart,” a U.S. Army report titled A Program for the Pacification 
and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN) had asserted. “Whether, and 
how, he can be influenced is crucial to the achievement of U.S. objectives.”54 The 
means of influencing GVN officials ran the gamut from persuasion and flattery 
to the threat of sanctions or the application of some other form of pressure.
The correct amount of pressure or “leverage” to place on the GVN was one of 
the issues that had long divided U.S. nation builders. Too direct an involvement 
in South Vietnamese affairs was controversial in the USAID mission. The extent 
of USOM’s deployment in the rural areas of South Vietnam was unprecedented 
in its history, and was resisted by some officials.55 In late 1966, a journalist who 
covered USOM’s activities in South Vietnam wrote that it was “axiomatic in the 
United States mission that you must ‘get along with your Vietnamese counter-
part’ or get out.”56 Even after the creation of CORDS, Komer believed that this 
attitude “lasted on in USAID, those parts that were not under our control.”57
At the other end of the spectrum of the debate on leverage were the military 
authors of PROVN, all of whom had extensive experience in South Vietnam. 
The study’s authors considered “nonfunctioning Vietnamese officialdom” to be 
“the crux of the matter and the harsh reality of our situation” and called for a 
high degree of involvement by U.S. personnel in the affairs of South Vietnam. 
“If we lose in Vietnam,” the report noted, “we pay the price no matter how care-
fully American officials rationalize the need to respect Vietnamese sovereignty.” 
PROVN painted a picture of a GVN that was unable to save itself and would need 
the United States to “stimulat[e] social reform as required” if it were to survive. 
Paraphrasing the Serenity Prayer, the authors said that U.S. personnel must pos-
sess “the courage to become directly involved where we must, the patience to 
abstain when appropriate and the wisdom to know the difference.”58 Colonel 
Volney Warner, who had worked on PROVN and then joined William Leonhart’s 
White House office, continued banging the drum during 1967. Warner called for 
a “scaffolding of influence” that allowed for the exercise of leverage by relatively 
low-level personnel in CORDS, including the ability for PSAs to withdraw sup-
port from GVN provincial programs that were not performing. He also raised the 
issue of “an explicitly negotiated U.S.-GVN influence relationship” that would lay 
down obligations on both parties and allow for the exercise of sanctions on the 
GVN, such as the withholding of funds for key programs, if necessary.59
Komer had his own ideas about how leverage ought to be used to improve 
GVN performance. Eschewing grand theories of leverage, Komer was insistent 
that its exercise was an art of the possible and that it be used discriminately rather 
than as part of a formal framework. Komer would have agreed with White House 
advisers who exulted that “for the first time the Mission structure is sufficiently 
integrated to permit its influence to be properly focused.”60 By unifying the U.S. 
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nation-building effort, CORDS had created the capacity to coordinate the exer-
cise of leverage against all levels of GVN officialdom, from Saigon down into 
individual villages. But Komer continued to believe that the best way to exercise 
influence over the South Vietnamese was informally and quietly. Many of the 
South Vietnamese officials involved in attempting to reform the GVN—espe-
cially Chau and Thang—were particularly sensitive to the charge that they served 
American masters, especially when they went against the preferences of their 
own countrymen. Komer hence wanted to retain tight control over the exercise 
of leverage rather than devolving it to lower levels.61 As he explained in Janu-
ary 1968, “I do not want leverage considered as an advisory tool available to all 
our field personnel. It should only be applied at certain key power centers and 
only when other advisory techniques have not brought results. Even then, as few 
people as possible should know that we imposed our way and what methods we 
employed to do so.”62 This did not mean that CORDS personnel in the provinces 
were not supposed to try to influence their GVN counterparts; that was in fact 
the sum total of their job. What it did mean was that the direct imposition of the 
U.S. will or the use of coercion was to be limited. Komer was willing to go only 
so far away from the old USAID admonition to get along with your Vietnamese 
counterpart or get out. Given that the work of CORDS depended on a good rela-
tionship with GVN officials, threats to remove American support or resources 
would jeopardize the daily functioning of CORDS if they caused a GVN official 
to “lose face by knuckling under to his advisor.”63 Komer directed that if disputes 
arose at the provincial level over the actions of GVN officials, then PSAs should 
get the official to agree to an action plan and hold him accountable for imple-
mentation. But if cooperation was not forthcoming, then the PSA’s only recourse 
was to report the incident up the chain of command. Komer, Westmoreland, and 
Bunker would then decide what action was to be taken in light of overall U.S. 
interest.64 Westmoreland also favored a “low key, behind the scenes” approach to 
influencing the GVN.65 How much change could be leveraged out of the GVN 
under such conditions would be a key question for CORDS.
Komer had once been in favor of a greater use of leverage but believed that he 
had “mellowed” since arriving in-country and realizing “that the practical prob-
lems just look a lot different when you’re out there on the implementing end.”66 
While he acknowledged that the United States had to pressure the GVN into 
reforms, this pressure had to be carefully calibrated so as not to undermine the 
independence of the GVN in the long term. It was also crucial to avoid a nation-
alist backlash that would make the GVN’s task of winning over the rural popu-
lation even more difficult. For the thousands of Americans who now came to 
South Vietnam convinced they could leverage useful reform from the country’s 
regime, doing so both effectively and sensitively became the key challenge ahead.
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CORDS’s First Year
It was in Komer’s hard-pushing nature to hit the ground running. After CORDS 
was established in May 1967, he set about trying to have an immediate impact on 
the effectiveness of the GVN’s local government. As during his time in Washing-
ton, he seemed to place his faith in the mass application of American resources to 
achieve this end. He had little to say about long-running disagreements between 
U.S. agencies over how best to pursue nation building, for instance whether the 
provision of economic goods or the intangibles of motivation and ideology were 
more important. Komer’s general message was for everyone to push harder on 
all fronts, and eventually the GVN would muddle through. But his efforts were 
frustrated by two long-running problems in South Vietnam: the rural security 
situation and the return of governmental instability in Saigon. Faced with these 
challenges, Komer and CORDS appeared to be as helpless as their predecessors.
Komer’s attempt to have an immediate impact on GVN performance was known 
as Project Takeoff. He named it for Walt Rostow’s theory of economic takeoff, which 
held that developing countries passed through a number of stages of economic 
development before taking off into self-sustaining growth.67 In a vivid demonstra-
tion of the impossibility of applying large-scale visions of modernization to wartime 
South Vietnam, Komer’s goals in the project were considerably more limited.
While Thang had attempted in 1967 to impose on provincial and district gov-
ernments an overall national plan for strengthening the GVN, based largely on the 
RD cadre effort, he had failed. Corps commanders and province chiefs continued 
to operate as they wished, with little fear of punishment if they did not follow 
central direction. As was typical in South Vietnam, the program had also been 
slow to begin until after the Tet celebrations, which fell at the end of January.68 
In the words of CORDS officials, the GVN’s reform efforts for the year remained 
hampered by an adverse security situation, “a general lack of enthusiasm among 
officials at all levels of GVN participation,” and the limited ability of central GVN 
officials such as Thang to coordinate and influence local government around the 
country.69 These were the perennial bugbears of South Vietnamese rural gover-
nance. Security problems continued, and no major improvement appeared to be 
on the horizon if the war remained within its current dynamics. A major CORDS 
report in August concluded: “The VC have the capability to counter pacifica-
tion throughout SVN with few exceptions. The strength of the infrastructure and 
local VC units has not changed substantially despite successes . . . against main 
force units.”70 In other words, the struggle for security, much less nation build-
ing, was only just beginning. It was around this time that Knowlton was briefing 
visitors from Washington with a map that showed how little progress had been 
made in controlling the countryside since 1954.
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A fundamental problem faced by the GVN as it attempted to spread its admin-
istrative control throughout the country was a lack of resources. Even with U.S. 
forces fighting the bulk of the main-force war, the GVN did not have the military 
or administrative assets to control all of the countryside at the same time. Even 
where an ARVN presence could be established, South Vietnamese soldiers were 
frequently abusive toward the local population and defined their goal narrowly as 
preventing the visible movement of enemy units. This meant that an ARVN pres-
ence might appear to provide “security” while doing nothing to challenge covert 
NLF administration, much less the population’s allegiance to it. The main U.S.-
backed attempt to bridge the gap between the people and the GVN’s local organs 
thus far—the RD cadres—were often unwelcome in the villages as well. But even 
if they had been successful, there were not enough RD cadres to go around. This 
was especially the case given the high rate of attrition they suffered. In the sum-
mer of 1967, the political scientist Samuel Huntington arrived in South Vietnam 
for a six-week study of the GVN’s nation-building program. After visiting fifteen 
provinces in all four corps areas, Huntington concluded that “improvements in 
security produced by the introduction of a governmental presence last only so 
long as the presence lasts.” After government forces left, the NLF’s administration 
resurfaced. Noting that the United States and the GVN did not have “sufficient 
military forces, administrative personnel, or RD cadres to saturate the entire 
countryside simultaneously,” Huntington concluded that “pacification by itself 
cannot produce comprehensive or lasting rural security.”71
Project Takeoff was CORDS’s attempt to improve the situation against this 
grim background. The project was, according to one briefing, “designed to focus 
attention on the top priorities and to marshall the effort and the resources to make 
pacification work.”72 It did not involve any new projects or initiatives, but rather 
was designed to emphasize the activities that Komer felt were most important at 
that stage. Project Takeoff accordingly set eight priorities: improving 1968 plan-
ning, accelerating a program called Chieu Hoi aimed at encouraging defections 
from the NLF, mounting an attack on the NLF’s infrastructure, expanding and 
improving ARVN support of pacification, expanding the RD effort, increasing 
refugee-handling capabilities, revamping the police, and pressing land reform.73 
These were all goals the GVN was already pursuing. Nation builders who had 
been in the country longer than Komer were quick to note the lack of originality 
in the plan. John Paul Vann wrote to Daniel Ellsberg in August that “Komer has 
been a big disappointment to me” and sardonically questioned the value of a plan 
that was a mere “intensification of current efforts.”74 Others shared Vann’s skep-
ticism. Corson, the Marine officer who was handy with his fists, stated: “Komer 
made it plain to the CORDS people that they were going to do better and were 
going to operate as a team, but then he neglected to make clear exactly what they 
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were to do.”75 Much as the attempt by Washington officials to urge forty-one 
different programs on the GVN in the summer of 1965 had shown they lacked a 
coherent plan, Project Takeoff was a sign that Komer had no clear sense of priori-
ties or idea of how to deliver a radical departure in U.S. efforts.
Nor did Komer manage to make headway in winning the cooperation of key 
figures in the GVN for a joint program in 1967. Without the involvement of the 
Saigon leadership in drawing up the CORDS programs, there was little incen-
tive for provincial and district officials around the country to follow them. With 
the Americans remaining outside the chain of command and acting merely as 
advisers, GVN officials had nothing to gain by following a program that their 
own bosses in Saigon seemed to regard as unimportant. Even if Komer had pos-
sessed a clear and incisive vision for how to achieve nation building, rather than 
a vague list of priorities, he would have been stymied by the continued infighting 
and lack of focus on rural nation building that continued to characterize Saigon 
politics.
The problem started with Thieu and Ky. Bolstered by the American support he 
had received during the Honolulu Conference, in early 1966 Ky tried to orches-
trate the ouster of the Vietnamese commander of I Corps, Nguyen Chanh Thi. 
The son of a French mandarin from the old imperial capital of Hue, Thi had been 
one of the most independent of the corps commanders, running his realm as a 
personal fiefdom. Following the practice of local strongmen back to the days of 
the emperors, Thi aligned himself much more closely with local political forces in 
the northern reaches of South Vietnam than he did with the central government. 
In his case, this meant cultivating ties with the activist Buddhist movement, 
which was strong in and around Hue. Though this movement was extremely 
diverse, its core idea was a rejection of violence by both the Communists and the 
GVN and an embrace of what one activist called “the politics of reconciliation 
to bring peace and happiness to the country.” The movement’s leaders refused 
to take a stance in favor of either side in the war, viewing soldiers on both sides 
as helpless peasants who were “victims of society’s ignorance and injustice.”76 
The moral evenhandedness of the movement was interpreted by the GVN as 
tacit support for the Communists, and the movement was even suspected of 
being secretly directed from Hanoi. Thi’s flirtation with the movement was hence 
extremely provocative to Saigon. When Ky finally moved against Thi, Buddhist 
leaders declared a “struggle movement” and attracted dissident ARVN units to 
protect them. After months of a tense standoff, loyalist ARVN units crushed the 
dissidents in street-to-street fighting in Hue and Da Nang. Thi was sent into exile 
and the Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang put under house arrest, ending the 
struggle movement.77
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From the perspective of Thieu and Ky, the removal of Thi was a necessary step 
to decrease the autonomy of a corps commander who had gone too far. It also 
meant crushing the last organized movement in South Vietnamese urban poli-
tics that was strongly anti-American, as the burning of the U.S. consulate in Hue 
during the struggle movement had demonstrated.78 But it also had other conse-
quences. During the course of quelling the movement, the duo felt compelled 
to agree to a timeline for the national constitutional assembly and subsequent 
elections they had agreed to in principle at the Honolulu Conference. This would 
mean a civilianization of the government, at least formally, with either Thieu or 
Ky leaving the armed forces and becoming the civilian president. Although the 
Thieu-Ky regime had seen off the last major non-Communist challenge to the 
Saigon regime until the end of the war, they now became absorbed in the ques-
tion of what the outcome of the election would be. Until September 1967 when 
the elections were held, Thieu and Ky were engaged in a struggle for power with 
each other to determine who would emerge as the paramount figure in the GVN. 
They had little time to worry about CORDS. Project Takeoff was not briefed to 
GVN officials because “the attention and effort of the GVN has been so taken 
up with the elections that Takeoff would not have been understood or given the 
time it merits.”79 Komer nevertheless brought the subject up with Ky, who gave 
it a “vague blessing.”80 In these conditions, even with the best ideas in the world, 
CORDS could accomplish little.
According to Vann, it was “absolute madness” to expect programs drawn up 
unilaterally by Americans without the backing of Saigon to be followed by pro-
vincial and district governments throughout the country.81 Local advisers were 
left to attempt to persuade their GVN counterparts on their own, a task made 
only marginally easier by the creation of CORDS. The new agency did at least 
put an end to what Bui Diem called the “rivalries and bureaucratic games” fought 
between Americans at the local level when their efforts had been split between 
various agencies. This had diluted American influence by overloading local GVN 
officials with conflicting advice, making it easy for them to ignore it.82 Yet while 
the creation of CORDS did at least unify advisory functions on the American 
side, this did not necessarily make it easier for local advisers to exercise leverage 
over their counterparts.
The ability of CORDS advisers to achieve their goals was dependent entirely 
on how they managed their relationship with their GVN counterpart. Advis-
ers communicated extensively with their GVN counterparts and often became 
aware of a gaping chasm in worldview and priorities. Advisers necessarily spent 
much of their time managing this relationship. They could not impose their will 
through coercion, and most believed it counterproductive to establish a belliger-
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ent or hectoring relationship with their counterpart. Instead, they likened their 
roles as akin to acting as diplomats, lobbyists, or confidence tricksters.83
Most province chiefs hailed from the urban, French-influenced class and had 
little understanding of the rural population. They had risen to field-grade ranks 
in the ARVN, meaning they had likely participated in the war against the Viet 
Minh on the side of the French, or been trained by officers who had. What con-
tact they did have with the rural population thus far in their career had often 
been down a gun barrel. And having risen to respectable ranks in the byzantine 
politics of the ARVN without been killed or purged, province chiefs frequently 
went about their new jobs with an abundance of caution. Most American advis-
ers found their counterparts difficult to persuade to change their established pat-
terns of behavior just because an enthusiastic new American had arrived in their 
orbit. Americans were often struck by what they regarded as the lethargy of Viet-
namese local officials, while others complained that the chiefs hardly knew their 
provinces better than the Americans did and refused to travel around them.84
How to manage their counterpart relationship correctly was the key task 
facing CORDS advisers, and often forced them into compromises. Having few 
methods of acting unilaterally, they had to accomplish almost everything in 
cooperation with local officials. “This is the Vietnamese country and we’re advi-
sors,” explained one American who served in 1966. “This is one of the things we 
have to realize—we are nothing but advisors and when we act in any capacity 
other than advisors we are out of our element. I think that persuasion is the 
word that is necessary and I think that it is very necessary to be able to persuade 
by being knowledgeable and know what we’re doing.”85 Another adviser, who 
served in I Corps in the same year, felt that doing anything against the wishes 
of the province chief was unwise. “The day when we start going this way and 
he wants to go the other way,” he remarked, “our usefulness is terminated.” The 
application of careful persuasion after gaining the chief ’s trust—which this 
adviser believed could take four or five months, or over a third of the length of 
an advisory tour—was the only way to go.86 The creation of CORDS did little 
to change this dynamic. Most advisers operated circumspectly, believing that 
developing hostile relations with their counterpart would destroy their ability 
to operate. Guidance sent to all PSAs noted that advice should be given to the 
province chief “in privacy so that he will not lose face when passing it to subor-
dinates.”87 Acting as a behind-the-scenes counselor and manipulator, advisers 
clearly had some power but still relied on their local partner. In 1970, an end-
of-tour report by Louis F. Janowski, a Foreign Service officer who served in 
various advisory positions in IV Corps, stated that “too often good counterpart 
relations simply means letting your counterpart do exactly what he wants or 
raising minimal objects [sic] to his actions.”88
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Virtually no adviser regarded his counterpart as a puppet who was easy to 
manipulate into doing what the adviser wanted. “Brad” described the handicaps 
that faced advisers in interacting with their counterparts on an equal basis. “In 
the first place,” he began, “let’s face it, you probably tower over the guy, you weigh 
twice what he does, you probably are enjoying a salary several times his, and you 
have all kinds of amenities that he probably does not enjoy, such as access to 
the PX and all the goodies therein.” Given the fact that advisers could also leave 
the country if they had to, whereas GVN officials could not, Brad concluded: 
“You’re starting the relationship under a hell of a handicap, and it’s a miracle 
that the guy doesn’t hate your guts on sight.”89 It was also incredibly difficult for 
an adviser to grasp the context in which his counterpart operated. An American 
adviser faced with the task of understanding the political, cultural, social, and 
economic intricacies affecting Phu Yen’s province chief in 1968 confronted the 
same task that a Vietnamese would have faced if parachuted into California and 
ordered to understand the priorities of Governor Ronald Reagan. One docu-
ment written by an experienced adviser and distributed for the edification of 
his PSA colleagues listed sixty-four separate questions about the counterpart’s 
religious affiliations, business interests, sex life, political links, and educational 
background, the answers to which could bear on his behavior.90 Few American 
advisers were equipped to understand even a fraction of these factors, and the 
language barrier only exacerbated the problem.
One of the main problems facing CORDS advisers on a daily basis was encour-
aging their counterparts to focus on the rural population even when this did not 
accord with their own interests or priorities. The fact that almost all province 
chiefs were ARVN officers with a limited background in understanding rural life 
meant that PSAs could find it difficult to get them to agree on the importance of 
such efforts.91 By late 1971 a CORDS briefer reported that in rural South Viet-
nam, “the center of power rests with the province chief, who is by and large an 
Army Colonel, does not have an M.A. in Economics or Public administration, 
and has been fighting a war all his life.” The chief ’s characteristic response to 
being told to involve himself in civil matters, the briefer said, was “to have noth-
ing to do with it because he would have nothing to say.”92 Vann considered the 
GVN to be “dominated by military men who have to be coerced into performing 
civil functions, and it was a strange role for them to perform.”93 Cao Van Vien, 
chief of staff of the ARVN, likewise commented after the war that “most ARVN 
field commanders acted as if they were totally detached from the problems of 
pacification and concerned themselves solely with military matters.” According 
to Vien, the fault lay with the Americans, who had trained ARVN commanders to 
fight conventional war and left them “woefully inadequate as contestants of the 
‘other war.’ ”94 CORDS advisers faced the difficult task of undoing what decades 
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of ingrained cultural and social biases and professional training had wrought on 
their counterparts.
In attempting to persuade their counterparts to focus on civil functions, the 
methods used by CORDS advisers varied. Most sought to see their counterparts 
at least daily, and also to develop social relationships with them. Because of their 
access to the technical knowledge on matters such as agriculture that Ameri-
can provincial organizations could supply, as well as access to the resources that 
CORDS was willing to invest in local development and reform programs, advis-
ers could become valuable to their counterpart. Yet most advisers felt the need 
to not appear too indispensable, lest they undermined the appearance of the 
province chief ’s autonomy and sovereignty within his own province. One adviser 
commented that “it was very difficult to work in such a manner to try to get 
things done and to control things while, at the same time, presenting the facade 
that I was not manipulating anything.”95 Another described his job as akin to a 
lobbyist, but one who did not want to seem too close to the province chief lest 
it arouse suspicion that American interests were in fact governing the chief ’s 
actions. “Try not to give the overly [sic] impression that you are with him all the 
time,” he advised, “because he either resents it or if he doesn’t resent it, he starts 
looking like an American puppet.”96 With factors such as these limiting the direct 
influence that an adviser could have on a province chief, some sought indirect 
means such as developing closer relationships with the province chief ’s deputies. 
They could then plant an idea further down the GVN hierarchy and endorse it 
when it came across the province chief ’s desk, maintaining a facade of noninter-
ference.97 However, such interventions seemed to undermine the long-term goal 
of fostering an independent GVN.
Far from being the compliant puppets of NLF propaganda, GVN officials also 
actively sought to manage the relationship with their American counterpart in 
a way that benefited their own interests and in line with their own conception 
of their duties. As CORDS advisers were attempting to reshape the behavior of 
their Vietnamese counterparts, GVN officials were also attempting to shape and 
control the behavior of the Americans. The description by “Anh” of his han-
dling of American officials is instructive. A self-confident son of the rural elite, 
Anh was born into a rich landowning family in Kien Tuong Province. Deprived 
of the ability to enjoy the family fortune by the coming of the revolution and 
war in the 1940s, he partook of the rural elite’s traditional way out by fleeing to 
Saigon with his family as his home province became a Communist stronghold. 
Proud of his rural roots, Anh attended the National Institute of Administration 
(NIA) and began working in local administration under the Diem regime. Along 
the way he attended college courses in government administration in the United 
States, including at Michigan State University and the University of Connecticut. 
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Choosing to continue to work in government service despite the possibility of 
much higher salaries in the private sector, Anh was exactly the sort of socially 
conscious civilian that many Americans and Vietnamese leaders like NIA chief 
Nghiem Dang saw as crucial to strengthening the GVN.98
Anh believed that Americans had to be domesticated and taught to “think Viet-
namese” if they were to be successful advisers, while one Vietnamese adviser to 
IVS despaired at whether this was possible, as his countrymen had “our own way 
of thinking, our own logic,” which was difficult for Americans to understand.99 
Anh said that the Americans “should think that they work for the Vietnamese” 
and “never” give orders themselves. Instead, the only proper role of Americans 
was to “advise discreetly” while remaining invisible behind their counterpart. 
Vietnamese officials like Anh worried that an influx of thousands of American 
advisers would undermine the apparent independence and sovereignty of local 
GVN organs, and called for American contingents to place a focus on the quality 
rather than quantity of advisers. “I recommend very strongly that Americans be 
trained as advisors, not doers,” he told USAID personnel, “as otherwise you will 
leave the impression of being a conqueror, a colonialist, or a capitalist”—in other 
words, the exact impression of American personnel that NLF propaganda aimed 
to create.100 Another South Vietnamese official who had “known and worked 
with many Americans” also strongly believed that CORDS should stick to its role 
as a “support” organization rather than appearing to override the sovereignty 
of Vietnamese officials. In his view, good American officials were “humble” and 
only distributed material aid or advice through Vietnamese channels, so it could 
be clear to the population that “their local government helped them.”101 Vien 
likewise believed that “there was a requirement for US advisers to be modest and 
self-effacing in their life and work.” They also needed to “exercise tact and persua-
sion instead of leverage to get things done, because no Vietnamese could stand a 
loss of face”—especially to a foreigner. For the Americans to act otherwise would 
give credence to the “vicious slanderings of Communist propaganda.”102
Anh made clear that he viewed the balance of power in the relationship 
between him and his adviser as favoring himself. He mused about the possibility 
of having to “oust” a bad adviser, and boasted of another that “I made him behave 
the way he should, one way or another.” Anh also believed it was crucial for the 
effectiveness of any GVN government official that he maintain his independence, 
as any Vietnamese who seemed too close to the Americans or who seemed to dis-
play what Anh regarded as American patterns of thought—“modern, scientific 
and rational”—risked being ostracized by the rest of the GVN hierarchy.103 While 
Vien believed that the presence of U.S. advisers had led to “modern management 
techniques” and “scientific knowledge” diffusing throughout the GVN hierarchy, 
Anh’s grassroots perspective suggests this cultural and organizational change was 
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limited in practice.104 Anh also questioned the quality of many American advis-
ers, and by extension the usefulness of their presence. He complained that while 
the French had sent their best administrators to Vietnam, the Americans did not 
seem able to muster a similar cohort of experienced and dedicated officials. “For 
the sake and honor of the United States, which has very good administrators as 
far as I know,” he said, “they should send their good administrators, who should 
impress the Vietnamese.” Faced with the prospect of having to work with less 
impressive Americans, he advised his Vietnamese colleagues to closely study the 
weak points of their counterparts and work around them. He also complained 
that younger Americans like the Tigers could give the impression of “lacking in 
experience,” and said he preferred middle-aged Americans who had technical 
expertise rather than young generalists.105
An incident in 1966 demonstrated that even the vast amount of American 
combat power deployed to South Vietnam could not protect U.S. advisers from 
threats of physical violence at the hands of their counterparts if they went too 
strongly against their wishes. A USOM province representative believed he had 
discovered a corruption scandal with “implications all over the Delta.” At the 
time, the local corps commander was General Dan Vang Quang, whose financial 
dishonesty was notorious. Believing that corruption needed to be rooted out 
if the GVN was to become stronger and more legitimate, the American began 
investigating. Then one night the local chief of police invited him to ride in his 
car to inspect a remote outpost, only for the adviser to feel the cold muzzle of the 
carbine pressed against his neck from the backseat. With the help of a “goon,” the 
police chief was attempting to intimidate the American to get him to stop asking 
questions. When the adviser informed his superiors in Saigon, they told him they 
were powerless to take action and offered him a transfer to another province. 
They were unable to take any action against the police chief, and with Ky having 
offered corps commanders the power of virtual warlords within their fiefdoms, 
the central GVN would not act against him either.106 Despite its reconfiguration 
of the American presence in the provinces, CORDS could do little to address 
problems and dynamics such as these without the cooperation of the central 
GVN in ending the corps commander system. But with their attention elsewhere 
and their reliance on the commanders undiminished, neither Ky or Thieu was 
willing to take such a step in 1967.
Faced with these problems, long-serving nation builders like Vann believed 
that Komer and CORDS had done little to help them. Having to deal daily 
with corrupt or incompetent GVN local officials shielded by the corps com-
mander system, they began to question the value of Komer’s subtle approach 
to influencing an apparently unmoved GVN. Advisers like Vann wanted much 
more dramatic action from the center to radically overhaul the GVN’s system 
SETTING UP CORDS      91
of rural governance. “What is desperately needed,” Vann opined to Ellsberg, “is 
a strong, dynamic, ruthless, colonialist type ambassador with the authority to 
relieve generals, mission chiefs and every other bastard who does not follow a 
stated, clearcut policy which, in itself, at a minimum, involves the US in the hir-
ing and firing of Vietnamese leaders.”107 Another American wrote that “Saigon 
has apparently given up all hope of regaining lost leverage over RD/pacification 
execution despite repeated pleas from field advisors and a history of program 
failure.” Castigating what he saw as “supersensitivity for Vietnamese sensibili-
ties,” he added: “With 200 men dying each week to buy [the] GVN time, it is 
very difficult for me to agree that the RD program is primarily a Vietnamese 
affair.”108 But a heavy-handed U.S. approach is precisely what Bunker, Komer, 
and Westmoreland all ruled out, as likely to be too upsetting to nationalist sen-
sitivities and risking derailing the constitutional process. Given the potential for 
anti-American unrest that the Buddhist struggle movement had revealed, their 
opinions appear valid.
Out in the provinces, the Communist movement remained largely unmoved 
by GVN nation-building efforts in 1967. Given the honesty with which the 
internal documents of the Communist movement usually addressed problems 
and shortcomings, this is notable. American military operations were placing 
pressure on its infrastructure, but observers in the movement saw little evidence 
that U.S. and GVN military victories were being followed up by nation build-
ing. In the central lowland province of Phu Yen, an NVA infantry division had 
been placed on the defensive by American search-and-destroy operations, and 
the number of people living in the Communist “liberated area” had shrunk to 
one-tenth of its peak size. Assessing GVN actions, the NVA observers correctly 
concluded that the operations had three phases: search operations to drive away 
large Communist units, police efforts to go after party infrastructure, and the 
effort to “re-organize their control” by reestablishing GVN village and hamlet 
administration. Whenever the enemy tried to move beyond stage one, “these 
occasional efforts were only temporary and would disappear as we redoubled 
our efforts,” the NVA reported. Lacking the assets or policies to reoccupy the 
entire countryside, much less carry out nation building, the GVN was disrupt-
ing Communist control but doing little to establish its own.109 An NLF agent 
reported from Phu Yen in June that although the RD cadres were spreading 
“demagogic” propaganda and trying to ingratiate themselves with the villagers, 
the GVN was having little success in reestablishing permanent hamlet govern-
ments.110 Although enemy military operations were forcing Communist cadres 
to live an underground or mobile life and making it difficult for them to engage 
with the population, there seemed little indication the GVN was making inroads 
among the population either.111
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Disillusioned with the Saigon regime—and reeling from his conflict with 
Thang—Chau had left its service in 1967 to run as a legislator. Still head of the 
Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MRD), Thang was hence the highest-
ranking GVN official who kept his attention on rural reform. Thang hoped in 
1968 to subordinate the corps commanders to the central government and to 
push a national reform effort, with benchmarks to be met and punishments to be 
dispensed if they were not. Yet he was unable to successfully curb the autonomy 
of the four “warlords” in the corps areas. The notes taken by a U.S. liaison officer 
of a meeting in late September 1967 reflected the fact that “at least two (if not all 
four) of the Corps had completed their 1968 RD plans long before coming to the 
meeting . . . MRD officers were not amused.”112
More fundamental reforms of the structure of the GVN would be required if 
the autonomy of the corps commanders was ever to be reduced enough to allow 
the central state in Saigon to design and implement national programs of the 
sort Thang wanted. For the GVN to acquire the strength to contest the Com-
munist movement, it needed to revamp the relationship of Saigon to its local 
organs of power. Thang devoted much energy during this period to pushing for 
reforms of the relationship between Saigon, the corps commanders, and prov-
ince chiefs. He wanted to reduce the power of the corps commanders to appoint 
province and district chiefs, which the commanders used to shelter incompe-
tent and corrupt officials. As one American wrote of the futility of economic 
aid delivered via a corrupt government, “too many Vietnamese counterparts see 
no value in the program and either have no desire to execute it or demonstrate 
an intolerable knack for converting the Self Help program into a Help Yourself 
program.”113 Thang believed the solution was to appoint province and district 
chiefs directly from Saigon, removing the ability of corps commanders to shelter 
corrupt officials in return for kickbacks. Under Thang’s proposals, province and 
district officials would be selected by the Saigon authorities and trained at Vung 
Tau. Thang’s proposals were thus a continuation of the task of centralizing the 
nation-building effort, removing its direction from the hands of the myriad local 
GVN actors who had come to prominence in the chaotic years since the coup 
against Diem and instead enforcing national plans and standards set in Saigon. 
Duly appointed by the central GVN, the new breed of province and district chiefs 
would be beholden to it.
The problem was that those local officials who stood to lose from such 
reforms did not intend to be passive throughout this process, and neither 
Thang nor the Americans had the power to bring about such an overhaul 
of the GVN. The fate of Thang’s efforts revealed much about how little had 
changed in South Vietnamese politics even after Thieu won the presidential 
election of September 1967. Regardless of the veneer of civilian government, 
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Saigon politics remained military politics. Thieu was extremely reticent to 
undermine the power of the corps commanders, because he believed that he 
owed his position to them and because to challenge them would create, as 
he told an American interlocutor, “dissension and instability.” Protesting that 
he had no independent power base to resist coups, Thieu said he had “no 
intention of standing against the entire army as President Diem did.”114 Even 
though Thieu had emerged as president after the 1967 elections, his ongo-
ing rivalry with Ky also made him skeptical. Given that the proposals for the 
selection and training of province and district chiefs would allow Thang and 
Ky to select the individuals involved and then, as an American observer put it, 
to “control the countryside through the province chiefs” who were beholden 
to them for their jobs, this only compounded Thieu’s problems by essentially 
demanding that he take power away from his own key constituency and place 
it in the hands of his opponents.115
As the dispute between Thieu and Thang raged, Komer and other high-level 
U.S. officials were forced by their own theory of leverage to tread carefully, even 
though they broadly favored Thang’s proposals. Thang’s own attitude limited 
what they could accomplish on his behalf. Like Chau, Thang was unwilling to 
ask for Americans to back him against figures in his own government, believing 
it would undermine his nationalist credentials.116 Komer and other U.S. officials 
tried to use their access to Thieu to gently influence him in favor of Thang’s pro-
posals, but their results were limited. On January 2, 1968, Thieu tried to square 
the circle between his two main constituencies—the ARVN and the Americans—
by announcing limited reforms to the structure of the armed forces. The corps 
commanders and commanders of ARVN divisions would have their power over 
the provinces diluted, Thieu announced. But the change would come only once 
a number of what a senior U.S. observer considered “crippling stipulations” had 
been met, including an improvement in the military situation, which was unlikely 
anytime soon.117 Thang responded by submitting his resignation.118 Bunker and 
the CIA believed that Thieu was right to move cautiously in curtailing the pre-
rogatives of the military, and Westmoreland went so far as to tell Thang’s military 
superiors that Thang “is old enough to know better” than to resign.119 This split 
in the U.S. community was the final nail in the coffin of any attempt to use U.S. 
leverage at the center to make Thieu move more rapidly. Faced with the prospect 
of a governmental collapse and the central GVN’s complete loss of control as in 
the period after the coup against Diem, Komer’s preference for working with the 
corps commander system broadly as it currently stood, combined with the fear 
of the unknown, overrode any desire to push for radical change. Then, just as an 
apparent impasse loomed, it was broken—in the most violent and undesirable 
way imaginable.
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THE “OPPORTUNITY”
As 1967 drew to a close, the war in South Vietnam was stalemated. In the dry 
season that lasted from October 1966 to May 1967, U.S. commander William 
Westmoreland had sent the formidable U.S. military machine that had been 
built up in South Vietnam on a series of offensives designed to win back the 
initiative and inflict heavy losses on Communist forces. U.S. brigades spread 
out in a checkerboard fashion over the countryside and sought out the enemy, 
drawing on their advantages in mobility and artillery. The main focus was the 
area around Saigon, where two massive U.S. operations code-named Cedar 
Falls and Junction City sought to annihilate the Iron Triangle, a Communist 
base area that had existed since the war against the French. Though they 
inflicted heavy damage on NLF and NVA forces, U.S. troops were soon forced to 
withdraw, ceding the sanctuary back to its occupants. Meanwhile, Communist 
forces maintained the initiative both in the northern part of South Vietnam and 
in the mountainous areas of what had formerly been Annam, and a grueling 
guerrilla war simmered on in the Mekong Delta. Westmoreland simply did not 
have enough troops to guard against enemy offensives in the north, destroy and 
occupy enemy base areas around Saigon, and drive the enemy from the delta. 
The result was stalemate.1
It would fall to Hanoi to break it. Throughout 1967, the Communist lead-
ership was split into two factions. One, headed by party general-secretary Le 
Duan, believed the time would soon be ripe to launch a final military offensive 
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in South Vietnam. Much like in the months before the U.S. intervention in 
1964–1965, the Communists hoped they could break the ARVN with one 
decisive push and triumphantly enter the cities amid an anti-GVN and anti- 
American popular uprising. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in South 
Vietnam added a new layer of complexity that would be dealt with by diverting 
their attention to battles far from the cities, such as the famous siege of Khe 
Sanh. On the other side of the debate stood a group of officials headed by Ho 
Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, who argued that Le Duan’s adherents misun-
derstood the state of the war and that the Communists needed to dig in for a 
long struggle. A premature push would waste revolutionary resources and make 
the final victory more difficult to attain. As the matter was settled by day in 
high-level debates dripping with Marxist-Leninist verbiage, by night the secret 
police rounded up journalists, academics, and mid-ranking officials opposed 
to Le Duan’s approach and spirited them away. Ho and Giap left the country 
in unclear circumstances and remained there when the offensive began. Cer-
tainly not any more democratic than the Saigon regime, the dominant faction 
in Hanoi was more ruthlessly effective at imposing a strategic direction on its 
agents. Le Duan had won, and the orders for the offensive were carried south 
in August.2
The decisive push that North Vietnam’s paramount leader wanted came on 
the night of January 30, when combined NLF and NVA forces struck nearly 
every major urban area in South Vietnam. Saigon, which had long existed in 
an insulated bubble punctured only by acts of terrorism, saw major combat for 
the first time. The attackers seized almost all of Hue, where they would remain 
until dislodged by bloody street-to-street fighting in early March. While neither 
the collapse of the ARVN nor the urban uprising that Le Duan had hoped for 
occurred as a result of the offensive, its impact on American policy eventually 
marked a turning point in the war. Under domestic pressure from a public and 
media who had been led to believe that the war was on the verge of being won, 
Johnson soon announced that he was halting almost all bombing of North Viet-
nam and seeking to open peace talks with Hanoi. Formal talks opened in Paris 
on May 13. Sensing weakness, Le Duan ordered a second wave of attacks, result-
ing in a May offensive that the Americans dubbed “mini-Tet.” While the ARVN 
still held firm, Saigon again saw widespread destruction. Hanoi ordered a third 
wave in August, but by this point the Communist movement could summon only 
scattered ground attacks and the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian 
population in Saigon by long-range rockets. After the August offensive fizzled, 
Communist main forces withdrew to base areas and cross-border sanctuaries to 
lick their wounds, allowing Bunker to report in October that allied forces had 
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TABLE 1. U.S. KIA by corps area, 1967–1968
1ST QUARTER 2ND QUARTER 3RD QUARTER 4TH QUARTER TOTAL
I Corps
1967 684 1,604 1,348 1,006 4,642
1968 2,646 2,892 1,675 877 8,090
% change 286.84% 80.3% 24.26% –12.82% 74.28%
II Corps
1967 530 427 271 558 1,786
1968 512 447 300 170 1,429
% change –3.4% 4.68% 10.7% –69.53% –19.99%
III Corps
1967 773 647 367 688 2,475
1968 1,340 1,102 810 812 4,064
% change 73.35% 70.32% 120.71% 18.02% 64.20%
IV Corps
1967   56 58 69 93 276
1968 326 250 142 161 879
% change 482.14% 331.03% 105.8% 73.12% 218.48%
This table is adapted from figures in Thomas C. Thayer, ed., A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, 1965–
1972 (Washington, DC: OASD(SA)RP Southeast Asia Intelligence Division, 1975), 8:125.
“more freedom of movement than they have had at any time since the start of 
the U.S. build-up.”3
The year 1968 was hence one of dizzying and seemingly contradictory shifts. 
By its end, Le Duan’s hope of a quick termination to the war lay in tatters, but 
apparently faltering American will had opened up a new possible path to vic-
tory through diplomacy. Meanwhile, the situation in the countryside had been 
rendered fluid by the Communist decision to mobilize all of its resources for 
the urban offensives. After an initial period in which they were stricken by 
despair, as the dust settled U.S. and GVN leaders in South Vietnam saw the 
opportunity to launch a nation-building offensive unlike anything they had 
attempted before.
TABLE 2. ARVN KIA by quarter, 1967–1968
1ST QUARTER 2ND QUARTER 3RD QUARTER 4TH QUARTER TOTAL
Nationwide
1967 3,092 3,222 2,834 3,568 12,716
1968 9,424 6,241 5,147 3,453 24,625
% change 204.79% 93.7% 81.62% –3.22% 93.65%
This table is adapted from figures in Thayer, Systems Analysis View, 8:217, 222, and 6:27.
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Holding the Line: The 1968 Offensives  
and Urban Relief
Although some high-ranking Americans would claim in postwar accounts that 
they did not share the panic that struck U.S. media and political circles in early 
1968, those involved in the nation-building effort were gravely shaken.4 It is easy 
to understand why. As tables 1 and 2 show, “Tet” should be understood not as a 
singular event but as the beginning of a year of unremitting military pressure on 
the United States and the GVN that only began to tail off in the fourth quarter. 
There were only three instances over the whole year when any given part of the 
country was safer for allied forces than it had been at the equivalent time the 
previous year, and two of these came in the last quarter.
Physical damage was also widespread. Around 150,000 homes had been 
destroyed during the year’s offensives, primarily in Hue and the greater Sai-
gon area.5 But smaller towns were not immune from the destruction either. In 
My Tho, the Mekong Delta hometown of President Thieu’s wife, the firepower 
required to dislodge two regiments of Communist forces left 25 percent of the 
population homeless.6 The fact that much of the damage was inflicted by U.S. 
firepower raised fears of rising anti-Americanism. As Saigon police chief Nguyen 
Van Luan, a close ally of Ky, complained: “The Viet Cong has no air force of its 
own, so it uses ours.”7 Playing on these themes, NLF propaganda attempted to 
drive a wedge between the Americans and their “puppets” in the GVN. Leaflets 
were distributed accusing “Thieu-Ky” of “lending a hand to the foreigner’s colo-
nialist mission . . . destroying countless lives and properties, flooding our country 
with death, sorrows and sufferings.”8 With both U.S. firepower and Communist 
shelling of major cities bringing destruction to the urban population like never 
before, NLF propaganda could easily prove effective. Bui Diem had previously 
noted on trips to Saigon that the war had seemed very distant, and the pop-
ulation occupied with making a living and the twists and turns of the Thieu-
Ky rivalry.9 After the offensives of 1968, the war would never seem so distant. 
Nguyen Thi Thu-Lam remembered that “never again were we to feel safe on the 
streets of Saigon.”10 The steady military pressure during the first three quarters of 
the year also vastly complicated the effort of resettling the homeless and restoring 
a sense of normalcy.
The initial damage to the GVN’s position in the countryside also seemed grave. 
Large numbers of RD cadres and local GVN officials had to be withdrawn from rural 
areas to aid with urban relief efforts and because of threats to their security, leading 
Komer to report in April that rural administration had been “seriously reduced.”11 
As at other times of stress and insecurity, fleeing from the rural communities of 
FIGURE 5. Devastation in Saigon in February 1968.
National Archives identifier 558530, General Black and White Photographic File of the Department of the Navy, 
Record Group 428, National Archives II at College Park, Maryland.
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which they supposedly were the leaders into the protective embrace of a distant 
state only underlined whom these officials really represented.12 By August and Sep-
tember, the NLF was announcing the creation of “liberation committees” in areas 
it controlled, following the promulgation of a Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment (PRG) in June.13 Although little more than a rebranding exercise for its infra-
structure in South Vietnam, these moves allowed the Communist movement to 
demonstrate to the world the extent of its political reach in South Vietnam and 
hence negotiate from a position of strength in the unfolding peace talks. Colby, 
now Komer’s deputy at CORDS, briefed military commanders in September that 
“in the event of a cease-fire, the enemy might claim political control of about one-
half of the population of South Vietnam.”14 As Komer recognized, it would require 
new military offensives into the countryside to dislodge this PRG infrastructure 
and restore GVN rule.15 Thus, the military pressure placed on both the United 
States and the GVN in 1968 was matched by a new political challenge. Both the top 
civilian and military leadership in South Vietnam recognized its importance, but 
they first had to deal with the crisis in the cities.16
If Vietnamese civilians no longer felt safe in the streets of Saigon, then Ameri-
can officials no longer felt safe in their strategy. The relentless military and 
psychological pressure of the spring of 1968 led Bunker to write to Washing-
ton during a dark moment to question “how long this can be endured without 
threatening all that has been achieved here.”17 Komer was even more pessimistic. 
In a briefing to journalists in late February, he said that pacification had suf-
fered extremely heavy setbacks in the Mekong Delta and I Corps, and that many 
hamlets previously considered “pacified” would now need returning to. While 
he noted there was a “vacuum” in the countryside after the heavy losses suffered 
by the Communist movement, he was pessimistic about the ability of the GVN 
to capitalize on it. And if the movement shifted its attention from the cities onto 
what was left of the GVN’s rural infrastructure, then “we’ll have problems, real 
problems,” Komer concluded.18 Several days after the briefing, Bunker dispatched 
Komer back to Washington to recuperate from the psychological strain placed on 
him by events. Bunker was so concerned about his subordinate’s mental state that 
he sent a secret cable to the White House asking that Komer not be pestered to 
take part in official meetings during his time in the capital.19
Nor was Colby immune from doubts. In February, shortly before he left to 
take over as Komer’s deputy at CORDS, Colby was one of several officials to 
place his name to a memo that seemed to ooze complete despair over current 
American strategy.20 The proposal, dubbed Operation Shock, stated, “Over the 
years the current leaders of Vietnam have developed a complacent assurance that 
American support is immutable. Consequently, they have felt free to approach 
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the war in terms of gradualism, favoritism among the limited circle of person-
alities at the top and only a casual attention to mobilizing popular support and 
engaging the population actively in the war. . . . The Tet offensive can be utilized 
in a frontal assault on these attitudes and habits.”
In the view of the memo, the GVN’s inability to protect its own borders 
without half a million American troops and to keep the enemy out of the Ameri-
can Embassy “demonstrated that the present GVN lacks some of the principal 
attributes of sovereignty.” Faced with a weak state that was dependent on it for 
survival, the United States was justified in demanding that the GVN “follow U.S. 
direction” and allow its own structure to be remade according to U.S. wishes. 
The authors argued that Thieu should be compelled to give a greater role to 
Thang and Ky and that the GVN should then be given one hundred days to rein-
vigorate the pacification effort, tackle corruption, and expand the government’s 
base among the population. If it failed, unspecified but severe consequences 
were to be threatened.21 Operation Shock was circulated by Director of Central 
Intelligence Richard Helms to several key figures in Washington, but without 
the authors being identified on the memo. It does not appear to have been cir-
culated in Saigon.
Operation Shock was wildly unrealistic in assuming that the United States 
could simply snap its fingers and solve problems that had already failed to be 
resolved in nearly fifteen years of American involvement in South Vietnam. It 
also ignored political realities in Saigon. As a later CIA study noted: “No one can 
seriously have thought that President Thieu would consent to put his nemesis 
Nguyen Cao Ky in charge of both a mass corruption purge and a national political 
front.”22 Colby’s contribution to the memo is curious because his actions after he 
became head of CORDS did not remotely reflect anything written in the docu-
ment. Nor were the other authors—Helms’s special assistant for Vietnam affairs, 
George Carver, and former Saigon station chief John Hart—bureaucratic gadflies. 
Consequently, it is hard to see the document as anything but the product of panic 
in the CIA in the immediate aftermath of the Communist offensives of early 1968.
American optimism was gradually restored as it became clear the Communist 
offensives would face military defeat, and as 1968 wore on, Komer turned to orga-
nizing joint U.S./GVN relief efforts for the urban population. As well as hoping 
to restore confidence in the government among the ravaged urban population, 
Komer hoped to establish a model of cooperation between CORDS and the Sai-
gon regime in the future. The United States and the GVN formed a joint executive 
committee to run what became known as Project Recovery.23 Project Takeoff had 
failed because of a lack of GVN cooperation, but Komer and his colleagues “in 
effect operated as part of the Vietnamese government” during Project Recovery.24 
The Central Recovery Committee was initially chaired by Ky, with Komer acting 
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FIGURE 6. Vietnamese refugees in northern South Vietnam, 1965. According 
to the U.S. Marine Corps photographer, “the wages of many years of war are 
reflected in the faces of this aged Vietnamese couple.”
National Archives identifier 532436, General Photograph File of the U.S. Marine Corps, Record Group 127, 
National Archives II at College Park, Maryland.
as his U.S. opposite number and Thang serving as chief of staff. Komer and his 
deputies also began attending GVN cabinet meetings during this period.
Project Recovery’s immediate focus was to provide for the vast numbers of 
evacuees created during Tet and the subsequent offensives. A CORDS report later 
noted that enemy offensives between Tet and August “generated over a million 
cases of people who, while they did not have to leave their homes for more than a 
few days, required assistance in reestablishing themselves after the death of rela-
tives and/or the destruction of their homes.”25 Unlike rural refugees, the urban 
refugees generated during Tet usually moved only very short distances from their 
homes and maintained access to their livelihoods once normal economic life was 
restored in the cities. But many saw their homes destroyed in heavy fighting and 
needed to be rehoused. There was also a fear among Americans in Saigon that 
food shortages might quickly lead to riots, which the Communists could then 
misrepresent as the general uprising they had predicted.26
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Feeling unable to trust its bureaucracy to oversee the rebuilding of shattered 
urban centers, the GVN decided the effort would take the form of “a community 
action project, with the government furnishing funds and materials and the peo-
ple building their own houses on presurveyed plots.”27 The plan was to provide 
direct, tangible aid to the refugees rather than relying on the GVN administration 
to supervise building projects. Thang won an argument with the Americans on 
the committee over whether the corps commanders could be made responsible 
for delivering aid to refugees. As well as not wanting the United States to com-
pletely supplant the GVN at the most basic task of providing shelter for its citi-
zens, he also argued that officials could be observed and punished for corruption 
during the process.28 As one U.S. official explained to a journalist, failure could 
have dire consequence for the GVN: “I think even the most corrupt official real-
izes what is at stake. The Government’s best support comes from the cities, and 
if it lost this support because of corruption in the refugee program it would be 
in serious trouble.”29
Komer was enthusiastic about Project Recovery, but his enthusiasm 
betrayed how limited was his grasp of the challenges of genuine nation build-
ing. It was one thing for the GVN to perform adequately in the distribution 
of American largesse to its citizens, and quite another for it to undertake 
fundamental reforms to build an active base of support and undermine the 
political appeal of the Communist movement. The need to focus on urban 
recovery had also meant a transfer of attention and resources away from rural 
areas, where the real battle for the allegiance of the population was still to be 
won.30 In addition, the nationwide refugee caseload actually grew substan-
tially over the course of 1968 despite Project Recovery’s efforts. There were 
nearly eight hundred thousand refugees at the end of 1967, and this casel-
oad had increased to over 1.3 million individuals by January 1969 despite 
the resettling of over a million temporary evacuees during 1968.31 Where 
the GVN’s rural administration was still functioning at all, it remained as 
sclerotic, centralized, and unresponsive as before. Local officials had to get 
permission from Saigon to take the smallest action, such as rebuilding a 
bridge or a classroom, and they could wait months for their requests to be 
answered.32 Komer’s earlier statement that he was lowering his sights “from 
the desirable to the doable” had now brought his sights very low indeed, 
admittedly through necessity. Project Recovery accomplished little more than 
helping the GVN stave off collapse in 1968, a necessary achievement but one 
that did not automatically promise a future of U.S.-GVN cooperation once 
the immediate emergency had passed. As the Americans stood eager to help, 
what happened next depended primarily on Thieu.
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“A Great Opportunity to Be Seized”:  
GVN Reform in 1968
The initial Communist assault had found Thieu celebrating Tet in his wife’s 
hometown of My Tho, a fact unknown to the assaulting Communist forces. Had 
the rural cadres attempting to guide the attack not got lost in the unfamiliar 
streets, and had Thieu’s personal guard of elite rangers not helped fend them off, 
the president might have been captured. As it was, he escaped My Tho in a U.S. 
helicopter on the second day of the attack to return to Saigon.33 Absent from the 
political scene in Saigon in the first weeks of the offensive in unclear circum-
stances, the cautious general eventually emerged to take control. Over the course 
of 1968, he consolidated his grip on the GVN, never to relinquish it. “Little by 
little,” Ky later conceded, “the balance of power between us swung in his favor.”34 
Tran Van Don observes that during this time “Ky gradually lost power, much like 
American vice presidents, but remained in the government.”35
Alongside this sidelining of his adversaries in Saigon, Thieu managed over 
the course of 1968 to strengthen Saigon’s grip on the localities. Liquidating Ky’s 
power also allowed him to bring to heel the corps commanders who were Ky’s 
most important allies, and to appoint his own men in their place. Unsure of his 
own position when the Thieu-Ky regime started in 1965, Ky had given the corps 
commanders “total authority over local decisions” in return for their loyalty to 
the central regime.36 If Thieu wanted to get a firmer grip on rural administration, 
he would have to rescind that authority. In consequence, Thieu worked with, and 
became reliant on, CORDS’s network of provincial and district advisers to provide 
support to local GVN officials, but also to spy on them. Only by using the United 
States was he able to make inroads against the corps commanders and their tra-
ditional system of corruption and patronage. In this sense, Thieu turned the con-
cept of leverage on its head and used CORDS as leverage against his domestic 
opponents. By October, Bunker was able to report back to Washington: “Thieu is 
in fact now close to exercising the full powers vested in him by the constitution, 
and the extra-constitutional power of Vice President Ky and the other generals 
has continued to decline.”37 Thieu’s newfound reliance on the United States also 
made him appear more willing to listen to U.S. advice and engage in a genuinely 
collaborative relationship with CORDS to reform the GVN.
Amid the nerves of spring 1968, one word kept recurring to U.S. officials in 
South Vietnam. That word was “opportunity.” Even since the creation of CORDS, 
top U.S. officials had struggled to gain traction for their reformist ideas inside 
the GVN. The 1968 offensives came to be seen as an opportunity to galvanize the 
GVN to achieve reforms that would ultimately strengthen the South Vietnamese 
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state once the immediate emergency passed. Lansdale was urging Bunker to see 
the offensive in this light in a memo typed even before the first day of the attacks 
was over. He wrote that “the extraordinary events of the past few hours open up a 
rare opportunity for President Thieu to exhibit some extra leadership right now 
that can have most rewarding consequences.”38 Bunker quickly took up the theme. 
At a meeting with Thieu shortly after the latter returned from My Tho, he told 
the South Vietnamese leader that the attacks presented “an ideal moment for him 
to demonstrate his leadership and to galvanize the nation.”39 Days later he told 
Thieu that the offensive was “a moment of opportunity” for him and Ky to bury 
their differences and unite with other top GVN leaders to prosecute the war more 
effectively.40 In a message back to Washington, Bunker said that the GVN faced a 
“crisis of confidence” caused by its inability to prevent the widespread destruction 
caused by the offensive. Nevertheless, he claimed the cloud had a silver lining: “It is 
to meet the crisis of confidence to which I have referred that I have been pressing, 
as strongly as I know how, on Thieu and other leaders in the government the idea 
that there is a great opportunity to be seized in this situation; that if the govern-
ment moves quickly to help the victims, to move ahead vigorously with recovery 
and reconstruction, if it mobilized the potential support available to these efforts, 
it can score a very significant political as well as military success.”41
As well as hoping that the GVN would be invigorated by the offensive, U.S. 
officials calculated that the new level of political and military threat felt by the 
GVN might allow the United States to exercise greater leverage over the govern-
ment’s behavior and structure. This had been the idea behind Operation Shock. 
Vann, who had been sharply critical of the softly-softly attitude toward leverage 
at the top of CORDS, likewise thought Tet and subsequent events provided an 
opportunity to change this approach. Cynical as he was of the GVN’s capacity 
to reform itself, he believed there was a need for much greater U.S. involvement 
in South Vietnam’s “so-called ‘internal affairs.’ ” Following the Tet Offensive and 
Johnson’s speech of March 31, Vann thought the GVN was more susceptible to 
such pressure than ever before.42 He also thought that effective change would 
require it. In July, Vann was asked by Ellsberg to explain why he thought the GVN 
would “rise to this which you describe as their opportunity.” “Well, we don’t know 
that they will,” Vann replied. “All I’m suggesting is that we try to force them to.”43 
Bui Diem remembers that “in Saigon, strangely enough, the mood was exuber-
ant” in government circles as the Communist offensives were easily beaten back.44 
Bunker’s own sense that Tet presented an opportunity that could nevertheless be 
squandered was encapsulated in his invocation of a line from Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar that he felt captured the moment well: “There is a tide in the affairs of men 
which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune: omitted, all the voyage of their life 
is bound on shallows and in miseries.”45
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It remained to be decided how the United States could best help the GVN take 
fortune at its flood. Komer and Bunker were not of a mind to make dramatic ges-
tures that undermined South Vietnamese sovereignty, as Operation Shock had 
called for, fearing that this would only vindicate Communist propaganda and 
undermine the long-term confidence and viability of the GVN. Instead, Komer 
and Bunker quietly pressured Thieu behind closed doors in the manner they had 
always considered appropriate. President Johnson set the tone in a message to 
Bunker a few days after the Tet Offensive had begun, instructing the ambassador 
to tell Thieu that the United States could no longer live with a “business as usual” 
approach and criticizing the GVN president for his previous “cautious approach 
to problems.” Present events, Johnson suggested, were an “opportunity” for 
Thieu to act more boldly.46 Bunker took the rare step of showing this presidential 
message to Thieu to demonstrate that the demand came from Thieu’s supreme 
patron. Bunker also told Thieu that “it is of the highest urgency for the GVN to 
act vigorously to meet both the immediate problems, as well as those of longer 
range and more deep-seated in nature.” In the latter category Bunker placed the 
incompetence and corruption of local administration, and the role of the corps 
commanders in perpetuating it. Rather than minimizing the scale of the problem 
as he had done previously, Thieu admitted that “probably some eighty per cent” 
of current province chiefs were incompetent or corrupt.47 Even before the shock 
of Johnson’s March 31 speech, Bunker and Komer attempted to scare Thieu into 
greater reforms by threatening him with a collapse in U.S. support on the home 
front.48 Bunker reported by May that “the Vietnamese are really beginning to face 
up to the fact that the time will come when they are on their own.”49
The operation of Project Recovery was initially beset by mutual recriminations 
in which both sides in the Thieu-Ky dispute appeared more interested in pinning 
blame for failure on the other than making the effort operate smoothly. Thieu at 
first absented himself from the committee, leaving Ky to chair it, and then Ky and 
Thang resigned, claiming that the rest of the government was not cooperating with 
them.50 In a blueprint eerily similar to that of Operation Shock, Thang report-
edly urged Ky to have the constitution amended “so that he, Ky, can hold the post 
of Prime Minister, or to have Thang appointed to that post.” Thang claimed the 
corps commanders would back such a move. Ky dismissed the suggestion as “fool-
ish talk,” adding that he and Thang “must work within the existing governmental 
framework for present.”51 Another source of pressure on Thieu was the power-
ful commander of the III Corps region, Le Nguyen Khang. Like many generals 
in ARVN, Khang was suspicious of the U.S.-backed trend toward democracy and 
civilian rule in South Vietnam, and favored a strong military dictatorship.52 Among 
the top leadership of the ARVN, he was far from alone in this point of view. As Bui 
Diem explained, the generals “stood to lose a great deal in the transition to civilian 
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government . . . they would find themselves subordinate to political leaders with 
whom they carried no special influence. . . . Their attitude dripped with contempt 
for the very idea that a civilian government could rule effectively.”53
Khang also controlled the crucial military region around Saigon, which would 
be vital in any coup attempt. But realizing that the Americans would not tolerate 
any further coups, Khang forbade to openly entertain them, instead hoping to 
parlay his position into leverage over Thieu.54 On February 18, Khang led a meet-
ing in which he, Thang, Ky, and Joint General Staff chief Linh Quang Vien blasted 
Thieu for the GVN’s “weakness” and what they saw as the ineffectiveness of the 
civilian ministries. Khang offered his resignation at this meeting as a symbolic 
gesture, knowing Thieu did not feel secure enough to accept it.55 Despite having 
initially chided Thang for his “foolish talk,” Ky began to press Thieu to appoint a 
general as prime minister as the year wore on.56
To the seeming surprise of his opponents, rather than bowing to demands to 
give the military and the Ky faction a greater role in governance, Thieu instead 
flashed his steel. He opted to ally himself with the Americans against his domestic 
opponents. Only the strong support and cooperation he received from CORDS 
both in Saigon and the provinces made this feasible.
Thieu’s first step was providing effective leadership to the relief effort. After Ky 
and Thang resigned from Project Recovery, Thieu leapt in and made a success of 
it, in the process demonstrating that it seemed to lose little through not having 
Ky and Thang’s participation. Buoyed by this close cooperation with CORDS and 
eager to take advantage of the crisis atmosphere as new enemy offensives struck, 
Thieu then began to implement more structural reform. On March 1, he removed 
the commanders of both IV Corps and II Corps, citing their incompetence under 
military pressure.57 Thieu appointed Major General Lu Lan, widely perceived as 
an apolitical general, to II Corps. Thang, still popular with the Americans and a 
key confidant of Ky, was sent to become head of IV Corps.
At the same time as replacing these two commanders, Thieu announced wide-
ranging reforms in the relationship between corps commanders, province chiefs, 
and the central government. Province chiefs would no longer be appointed by 
corps commanders, but rather would be picked and supervised by the central 
government. Invoking the success of the Project Recovery task force, Thieu said 
that “province chiefs will act as the head of a task force in each province for the 
ministries’ representatives there.” They would be supported by CORDS. Mean-
while, civilian inspectors appointed by Saigon would oversee the province chiefs, 
whose ultimate responsibility would be to the interior minister.58 This returned 
South Vietnam to the system that had existed under Diem, in which the corps 
commanders were not yet official warlords in their own domains but answered 
to the central government.
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Thieu soon began to demonstrate that this shift in responsibility had not just 
taken place on paper. Ten days after his initial announcement, he dismissed seven 
province chiefs in the II and IV Corps areas, where he had just appointed new 
commanders. He also dismissed the mayor of Hue, who had also failed to dis-
tinguish himself during the Tet Offensive.59 This amounted to a nearly 16 per-
cent turnover in provincial leadership in one day. By the end of the year, twenty 
of the country’s forty-four province chiefs had been removed for corruption or 
incompetence, and some placed on trial. Ninety-one district chiefs, out of 243 
nationwide, had also been removed.60 By September, Thieu had replaced nine 
of sixteen province chiefs and nearly half of the district chiefs in the Mekong 
Delta.61 When turnover due to deaths and other causes were added, over 50 per-
cent of the country’s provincial leaders were changed during the course of the 
year. The replacements were handpicked by Thieu.62
The support of CORDS was vital in enabling Thieu to make these changes. 
Since the beginning of Project Recovery, CORDS officials had been observ-
ing GVN provincial and district officials to sniff out corruption and incom-
petence.63 Thieu made use of dossiers of evidence and advice from CORDS 
officials in deciding which chiefs to change, generally but not always follow-
ing U.S. advice. CORDS was also vital in providing support to province and 
district chiefs whom the corps commanders shunned because they had been 
appointed from over their heads and were not part of the traditional net-
works of patronage and corruption. When Bunker told Thieu that CORDS 
had received reports that the corps commanders were not cooperating with 
local government officials and providing them military support when needed, 
Thieu “grew visibly annoyed” at the situation. It was clear under his reforms, 
he said, that corps commanders remained responsible for providing mili-
tary support to the local chiefs when needed, even if they no longer had civil 
responsibilities. He also conceded that “province chiefs must depend more on 
CORDS and USAID than on corps and subordinate commanders to help them 
do their various jobs” in the civil sphere, but the ARVN “clearly must help” 
as well when military support was required.64 Thieu’s annoyance notwith-
standing, it was only the existence of CORDS’s networks of advisers and the 
resources at its disposal that allowed province and district chiefs to declare any 
independence from the corps commanders at all. Had it not been for CORDS, 
province and district chiefs would have remained reliant on local ARVN units 
in both civil and military matters, with all the dilution of central government 
authority this had entailed since 1963. But the existence of CORDS gave Thieu 
an alternative to relying on the troublesome commanders and instead allowed 
him to align himself with the Americans, using their network to project his 
power throughout the country.
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Thieu concurrently took steps to solidify his rule in Saigon. In May 1968, he 
felt secure enough to appoint Tran Van Huong to the position of prime minister, 
ignoring the growing military clamor for a general to get the job.65 Unlike many 
of the top figures in the GVN, Huong was actually born in what would later 
become South Vietnam, in the delta province of Vinh Long. Huong had refused 
to take sides in the Franco–Viet Minh War, then entered Diem’s service as the 
mayor of Saigon after South Vietnamese independence. Huong resigned the post 
after falling out with Diem and became a prominent oppositionist, eventually 
being jailed by his former patron for demanding liberal reforms along the lines 
of those favored by the U.S. State Department at the time. Being opposed to 
Diem did not stop Huong being critical of the generals who murdered him, even 
as he served in the short-lived regime that followed the 1963 coup. Huong later 
became prime minister in his own right in November 1964, only to be removed 
in January 1965 amid widespread Buddhist protests at his attempt to increase 
mobilization for the war effort. This clash with his co-religionists was only the 
latest episode in a career marked by independence, bloody-mindedness, and 
anti-Communist nationalism. Huong was also widely regarded as incorruptible. 
He had run against Thieu in the 1967 presidential election, coming fourth in a 
field of eleven.
In appointing Huong, Thieu was hewing closely to American advice. Bunker 
had personally indicated that he considered Huong, whom the CIA rated as the 
“most widely respected politician in South Vietnam,” as the best candidate for the 
post of prime minister.66 But Huong’s reputation and the fact he was a civilian 
also helped Thieu bolster the image of his government. With Huong on board, 
it would be harder for Thieu’s opponents to accuse him of sliding toward Diem-
ist dictatorship as he centralized power. Bunker also hailed the new cabinet as 
“a considerable move towards civilian government,” both because Huong was 
expected to be a strong civilian leader and because it represented another way 
in which Thieu was strengthening the constitutional government at the expense 
of the military’s power.67 Huong also brought back General Tran Thien Khiem, 
another southern Buddhist who was then in Taipei as GVN ambassador, to serve 
as minister for interior. This role was vital now that province chiefs were respon-
sible to the Interior Ministry. Khiem had been out of the country since he was 
ousted from one of the revolving-door juntas of 1964, and was feared throughout 
the ARVN because of the grudges he was presumed to hold from this incident.68
Huong’s appointment was opposed bitterly by Ky and Khang.69 They contin-
ued to tell American officials about the perils of civilian rule and the need for a 
military strongman, but they did not receive a sympathetic ear.70 A number of 
factors were by this time working to undermine the power and influence of Ky 
and his allies. The first was the simple fact that as Thieu’s government became 
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more effective at carrying out reforms while working closely with the Americans, 
the space for criticism became more limited. Ky and Khang were increasingly 
unable to point to the GVN’s ineffectiveness as justification for their standpoint. 
The dilemma of the Ky faction on this point was illustrated when Khang held 
forth to Samuel Berger, the U.S. deputy ambassador, on his favorite topic: that 
South Vietnam “could not afford democratic institutions at this time” and that 
the United States “had made a major mistake in forcing them” on the country. 
Khang again questioned whether Thieu’s rule was “clear and firm” enough.71 But 
for the Americans, it increasingly was, and any deficiency did not stem from a 
surfeit of military involvement. It was precisely the trend toward the increased 
“civilianization of the government” that Bunker praised as the year wore on.72 
What Bunker and other CORDS officials wanted was a GVN that was coherent 
enough to work with as a nation-building partner, and which had a network 
of responsive officials in the localities. Because Khang and Ky refused to partici-
pate in the GVN constructively, it began to look like their complaints stemmed 
purely from factionalism rather than valid ideological or policy concerns. It was 
not the form of government they objected to; it was their own declining power 
within it.
Ky’s entourage had limited options in response. The Americanization of the 
war in 1965 had put an end to the series of coups that had characterized Sai-
gon politics since the fall of Diem, and Americans in both South Vietnam and 
the United States were in even less of a mood to tolerate them now. As Komer 
had stressed to Thieu upon his return from visiting the United States in March, 
American public opinion could not countenance internal strife in South Viet-
nam. Even Khang, considered by Bunker to be an “avowed opponent of con-
stitutional democracy,” realized that acceptance of the GVN’s constitution was 
a prerequisite for continued U.S. support.73 With the seizure of power not an 
option, Ky and his allies could only access it through cooperation with Thieu 
and his American patrons. As CORDS allowed Thieu to expand his own power 
both by supporting his reforms of the GVN’s rural apparatus and by the advice 
its leadership provided to both him and his ministries, Ky’s faction found them-
selves increasingly irrelevant to the main concerns of the Americans. They hence 
became not only expendable but also to be seen mainly as potential spoilers by 
South Vietnam’s U.S. backers.
A third factor in the declining fortunes of the Ky faction was a series of deaths 
in May and June of 1968 that thinned the ranks of Ky’s supporters and close 
friends. On the first day of mini-Tet in May, National Police chief Nguyen Ngoc 
Loan sustained serious injuries while hunting snipers in the back alleys of Saigon. 
Then, on June 3, an errant U.S. helicopter missile badly wounded the mayor of 
Saigon and killed seven other officials, including Luan, the Saigon police chief 
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who had made the apposite remark about the NLF “using” U.S. firepower. All 
the dead and wounded were allies of Ky, among them his “closest supporters.”74 
Thieu moved quickly to appoint his own men to the now-vacant positions.75 The 
sudden loss of so many close allies and hence influence was dizzying for Ky. He 
seemed to vanish from the political scene, and newspaper reports placed him 
“out of Saigon, depressed and tired.”76 While his mental state was said to have 
improved by September, Berger still found him “subdued, pensive, and intro-
spective”—adjectives that previously had rarely been applied to the flamboyant 
and belligerent former fighter pilot.77
A fourth factor that undermined the position of Ky’s faction was their 
repeated resignations, which only enhanced the impression that they were more 
interested in their faction’s power than in the effective running of the GVN. Both 
Ky and Thang had left the Central Recovery Committee before a month was 
even through, and Ky subsequently adopted and then abandoned a key role in 
the raising of territorial defense forces.78 Nor was Ky the only one who couldn’t 
hold down a job even when it was one the Americans considered vital. With the 
decline in Ky’s fortunes only accelerating, both Thang and Khang jumped ship 
in late June. Thang resigned from his position as head of IV Corps, claiming 
that Thieu did not trust him. This was the final straw among Thang’s American 
backers, and the general was left without effective supporters in either the GVN 
or on the U.S. side. He played no further role in the war.79 Khang also offered his 
resignation to Thieu as a token of responsibility for the rocket attack in Saigon 
that had killed so many prominent GVN officials. The offer was widely inter-
preted as a protest against the installation of the Huong government and the 
dilution of the Ky faction’s power in general.80 Thieu accepted the resignation 
and brought his close ally, Do Cao Tri, back from the ambassadorship to South 
Korea to become the new commander of III Corps.81
Thieu had emerged on top through a combination of his own cunning, chance 
events such as the rocket strike that killed Ky’s closest allies, and American sup-
port. The military and political challenges of 1968 had finally spurred the noto-
riously cautious general into action, and he had moved quickly to consolidate 
both American support for his regime and his own power within it. Attempting 
to ensure that American support would remain over the “long haul,” he moved 
to seize the power that was technically his under the constitution and use it to 
adopt reforms that pleased the Americans.82 The result was almost the opposite 
of what had been proposed in the Operation Shock memo earlier in the year. 
Rather than stepping aside and ceding power to Ky, Thieu had emerged in charge 
and had sidelined his rivals. It was a remarkable turnaround in Saigon politics. 
Now it remained to be seen if a similar turnaround might be produced where it 
really counted, in the villages.
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Seizing the Nation-Building Initiative
For Komer, Colby, and other top CORDS officials, the most important item of 
business in the GVN’s in-tray was the need to reassert its rural presence. Komer 
had become increasingly concerned as 1968 wore on that Project Recovery was 
diverting the GVN’s attention from “rural recovery.”83 The Communist move-
ment’s success at bringing the war to the cities had put the GVN on the defensive 
and forced it to spend nearly a year concentrating on its own base areas, to the 
detriment of rural nation building. The unremitting enemy military pressure 
and the need to consolidate the GVN’s control over the broadly pro-government 
cities made Thieu cautious and unwilling to embark on a counteroffensive for 
much of 1968. Back on the up and up following his convalescence in Washington, 
Komer told Thieu as early as March that he thought a “vacuum” was develop-
ing in the countryside. While the United States and the GVN had withdrawn to 
defend the cities and oversee Project Recovery, the NLF likewise had to weaken its 
grip over the countryside to generate the manpower for its continued offensives. 
While Komer said that a spirit of “offensive-mindedness” was needed, Thieu was 
much more cautious. He said that the GVN had to abandon grand ambitions for 
1968 and cut back pacification activities to “oil spot areas around cities, towns, 
prosperous villages, and vital roads and canals.” Emphasizing the spirit of con-
solidation, he summed up by saying: “We should know what to sacrifice.”84
By October, Thieu came to accept the need for the GVN to reassert its rural 
presence. The starkly deteriorating military position of the Communist move-
ment in the countryside was becoming apparent by this time. As a Communist 
history puts it, by late 1968 “our offensive posture began to weaken and our three 
types of armed forces suffered attrition. The political and military struggle in the 
rural areas declined and our liberated areas shrank. . . . Most of our main force 
troops were forced back to the border or to bases in the mountains.”85 A new 
GVN offensive seemed especially important, given the formation of the PRG and 
the Communist promulgation of its “liberation committees.” With its military 
campaign petering out, the movement seemed to be shifting to focus on political 
struggle.86 “By surfacing this apparatus,” Komer told the Mission Council, “they 
could attempt to validate a claim to ‘rule the countryside’—thus justifying either 
partition or a coalition government.”87 GVN officials were likewise concerned 
that the Communist movement’s network of village committees would allow it 
to assert “extravagant claims of political control.”88
CORDS and the GVN set out to work together on a counteroffensive. At a U.S. 
military conference in September, Colby issued the previously noted warning that 
the enemy might be able to claim control of nearly half of the South Vietnamese 
population in a cease-fire as things stood.89 He also displayed a map showing the 
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extension of the liberation committees over South Vietnam and argued that, as 
he recalled, “a vigorous extension of security and political presence by the Gov-
ernment, with American support,” was necessary both to preempt the spread of 
NLF control and to penetrate areas they currently claimed.90 With the blessing of 
Abrams, what became known as the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) 
was then developed by CORDS and the GVN. In early October, a series of bilateral 
meetings were held at which the Americans put the proposal to top GVN officials 
including Thieu, Huong, and a brooding Ky. On the U.S. side, Bunker, Abrams, 
Komer, and Colby were among the participants. These large bilateral meetings 
became the norm for developing strategies through which to bolster the GVN’s 
strength in the local areas. GVN cooperation with CORDS was spurred by the 
repeated emphasis that Thieu put on the need to win over the rural population.91 
Following the pattern of Project Recovery, the United States and the GVN were 
working closely on joint campaigns.
As well as the influence gained by their close working relationship with the 
central GVN, CORDS officials up and down the chain of command were newly 
empowered by the APC and the interest that Thieu showed in it. In the early 
stages of presenting the plan to the GVN, Komer had sent word down to the Dep-
CORDS in the four main corps areas to sell the concept of the APC to the corps 
commanders. When the commanders were asked by Vien whether the program 
was feasible, they said it was.92 Now that Thieu had made it clear that the corps 
commanders served at his pleasure and that he was aligning himself more force-
fully with the Americans and with CORDS specifically, it behooved the corps 
commanders to follow American advice. Another key factor in boosting the 
influence of CORDS personnel was the fact that the APC relied on an Ameri-
can system called the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) for measuring progress. 
The 1,084 hamlets selected to be part of the APC all had HES ratings of D or E, 
indicating that they were considered insecure by American advisers. Under the 
plan, success would be defined as upgrading them to category C or greater. The 
APC set specific numerical targets in every corps and province to be upgraded in 
this manner. As it was CORDS advisers who filled in the reports that determined 
what HES ratings were ascribed to each hamlet in South Vietnam, this gave them 
enormous influence over the central government’s perception of both the plan’s 
success and the performance of individual officials. HES had previously been 
criticized as a means of making false claims of progress in the war. But develop-
ments during the APC and thereafter showed that HES had another use—as a 
means by which CORDS advisers could focus the minds of their counterparts on 
the issues that they considered important in a local area, and then pass judgment 
on their performance up the chain of command via the HES ratings. As a GVN 
briefing noted, “President Thieu, in order to gauge progress more accurately and 
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to provide a common basis for planning, chose to use the American Hamlet Eval-
uation System.”93 In this context it was more important as a tool of leverage than 
as an objective measure of progress. CORDS officials were careful not to make a 
public fanfare about the campaign and especially not to make a public relations 
issue of the numerical targets. Though the broad outline of the plan was revealed 
in the press, even the detail of its name was not widely known. Three weeks into 
the campaign, the veteran New York Times correspondent Charles Mohr errone-
ously reported that the APC was called “Quick Fix.”94
HES was hence not being used to create an illusion of progress. It had instead 
become a tool both in reinforcing Saigon’s rule over the provinces and in solidifying 
the role of CORDS advisers in acting as the central government’s eyes and ears to 
assess the performance of its own officials. Unlike during the 1968 planning process, 
when Thang had not even been able to get the corps commanders to alter their plans, 
the APC was centrally conceived from the start. To further demonstrate his commit-
ment to the APC and to nation building more broadly, Thieu established a Central 
Pacification and Development Committee. Chaired by Huong and often attended by 
Thieu, the committee met to consider policy issues and oversee cooperation on plans 
for 1969, in which the GVN would try to build on the gains of the APC.
Using leverage of the form that Komer had long advocated—behind the 
scenes in Saigon—combined with the newfound ability of U.S. officials to use 
their influence in the localities, CORDS finally seemed to have a chance to work 
as intended. It is little surprise then that Komer stated shortly after leaving his 
job that he was “perhaps prouder of the APC than anything else.”95 Even Vann, 
who had been so critical of Komer’s leverage concept and his understanding of 
nation building in the past, was impressed. The situation in Vietnam, he stated 
in January 1969, is “better . . . than I have ever before seen it.” He continued: 
“The changes in province chiefs and district chiefs have generally been good, and 
in retrospect, I attribute Bob Komer’s initiative in securing leverage, establish-
ing management tools such as HES and TFES (and initiating the Accelerated 
Pacification Campaign), to mark him as the greatest single American contributor 
to progress in Vietnam.”96 Given that Vann had previously been critical of both 
Komer and his “management tools,” this was high praise indeed. Berger evinced 
similar optimism in September, when he told a chastened Ky that “many long 
term observers say the Huong government is the best one in a decade.”97
Yet the events of 1968 also contained a cautionary tale. It was initiatives 
by the Communists that had changed the dynamics of the war. The nation-
building effort, which had barely begun to be implemented at the grassroots, 
would be vulnerable to similar shocks in the future. And in 1969, there was a 
new administration in Washington—one determined to put its own stamp on 
the war.
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THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION  
AND NATION BUILDING
When he heard that Richard Nixon had been elected president in late 1968, the 
British counterinsurgency strategist Sir Robert Thompson had severe misgivings 
about what lay ahead. Although he had become highly critical of the way the John-
son administration was prosecuting the war, he never doubted that it placed a 
high priority on the containment of communism in the Far East. But the new 
president was an unknown quantity. It would be easy for him to declare that Viet-
nam was a war that had been started by Democrats and lost by Democrats, and 
that all an incoming Republican administration could do was get out. Thompson 
was not the only one who thought Nixon might take the easy option. According 
to Thompson, the staunchly anti-Communist Singaporean prime minister Lee 
Kuan Yew took much the same view shortly after Nixon’s election, bursting out to 
the Brit: “They’ve lost, haven’t they?”1 At the other end of the political spectrum, 
Daniel Ellsberg, by this point an ardent skeptic of the war, recalled that he felt no 
special alarm at Nixon’s electoral triumph over Hubert Humphrey: “I knew no 
reason to think that Nixon would prolong the Democrats’ failed war longer than 
Humphrey; if anything, as a Republican, he might do the contrary.”2 Buoyed by 
such hopes, Ellsberg even agreed to work with the administration in its early days.
His disillusionment, however, came quickly. Everything hinged on how 
Nixon reacted to the two key legacies of 1968: an increasingly inflamed and anti-
war public discourse in the United States and an altered strategic situation in 
South Vietnam. Confounding expectations of a quick withdrawal, Nixon and 
his key national security aides—particularly National Security Adviser Henry 
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Kissinger—aimed to pull out slowly and cautiously. By doing so they hoped to 
prevent withdrawal from harming either their domestic political position or U.S. 
credibility abroad.
Historians have tended to be transfixed by Kissinger’s diplomatic activities 
in Paris and Nixon’s military ventures into Laos and Cambodia, which were two 
cornerstones of this strategy. Less attention has been given to the administra-
tion’s attitude toward strengthening the GVN. Alongside the policy of strength-
ening the ARVN, which came to be known as Vietnamization, the Nixon admin-
istration also showed a keen interest in the development of GVN rural gover-
nance. They did not carry out any dramatic interventions in policy in this area, 
as Johnson had through the creation of CORDS. Nor did they share the reformist 
impulses that had led Johnson to first place a focus on the need to improve the lot 
of the South Vietnamese peasant through economic development. Instead, the 
new administration was focused on what Kissinger sometimes called “the control 
war.”3 It stressed the need for the GVN to exercise effective control over its popu-
lation both to strengthen its hand at the negotiating table and to be able to stand 
up to the Vietnamese Communist movement after an agreement. Dismissing the 
idea that providing material benefits to the population was the key to success 
and unconvinced by the necessity of active as opposed to passive support for the 
GVN, Nixon and Kissinger came to stress “security” and physical control of the 
rural population, much as Komer eventually had. There was as a result substantial 
continuity between the two administrations, a fact that has been missed either 
because historians have overemphasized Johnson’s initial reformist impulses or 
underemphasized Nixon and Kissinger’s concern with “pacification.”4 Commu-
nist histories, on the other hand, emphasize the importance of “pacification” in 
the latter years of the war.5
While not ordering any dramatic departure in nation-building policy in 
South Vietnam, the administration did bring about a revolution in the White 
House’s ability to understand its progress. While Komer and Johnson had been 
preoccupied with the herculean task of creating CORDS and had little time left 
over for asking larger strategic questions about its chances of success, Nixon and 
Kissinger inherited a mature policy and then subjected it to withering analysis. 
Through the creation of a Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) dedicated to 
the task, Kissinger brought a sophisticated understanding of the limits of nation 
building in South Vietnam to the White House. The fact he did so shows how 
important he considered the effort. But the group’s sobering conclusion that the 
GVN was unlikely to survive U.S. withdrawal undermined a key requirement for 
the success of a strategy that the administration had inherited but never truly 
believed in. If the Vietnam War was “effectively” won by the early 1970s as some 
have claimed, then this was far from apparent to Nixon or Kissinger.6
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Nixon, Kissinger, and Nation Building
The inauguration of Richard Nixon as president in January 1969 brought to an 
end the period in which the making of Vietnam policy had been dominated by the 
now tired men who John F. Kennedy had brought to Washington nearly a decade 
earlier. The main members of Nixon’s national security team—Kissinger, Secre-
tary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Secretary of State William Rogers—were not 
personally committed to the policies of the past. Kissinger especially was known 
to be highly skeptical of the way the war had been conducted, and especially of 
U.S. nation-building efforts. In an article for Foreign Affairs written before he was 
selected to serve in the White House, Kissinger had criticized Johnson’s strategy 
for the war and especially weaknesses in the “so-called pacification” program. In 
the article, he highlighted two key weaknesses of U.S. efforts to strengthen the 
GVN, pointing out there was “no concept as to how to bring about a political 
framework relating Saigon to the countryside,” and that current strategy resulted 
only in “military successes that could not be translated into permanent political 
advantage.”7
Like Nixon, Kissinger placed great emphasis on the manner in which with-
drawal from Vietnam took place. In a widely cited passage in his Foreign Affairs 
article, Kissinger argued that the United States could not simply abandon the 
GVN: “The commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of the impor-
tance of Viet Nam. For what is involved now is confidence in American prom-
ises.”8 Keeping that confidence alive throughout the world, Kissinger thought, 
depended on ensuring the survival of the Thieu government after American 
withdrawal. This sometimes brought Kissinger into conflict with other members 
of the administration. Laird, a nine-term congressman who had served on the 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, was highly attuned to domestic politics 
and the strains that the continuation of the war was placing on the U.S. military 
in a time of budget constraints. This often led him, along with Rogers, to push 
for a faster withdrawal of U.S. forces than Kissinger thought wise.9 Laird’s ability 
to manipulate the Pentagon budget in a way that forced a certain pace of troop 
withdrawals from Vietnam meant that even though Kissinger was the most influ-
ential of Nixon’s courtiers on matters pertaining to Vietnam, he did not always 
operate in circumstances of his own choosing.
There was no individual at the top level of the Nixon administration who 
placed the same emphasis on reforming South Vietnam as Johnson had done, 
nor did the administration order a dramatic restructuring of the U.S. nation-
building apparatus that had taken shape in CORDS. But this did not mean that 
the administration had lost interest in strengthening the GVN. Despite their 
military escalations, Nixon, Kissinger, and Laird were not inclined to believe 
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that a “military victory” was possible in Vietnam, especially after Nixon aban-
doned plans for a dramatic escalation in the first year of his presidency.10 As 
Laird told Nixon when the latter requested that maximum pressure be put on 
the enemy, Communist attacks could be “repulsed with heavy [enemy] losses,” 
but there was little that could be done to “produce any significant change in 
the military situation over any short run period of time.”11 The lack of any 
unilateral military option was worrying because, as Laird told Thieu during a 
trip to Saigon, “time had run out on the last administration in terms of public 
support for our Viet-Nam policy.” The administration had to stay ahead of the 
American public by ordering troop withdrawals and shifting the burden of 
fighting to the ARVN.12 At the end of the trip, Laird recommended the with-
drawal of from fifty to seventy thousand U.S. troops from South Vietnam in 
1969.13 While he later backtracked officially from this high figure and settled on 
twenty-five thousand, Rogers continued the pressure for an even larger with-
drawal. Thus began the steady drumbeat from both the Pentagon and Foggy 
Bottom, which would continue throughout the administration.14 Nixon would 
prove receptive, and he eventually announced the withdrawal of sixty thousand 
troops in 1969.
FIGURE 7. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger set up a sophisticated 
system in the White House to monitor the progress of nation building in South 
Vietnam.
Photograph GRF-WHPO-A4263(26), Gerald R. Ford White House Photographs, White House Photographic Office 
Collection, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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The withdrawal of U.S. forces without the abandonment of the goal of 
maintaining the Thieu regime naturally placed a large burden on U.S. efforts 
to strengthen the GVN, as the Saigon regime could now foresee the day when 
it could no longer rely on U.S. forces to defend it. The thought that this day 
would come too soon “torment[ed]” Kissinger.15 As he told Nixon in July 1970, 
he feared “a crunch point where we are caught between an ally that cannot with-
stand any further American withdrawals and a public that will not stand for 
any further involvement.”16 Nixon likewise wrote in his memoirs that he agreed 
that the “central problem” was “whether the South Vietnamese were sufficiently 
confident and prepared to defend themselves against a renewed Communist 
offensive at some time in the future.”17 Kissinger was concerned that the pace 
of U.S. withdrawal was being determined by budgetary and political consider-
ations rather than an objective assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. He 
was also concerned that what seemed to be steady gains in the GVN’s strength 
depended on a U.S. security shield that was being steadily withdrawn, and not 
Saigon’s intrinsic strength.18 When Tony Lake and Roger Morris, two members 
of Kissinger’s staff who were to resign over the Cambodian incursion, warned 
their boss that the United States was on course to withdraw from South Vietnam 
faster than was prudent, Kissinger was receptive and continued to mention his 
concerns to Nixon.19
Lake and Morris eventually went even further, warning that they did not 
believe there was “any option” that could achieve “an eventual political solu-
tion in South Vietnam in which most of us could take comfort.”20 This, however, 
was not a viewpoint that Kissinger expressed to the president. Instead, Kissinger 
placed his faith in two parallel tracks: negotiations with Hanoi, and the policy 
of “Vietnamization,” which focused on developing the military capabilities of 
the ARVN through training, expansion, and equipment transfers. In the nego-
tiations, Kissinger perceived that the United States had three bargaining chips. 
One was the rate of withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. The second 
was the level of coercion that could be brought to bear against North Vietnam’s 
assets. The third was the extent and durability of the GVN’s control of the South 
Vietnamese population. If Vietnamization allowed Saigon to durably establish 
control over much of the rural population, the allies would be strengthened at the 
negotiating table. Hanoi might be forced to settle faster if it felt it was faced with 
a situation in which the GVN was continually strengthening and improving its 
relative position.21 The more the GVN was able to accomplish without American 
support, then the more durable its position would appear. The strength of the 
GVN was hence a crucial bargaining chip in the negotiations with Hanoi. As the 
negotiations deadlocked over demands by the North Vietnamese delegation that 
the United States overthrow Thieu as the price for a peace agreement, it became 
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in fact the key point in the negotiations; this was not surprising, as the gover-
nance of South Vietnam was the central issue of the war.
The strengthening of the GVN was thus central to both the policy of Vietnam-
ization and U.S. negotiating strategy. It was also implicated in the administra-
tion’s coercive strategy in Cambodia and Laos. Both when U.S. forces invaded 
Cambodia in 1970 and when they backed an ARVN assault into Laos in 1971, 
the main aim was to clear out NVA supply and logistical networks. As raids, 
they could set back impending Communist offensives and buy more time for the 
GVN to strengthen itself, but without fundamentally altering the balance of the 
war. Kissinger listed the benefits of the Laos operation as including “very impor-
tant” blows to the NVA logistical network and the deterrent effect that would 
compel the NVA to maintain combat forces in Laos in the future, meaning “these 
forces (a portion of which were formerly in South Vietnam) cannot be used to 
threaten Vietnamization in South Vietnam.”22 The Cambodian incursion had 
been deemed to have a positive impact for the same reasons.23 But even though 
these temporary escalations could divert North Vietnamese resources and allevi-
ate pressure in the South in the short term, it remained the case that develop-
ments in South Vietnam itself would decide whether the Nixon administration’s 
strategy was a success. This was so whether the war was “doomed always just to 
trickle out the way it is,” as Nixon believed in a pessimistic moment in Septem-
ber 1971, or whether a negotiated settlement could eventually be reached.24 As a 
result, efforts to bolster the GVN remained central to the success of U.S. strategy.
The Vietnam Special Studies Group and the War
If Komer had been a doer, then Kissinger was, especially at the outset of the 
new administration, an analyzer. Kissinger had received his PhD from Har-
vard in 1954 and had spent the decade and a half since in the academic study 
of international relations. He brought a sophisticated view of the complexity of 
the Vietnam War—and especially of nation building—with him to the office. 
“Throughout the war, criteria by which to measure progress have been hard to 
come by; this problem has continued during the negotiations,” Kissinger wrote in 
his Foreign Affairs article of January 1969. “The dilemma is that almost any state-
ment about Viet Nam is likely to be true; unfortunately, truth does not guarantee 
relevance.”25 Kissinger was skeptical of the accuracy and relevance of the statis-
tics that were used to measure progress in the war.26 The first communication 
that Kissinger sent to William Colby, Komer’s successor as the head of CORDS, 
stressed “the need for realism in reporting on the pacification program.”27 Laird 
and Nixon felt likewise. After hearing an optimistic assessment from Johnson 
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administration holdovers about the declining morale of enemy forces in South 
Vietnam and their apparent willingness to surrender, Nixon pointed out that 
“I think there is a tendency to get skeptical of these optimistic reports,” while 
Laird interjected: “I have heard these briefings each year and each year they get 
more optimistic and, therefore, I hope that we will be very careful in digesting 
the material which is put forth.”28 When Nixon met Abrams for the first time in 
May, Kissinger suggested that he inquire whether “the apparent progress in paci-
fication is significant and whether or not he estimates that GVN control of the 
countryside is actually progressing.”29
Kissinger set in motion an internal White House effort to measure progress 
in nation building, down to the analysis of individual provinces. Like much of 
the broader reshaping of the NSC and the policy-making process that Nixon 
and Kissinger embarked upon, this was done in a conscious attempt to improve 
on the informal style of the Johnson administration, which had made its policy 
at secretive and much-derided Tuesday lunchtime meetings. The NSC system 
that Nixon and Kissinger constructed has often been viewed as a cynical means 
of expanding White House control over government agencies and narrowing 
the channels of debate and dissent. On Vietnam, at least, this is only a partial 
impression. Nixon personally made some of the most controversial decisions 
of his term—such as the Cambodian incursion—against the wishes of almost 
all his advisers, but the new NSC system was not integral to his ability to do so. 
Similarly, Kissinger’s ability to conduct negotiations with the North Vietnamese 
without the knowledge of most of the rest of the government did not depend 
on the new NSC system and would have been just as possible between Tuesday 
lunchtimes. While Nixon and Kissinger may have carried out a lonely policy at 
the negotiating table in Paris or in the Oval Office during the Cambodian incur-
sion, the regular NSC machinery they set up actually served to widen the debate 
and information flow within the government on more routine matters. The new 
system provided multiple forums in which periodic and detailed assessments 
of the situation in South Vietnam could be presented as papers by the relevant 
agencies and then discussed, something never possible under Johnson. One typi-
cal meeting in January 1972 had twenty participants from State, Defense, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, Treasury, and the NSC and debated matters such 
as enemy intentions and capabilities, the accuracy of intelligence, and the prog-
ress of Vietnamization.30 The wide variety of agency input provided for a much 
greater degree of debate about the progress of the war and of nation building in 
particular than had been possible under the Johnson administration.
Johnson had created Komer’s office as a means of bringing White House 
influence to bear in shaping the development of the nation-building program 
in South Vietnam. But he had never grappled in a holistic fashion with what 
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exactly he wanted from the program and how it could help achieve U.S. war 
aims. Inheriting a mature program, Kissinger instead organized his own office 
specifically for the purpose of assessing that program’s effectiveness. Kissinger’s 
NSC machinery included two forums specifically devoted to the study of issues 
related to Vietnam. The first of these, the Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam, was cre-
ated in February 1969 to prepare papers for consideration by the wider NSC.31 
In recommending its creation to Nixon, Kissinger told him that while the group 
would be useful to coordinate responses to Communist offensives, “it will not 
preclude the type of planning we conducted on Tuesday with Mel Laird and 
[Air Force Chief of Staff] General McConnell”—in all probability a reference to 
planning for Operation Menu, the secret bombing of Cambodia. Such sensitive 
matters, Kissinger assured the president, could be kept out of this channel. Nixon 
duly signed off on the recommendation to create the group.32 This demonstrated 
that while Kissinger and Nixon did indeed work together against other agencies 
and government officials, this was not the purpose of the regular NSC machinery.
This also applied to the second group that Kissinger created, the Vietnam Spe-
cial Studies Group. Its purpose was the “systematic analysis of U.S. policies and 
programs in Vietnam.”33 The group was chaired by NSC staff members, first Lau-
rence Lynn and later Wayne Smith.34 Until he left the administration after the 
Cambodian incursion, Lynn was considered by Kissinger to be a rigorous analyst, 
and the VSSG continued to impress him under Smith.35 The memo that Kissinger 
sent to Nixon suggesting the creation of the VSSG—which was drafted by Lynn—
cited numerous “preconceptions” that were said in the past to have led officials 
“astray even though a careful and objective analysis of readily available facts would 
have told them differently.” It cited the failures of the Strategic Hamlet Program, 
optimistic assessments of the impact of bombing North Vietnam, the shock of 
the Tet Offensive, and “our excessively optimistic expectations for the various 
‘revolutionary-development’ type cadre programs.” Once constituted, the memo 
continued, the group could help to guard against such misconceptions by consid-
ering the progress of Vietnamization, land reform, territorial control, and other 
aspects of the war and nation-building effort in South Vietnam.36
Kissinger was receptive to these proposals. From the beginning of the new 
administration, he had displayed skepticism toward reporting systems inherited 
from the Johnson administration. He was also dissatisfied with the quality of 
analysis available on the strength of the GVN and progress of the war in gen-
eral. Despite Ellsberg’s reputation as a well-established critic of the war, Kissinger 
brought him into the administration to help him define broad policy options.37 
While working for Kissinger, Ellsberg suggested that the White House should 
issue each national security agency involved in Vietnam with a series of questions 
designed to expose inconsistencies and gaps in knowledge and interpretations 
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of the war among the agencies. Ellsberg thought this would be especially useful 
in temporarily wresting the monopoly of interpretation on certain issues from 
the agencies and showing the wide variety of interpretation that existed within 
the government.38 Kissinger took this advice and set Ellsberg to work develop-
ing a set of questions that would most accurately reveal where the bureaucratic 
bodies were buried. Kissinger’s use of outside experts both to increase his own 
knowledge and bolster the White House’s position set the tone for an adminis-
tration that would be both much more intellectually curious about the war and 
more dedicated to setting up an independent analytical capability in the White 
House to understand it. When Lynn wrote to Kissinger suggesting the creation of 
the VSSG, he noted that Ellsberg’s project was the first time that many granular 
details of the war, including those related to nation building, had been discussed 
at the White House level. He proposed the VSSG as a way to institutionalize this 
process.39 Although Ellsberg became a strident critic of the administration, the 
early example he had set with National Security Study Memorandum 1 of how 
to best challenge the national security bureaucracy hence lived on through Lynn’s 
proposals and the creation of the VSSG. The group was created on September 16, 
1969.40 Ellsberg thus contributed to the running of the Nixon administration’s 
Vietnam policy in a way not appreciated by historians to date.
Despite their interest in strengthening the GVN, Nixon and Kissinger viewed 
this task mainly through the lens of increasing its military capabilities. At the very 
first NSC meeting on Vietnam, one of Nixon’s priorities was Saigon’s internal 
security forces. Echoing Johnson’s words from late 1966 about the ineffectiveness 
of civilian nation builders, Nixon stated that he believed that “the AID people are 
totally unsuited to supervise the development of local security forces, stating it 
is like the blind leading the blind, adding AID is incompetent to handle this mis-
sion.” Nixon also inquired about the leadership of the Chieu Hoi program, which 
was designed to encourage defections from Communist forces in South Vietnam. 
When told that the job fell under the remit of CORDS, headed by Colby, Nixon 
asked “is he a specialist, does he have any idea of what he is doing?” He seemed 
satisfied to hear that Colby’s qualifications included having previously served as 
CIA chief of station in Saigon. Nixon was not similarly satisfied, however, with 
the answers he received on local security forces—and so he ordered a “complete 
report on the whole program to include who is doing it, whether he is qualified, 
what system he is employing.”41
This concern with measures that either increased Saigon’s coercive capacities 
or cut directly into the insurgency—but not on those that aimed at increasing 
popular support for the GVN or reforming local governance—prefigured the 
administration’s focus. It was a preoccupation shared by Kissinger. In his For-
eign Affairs article, Kissinger had drawn an explicit link between the negotiations 
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and territorial control, complaining that U.S. and GVN assets were spread too 
thinly to produce durable gains for the GVN in extending its control of the rural 
population. “For purposes of negotiating, we would have been better off with 
100 percent control over 60 percent of the country than with 60 percent control 
of 100 percent of the country,” he explained—a viewpoint he continued to repeat 
in almost the exact same words throughout the Nixon administration.42
Unlike the Johnson administration’s early moves toward promoting social and 
economic reform, or the CIA’s concept of participative nation building, Nixon 
and Kissinger focused on the physical control of the population. Like Komer, they 
were dismissive of those with a wider view that differentiated between nation 
building and mere pacification. When Johnson had moved to put CORDS under 
the military, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms had warned him that 
success in South Vietnam depended on a “motivated population, not merely an 
administered one.”43 Others made similar arguments in the Nixon administra-
tion. Recognizing the link between the GVN’s political base and negotiations, 
Lake advised that the key factor would be how many areas of the country were 
“loyal to the GVN—not those militarily occupied or undergoing pacification.” 
Lake warned that GVN “control” of areas of the country where the population 
was not loyal would prove ephemeral, especially when the GVN could no lon-
ger benefit from U.S. troops and resources and had to spread itself more thinly. 
Instead he suggested that the GVN carry out local political reforms, to include 
province and district elections, in areas where support for it was already the deep-
est. The development of a true political base for the GVN “puts the most mean-
ingful kind of pressure on Hanoi . . . since it threatens their future prospects in a 
way that current casualty levels cannot.”44
As Johnson had brushed Helms’s concern aside, so Kissinger did with Lake’s. 
While Lake’s focus on priority areas may have seemed to chime with Kissinger’s 
preference for “100 percent control over 60 percent of the country,” it also rested 
on a fundamentally different concept of what constituted “control.” For the pur-
poses of the negotiations, which were Kissinger’s hope of ending the war without 
the risks of mere unilateral withdrawal, the GVN’s ability to claim control of the 
rural population was more important than whether it had gained their “loyalty.” 
Kissinger focused on the GVN’s institutions of control rather than on whether 
it had developed ties of mutual obligation with its population. Another reason 
to minimize the role of loyalty was that it was difficult to measure. A Special 
National Intelligence Estimate released just before Nixon’s inauguration had 
warned that it was “almost impossible to measure” the GVN’s progress in “gain-
ing the allegiance of the people.”45 This was a stark admission of the limited man-
ner in which U.S. nation builders, even those with a wider conception of their 
task, had managed to penetrate and understand South Vietnamese rural society. 
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Like the reports of a decline in enemy morale that Laird and Nixon had ques-
tioned in their first NSC meeting, an assessment of loyalty to the GVN was bound 
to be impressionistic and vague. Kissinger’s interests in what he sometimes called 
“the control war” were more concrete.46
This became apparent as the VSSG developed, under his tutelage, the most 
sophisticated analysis of the situation in the South Vietnamese countryside that 
had yet graced the White House. The analysis reflected both the administration’s 
focus on what could be tangibly and reliably measured and its interest in the 
extent of GVN control of the rural population. An early VSSG study defined 
control as “the ability of one side or the other to possess resources—people and 
their production—for its own purposes and to deny the use of such resources to 
the enemy.”47 This was a narrow conception of nation building that concentrated 
on population control rather than active political loyalty. This physical control of 
the countryside was thought to be “closely related” to the overall strength of the 
GVN, as “the GVN must achieve dominate [sic] control over the countryside, if it 
is to survive.”48 Control was defined as the permanent presence in any given ham-
let of both local GVN officials and local security forces to the complete exclusion 
of their equivalents from the NLF, the hamlet infrastructure, and local guerrillas. 
Conversely, a hamlet was said to be under enemy control if the latter two existed 
to the complete exclusion of the GVN equivalents. In between these two poles lay 
a large gray area of hamlets said to be “influenced by both sides.”49 Those under 
GVN control, meanwhile, had to be subject to its predominant influence both 
day and night.
Within the study, the concept of control was explicitly differentiated from the 
concepts of “security” and of “support.” While security was said to exist where 
the population was safe from enemy-initiated violence, this was seen as a mere 
prerequisite for control and not in itself indicative. An area may be secure simply 
because the enemy had made a decision not to challenge security at that time, 
perhaps to carry out other tasks of military significance such as recruiting or 
political activity. This meant that areas of apparent security always exceeded areas 
of GVN control in size, a situation that the authors of the study felt had given 
a misleading impression of the GVN’s strength in the past. The situation with 
regard to the concept of support was different. The authors considered positive 
endorsement of one side or the other by the population to be of “only limited rel-
evance” to the situation in South Vietnam, as well as being difficult to measure.50 
Within this framework, neither USAID’s materialist approach or the cadre pro-
grams designed by Chau and the CIA had any significance. As Kissinger pointed 
out in a meeting to discuss the paper, social and economic assistance programs 
did not necessarily have implications for control, as the enemy could simply be 
choosing not to contest these programs.51 As critics of the Tigers had pointed 
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out in the past, nor was it the case that support for the GVN could necessarily be 
inferred from a program’s existence. The VSSG concluded that popular support 
was more likely to follow than lead control gains, and that social and economic 
reform was not necessarily relevant to control, as the NLF could welcome such 
improvements without any lessening of control. Reforms “may even be credited 
to the Viet Cong if Viet Cong presence is viewed as the only guarantee that the 
GVN will continue to perform on behalf of the rural inhabitant.”52
Using this framework, the VSSG set about analyzing recent shifts in the “con-
trol war” and what had brought them about. Writing in late 1969, the group 
concluded that the GVN had improved its position markedly since the enemy 
offensives of 1968. Prior to the offensives, a situation that the report labeled a 
“control stalemate” had existed, with the GVN in control of around 20 percent 
of the population compared with the NLF’s 35 percent, and the rest under the 
influence of both sides. CORDS hence seems to have had little impact. But while 
the GVN position had then suffered markedly as a result of the Tet Offensive, 
the decimation of the NLF’s infrastructure and personnel during the offensive 
had prepared the way for impressive GVN control gains afterward. By Septem-
ber 1969, the VSSG concluded that the GVN controlled 54.7 percent of the rural 
population to the NLF’s 6.7 percent, with 38.6 percent under the influence of 
both sides.53 However encouraging these figures sounded, an analysis of the fac-
tors that had brought them about was less so. The study was based on an in-depth 
analysis of the situation in five provinces, and in four of them it was found that it 
was principally aggressive action by U.S. forces that had created the environment 
in which the control gains were possible. So even though the proximate cause 
of the increase was a vast expansion of the GVN apparatus and local security 
forces, this had taken place behind a shield of U.S. forces. It had also been helped 
by the damage that had been dealt to the enemy infrastructure during the 1968 
offensives.54
A trip to South Vietnam by Lynn and the NSC staffer Robert Sansom in Janu-
ary 1970 “to make a first hand evaluation of the situation in the countryside 
and of the extent and durability of recent improvements in GVN control over 
the rural population” only reinforced these impressions. The two found that the 
momentum of GVN control gains seemed to be slowing rapidly and that it was 
“far more likely that the GVN will lose control than it is they will significantly 
increase it” during the period of American troop withdrawals.55 Even though 
Sansom was an expert on the social and economic situation in South Vietnam 
who would soon publish a book titled The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong 
Delta of Vietnam, he and Lynn made little comment on such matters in their 
report, instead focusing narrowly on population control.56 They agreed that pop-
ular support tended to follow rather than lead control, placing the emphasis on 
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“pacification.”57 As they likewise attributed control gains to aggressive actions by 
the very U.S. forces that were now being withdrawn, it followed that the loss of 
control likely to follow would be significant.
Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that the conclusions of the VSSG studies were 
“moderately encouraging, but we also knew that North Vietnam’s confidence was 
unbroken.”58 He put his finger here on the central weakness of the GVN position. 
As the VSSG analysis had recognized, recent control gains were attributable to the 
two factors that the United States and the GVN were least able to control in the 
future. The first was the presence of American forces, which provided the shield 
behind which GVN control had been consolidated, and the second was the dam-
age done to the Communist movement in 1968. If the Communist movement 
could capitalize on its “unbroken” confidence to challenge the GVN again, Saigon 
would be in trouble. As U.S. forces continued to be withdrawn, it was not clear 
if ARVN local security forces would be able to meet this challenge in the long 
term. None of the VSSG studies indicated that Vietnamization was proceeding 
quickly enough to allow the ARVN to take over from the United States militarily. 
Moreover, the conclusion that measures leading to increased popular support 
had only a marginal impact on control indicated that there was also little oppor-
tunity for the GVN to improve or maintain its position through reforming local 
governance.
Boasting about the studies to the British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert 
Thompson in a way that also revealed his doubts about the underlying reality 
in South Vietnam, Kissinger said: “There never before had been a government 
consensus on what was actually happening, and we were trying now to reach such 
a consensus—perhaps five years too late.”59 Both parts of this statement were 
significant. It was certainly true that the VSSG allowed for a sober and clear-eyed 
view of the “control war,” even if narrowly defined, in a way that the Johnson 
administration had never managed. Nixon thought the resultant analysis “excel-
lent.”60 But the VSSG studies illustrated just how fragile those “control” gains 
could be, especially in the face of exogenous shocks like Communist offensives. 
They also took a pessimistic view of future trends, and dismissed the idea that 
nation building as it was understood by many Americans on the ground in South 
Vietnam—as encouraging the emergence of a rural GVN administration that 
was considered legitimate by its citizens—could have a meaningful impact on 
the future course of the war.
The analysis, pointing as it did toward the weakness of the GVN in the event 
of U.S. withdrawal, can only have hardened Kissinger’s desire for a negotiated 
settlement that would not amount to a unilateral withdrawal but rather would 
win concessions from North Vietnam to relieve pressure on the South and allow 
it to weather the storm of withdrawal. The incursions into Cambodia and Laos 
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also appeared logical within the VSSG framework. They allowed diminishing 
U.S. forces to be leveraged to maximum effect to disrupt enemy lines of commu-
nications and supply caches in a way that further relieved pressure on the GVN 
and allowed it to consolidate its control gains. The operations also increased the 
pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate. Thus Nixon’s chief of staff, H. R. Halde-
man, recorded Kissinger saying that the Laos operation in 1971 “would in effect 
end the war because it would totally demolish the enemy’s capability.”61 If Halde-
man recorded this remark accurately, it was a brief moment of ebullience that 
soon passed.
The Fragility of Control
According to the VSSG’s “control indicator,” GVN control did indeed expand 
steadily, standing at 76 percent of the rural population of the country in Decem-
ber 1971.62 But then came the Easter Offensive of March 1972, which dealt just 
the sort of setback to GVN control that the VSSG had warned of. Although the 
offensive was eventually beaten back, the damage to GVN control of the rural 
population was extensive, and only during the declining pace of hostilities fol-
lowing the signing of the Paris Peace Accords did the GVN manage to achieve 
74 percent control, still below the level of a year earlier.63 The fragility of GVN 
control in the face of major enemy offensives had hence been established, espe-
cially as the Easter Offensive had been contained only by the extensive deploy-
ment of U.S. air and naval assets. This clearly threatened the long-term survival 
of the GVN, but it was not a surprising situation—indeed, Kissinger had worried 
about this scenario all along, and it was one reason he had set up the VSSG to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the countryside and the 
progress of nation building. Thus although the analysis proved prescient, the 
question remains as to whether it was too narrow and whether the decision to 
slight the importance of social, economic, and political reform and to regard it as 
marginal to the GVN’s ability to withstand military attack led to deficiencies in 
the understanding of the situation in South Vietnam or in Washington’s ability 
to influence it.
This question arises because of the paradox of the Nixon administration’s 
Vietnam War policy, which was that even though none of the main policy-mak-
ing triumvirate—Nixon, Kissinger, and Laird—showed much interest in the 
reform of South Vietnam, by the time they came into office the role had already 
been institutionalized under CORDS. As we saw in this chapter, while Kissinger 
brought in outside experts and set up a sophisticated system for understanding 
the progress of “the control war,” he did little to intervene in the way it was being 
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run. As we shall see in the next chapter, CORDS had a great deal of autonomy 
in deciding how to approach nation building in South Vietnam. That this was 
so is apparent from the fact that CORDS stressed the very reformist measures 
Kissinger and Nixon underplayed in their approach to the problem of nation 
building in South Vietnam. Kissinger and the VSSG recognized that the GVN had 
to expand its control of the rural population and to generate the manpower and 
revenues necessary to defend South Vietnam from the Vietnamese Communist 
movement, but did not believe that reform measures aimed at actively generat-
ing support for the GVN were particularly consequential. They hence stressed 
only one part of the equation of mutual obligation between the GVN and its 
citizens, which Helms had referred to when he called for creating a “motivated 
population, not merely an administered one.” This was an idea that Colby and 
other CORDS officials had taken to heart, even if Nixon and Kissinger had not. 
Using the autonomy they had gained under Johnson, CORDS officials were able 
to implement their ideas in the latter years of the war. Even though Kissinger and 
Nixon remained uninterested and even largely unaware of it, Americans in South 
Vietnam were attempting a nation-building effort of ambitious scope. The ques-
tion that remained was whether they would be successful and could prove the 
skepticism of their superiors in the White House to be invalid.
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CORDS AND THE VILLAGE SYSTEM
Back on the ground in South Vietnam, the sun rose over a changed war on 
 January 31, the anniversary of the beginning of the 1968 offensives. Unable to 
summon anything like their effort a year earlier, the Communist movement 
stepped up artillery strikes and terror attacks on urban centers. Five rockets 
landed in Hue, and bombs killed two girls near a school in Saigon. About fifty 
miles northwest of the city, near the Cambodian border, the U.S. First Cavalry 
Division were busy operating in a Communist base area that they had previously 
been unable to penetrate. After driving off the rear-echelon forces who were left 
to guard it, they discovered a tunnel complex covering four square miles and con-
taining a three-thousand-bed hospital. Large formations of NVA had been forced 
to disperse under the American pressure, and a counterattack they launched on 
a nearby First Cav firebase was easily repulsed. Meanwhile, deep in the Mekong 
Delta near the town of Can Tho, American B-52 bombers unloaded one thou-
sand tons of explosives on “suspected enemy troop concentrations,” bringing ter-
ror to the countryside.1
These events presented a microcosm of the war over the next several years. 
Recovering their poise in late 1968 and taking advantage of the failure of Hanoi’s 
offensives, U.S. and ARVN forces had swept out into the countryside like never 
before, drastically expanding the GVN-controlled area. Reeling from their losses 
in the 1968 offensives, the Communist movement was forced to break down its 
large units into smaller and smaller pieces in order to avoid American sweeps. 
Lacking the freedom of movement they had enjoyed for years and with even their 
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base areas under pressure, they risked becoming targets for devastating displays of 
American firepower when they massed for assaults. They were increasingly unable 
to deter the allies from operating in the former “liberated areas,” leaving the NLF’s 
local and regional guerrillas and cadres vulnerable. At the same time, U.S. and 
ARVN counteroffensives were saturating parts of the country with a tremendous 
amount of firepower, causing civilian casualties on a scale hitherto unknown in 
some populated areas. In one well-documented case, the U.S. Ninth Division, 
which became the first U.S. unit of its size to operate in the delta during the entire 
war, claimed 10,889 enemy killed in one operation, but recovered only 748 weap-
ons, suggesting there were a large number of civilians among the dead. Attempt-
ing to escape this indiscriminate bombardment of Communist-controlled zones, 
a sizable number of civilians relocated to areas dominated by the GVN, further 
depriving the revolutionary movement of manpower and resources.
These military operations rapidly increased the number of civilians who were 
living in areas that were secure in the narrow sense defined by the VSSG studies of 
the Nixon administration. The attrition of the Communist movement’s political 
as well as its military apparatus, along with population movements occasioned by 
allied firepower, loosened the movement’s grip on the population in much of the 
delta to its lowest ebb of the entire conflict. In its traditional strongholds on the 
central coast, the movement was stronger, but still on the defensive in a manner 
it had not been prior to the military debacle of 1968.
These shifts in the dynamics of the war coincided with the emergence of a new 
CORDS leadership determined to take advantage of the situation, along with 
Thieu’s consolidation of power, to translate temporary security gains into a genu-
ine long-term strengthening of the GVN. Headed by William Colby, the group 
had all been sharply critical of the way the war was fought prior to 1968. They 
favored a new strategy that would minimize the role of the military’s firepower 
and divisions and stress nation building in the rural villages, just as the Commu-
nist movement did. Though these individuals often found themselves working at 
cross-purposes to the military units providing the security shield on which their 
efforts depended, the final years of the war presented them the most favorable 
conditions in which to attempt their approach. Their ideas came to dominate 
CORDS and determine the shape of U.S. nation-building efforts.
CORDS’s Strategy for Rural Reform, 1969–1972
Since CORDS’s formation by Komer, its officials had believed that the absence 
of large enemy units was a vital prerequisite to nation building. The Communist 
movement’s travails after the 1968 offensives created the most permissive envi-
ronment for U.S. forces to operate in since 1965 and made it much easier to keep 
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NLF and NVA units away from populated areas. Colby told the Senate in 1970 
that it had been “amply proven” that CORDS’s programs could not be effective 
“unless hostile regiments and divisions are kept away.” But he added: “At the same 
time, however, we have found that their absence does not thereby produce peace 
nor offer political fulfilment to the people.” Representing the “CIA school” of 
nation building that had been present in South Vietnam since the early 1960s 
but marginalized when CORDS was headed by Komer, Colby had definite ideas 
about how to offer “political fulfilment” of a sort that he hoped would allow the 
GVN to build a base of support comparable to that of the Communists.2
Prior to becoming the head of CORDS, Colby had spent decades in the CIA, 
including a term as chief of station in Saigon in the early 1960s. He had believed 
that neither the military’s focus on training the ARVN to fight an offensive war 
nor the State Department’s concern with liberalizing the Diem regime held the 
key to the conflict. A conventionally oriented ARVN would struggle against guer-
rillas, and a liberalization of the Diem regime to include other nationalist factions 
meant little to villagers who rarely left their own district. The key to the conflict, he 
thought, “would be found only in the villages, not in political circles in Saigon or 
in General Staff Headquarters.”3 Colby was not in a policy-making role in the early 
years of American involvement, and he later spoke with deep regret about how the 
correct “counter to revolutionary war” was developed by CORDS only long after 
the war had already been Americanized.4 He had watched the escalation of the 
conflict under Johnson with alarm, and continued to believe that true victory lay 
in the GVN involving South Vietnam’s rural population in a collaborative effort 
against the Communists—that is, in nation building. He was concerned like many 
of his agency colleagues that the militarization of nation building under CORDS 
would undermine the need for “some degree of engagement by the population as 
shown by a willingness to contribute to intelligence, local security and community 
development.” He further warned of an “impatient desire on our part to impose 
‘pacification’ and security on the population rather than engaging in a common 
effort.”5
Although concerned about nation building being placed under military 
leadership, Colby eventually came to see how CORDS could be turned to his 
advantage—provided it was kept under operational civilian control. After going 
to Saigon to become Komer’s deputy in 1967, he saw how CORDS’s sandwich 
structure of management in fact allowed for wide discretion in the running of 
the organization by its civilian head. He even came to appreciate Komer. “Komer 
knew that if you put pacification under the military it would be lost, because 
the military would go out and shoot everybody,” Colby explained to Chau. “But 
Komer also understood that the military would never accept anything but unity 
of command. Therefore the only way to make it work was to put pacification 
under the military, in civilian hands. He had the genius to see that.”6
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CORDS was now in Colby’s very own hands, and, as he put it in the mem-
oirs, he finally “had the chance to try out my idea that political development 
from the ground up was really the central part of winning a people’s war, and 
not just a supplement to the military and territorial-force part.”7 Colby’s tenure 
also saw the ascendancy of a certain faction of other like-minded officials who 
shared his approach to the war. This group, including Colby’s deputy George 
Jacobson, John Paul Vann—who under Colby served as head of CORDS in the 
delta and later the top American adviser in II Corps—and his policy chief Clay 
McManaway, made a sizable imprint on the war effort. Theirs was a collaborative 
effort that built on what they had learned during their many years in Vietnam. 
An internal CORDS assessment written in June 1969 put it this way: “The 1969 
pacification plan represents the culmination to date of progressive developments 
in the techniques of attaining Vietnamese popular identification with the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam and a concurrent increase in control of the government over 
its population.”8 But this was an understatement. Rather than just being an incre-
mental progression of what had come before, Colby’s focus on building mutual 
ties of obligation between the GVN and its citizens transformed the character of 
U.S. nation-building efforts after 1968.
Since the early 1960s, Colby believed the key to the war was building up the 
civil institutions of the GVN at the lowest level rather than militarily defeat-
ing the Communist movement. The inspiration for his schemes came not from 
American modernization theorists, of whom he seldom if ever talked, but rather 
from what he understood of the practice of the Vietnamese Communist move-
ment. Colby’s interest in the techniques of the Communist movement dated 
back at least to his time as chief of station in Saigon in the early 1960s, when he 
spent long hours discussing revolutionary warfare with former president Diem’s 
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who shared the fascination.9
As Colby told a military audience in 1971, he believed that the basis of “rev-
olutionary war” as fought by the Vietnamese Communists was “the organiza-
tion of the people and the use of the people.”10 Colby believed that the success 
of the Vietnamese Communist movement depended on their superior ability 
to motivate and organize the rural population in support of their movement, 
and that the GVN had to replicate this success to survive. The Vietnamese Com-
munist movement engaged in what he called “political development from the 
ground up,” mobilizing the rural population into functional groups focused on 
discrete tasks such as intelligence gathering, land reform, women’s affairs, and 
youth activities.11 Colby understood that Communist rule was a participatory 
experience for the villagers, creating a sense of political identification between 
them and the movement for which they worked, against their shared enemy in 
the Saigon regime. This not only provided a means for the NLF to control the 
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population; it also created a sense of joint enterprise. Colby wanted the GVN to 
organize the population in a similar way, believing that successfully replicating 
this Communist practice was key to the war effort. Vann had likewise come to 
believe in the importance of the “organization of the population” through his 
long association with Chau, and became an enthusiastic backer of Colby’s ideas.12
The approach to nation building that CORDS advanced during Colby’s tenure 
reflected this, although Colby favored the word “participation” (of the people) 
over the term “use.” “The war cannot be won,” he repeatedly said, “unless the peo-
ple participate.”13 Rejecting the attempt to impose nation building from the top 
down, Colby instead wanted to build a nation from the bottom up by focusing on 
what he called the “three selfs”—“self-development, self-government and self-
defense.”14 From the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) onward, CORDS 
sought to actively involve the country’s rural citizens in the running of their own 
affairs under the auspices of local GVN authorities. This did not require the con-
struction of a sense of South Vietnamese nationhood and patriotism, which had 
thus far proven elusive. Instead, like the Communist movement, CORDS aimed 
to engage with the rural population not as citizens of a wider entity called South 
Vietnam but instead as citizens of their home village. Like the NLF, they would 
stress concrete reforms and social empowerment that had an immediate and tan-
gible impact on villagers’ lives within their own sphere of interest in the village. 
Doing so would give rural citizens a stake in defending the new village order, in 
paying their taxes promptly and volunteering for service in the local militia. This 
focus on the village also chimed with Vietnamese tradition. As a GVN strategic 
plan for 1970 observed, the village was “the traditional community in Vietnam-
ese society.”15 The village had indeed been the central unit of Vietnamese rural 
life since the time of the Chinese conquest, and since Viet colonizers had first 
moved onto the central plains and Mekong Delta centuries afterward. As with the 
Communists who had based their own system of administration and mobiliza-
tion on the village, the new strategy would require a blend of “relevant tradition 
and necessary innovation.”16 Appropriately enough, the Americans called their 
innovation “the village system.”
This approach was one that Jeffrey Race, in his classic analysis of the Vietnam-
ese Communist movement, called “communalism.” The movement’s effort, he 
said, was “communal in the sense that it took place within the framework of the 
peasant’s span of interests, largely limited to issues within his own community.” 
The loyalty of the population to the movement was based on its ability to “resolve 
concrete local issues . . . [such as] land, taxation, protection from impressment 
into the national army, or a personally satisfying role in the activities of the com-
munity.” Race found in his extensive research in the province of Long An that 
nationalism as such was rarely a motivating theme for villagers. Rather, it was 
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defense of the local order in their village, plus the direction of Communist lead-
ership cadres whose job was to ensure the village acted in the strategic interests 
of the movement, that led peasants to give service to the NLF. This was the begin-
ning of the conveyor belt that allowed the movement to mobilize the popula-
tion and transmit taxes, food, and manpower to the higher levels. Race criticized 
GVN efforts to mobilize the rural population for focusing on nationalism and a 
“diffuse anticommunism,” for which peasants were unwilling to make sacrifices 
in their personal interests.17 While a strident and highly centralized South Viet-
namese nationalism did indeed mark Diem’s nation-building efforts, after 1968 
CORDS attempted to work with the GVN to foster something different. The 
village system was based on a vision of rural communities that was remarkably 
similar to the bottom-up approach pursued by the Communists. “Rather than 
considering it the lowest of a series of bureaucratic levels through which author-
ity descends from the Palace to the people,” Colby claimed in 1970, “it became the 
first assemblage of the population to conduct its own affairs.”18
In its broad outlines, the village system drew on a wider discourse of colonial 
counterinsurgency among Westerners who had fought movements similar to the 
NLF in Malaya, Algeria, and colonial Indochina. All of these theorists believed 
that conventional military operations were useless or downright harmful in such 
conflicts, and that the organization and motivation of the population was the 
key to victory. Sir Robert Thompson was the most prominent. He had earned his 
reputation in Malaya as, according to the British magazine the New Statesman, 
“the world’s leading counter-insurgency expert.”19 Although he could sometimes 
be blind to the differences between the situation in Vietnam and that which had 
pertained in Malaya, Thompson drew some lessons from his earlier career that 
chimed with Colby’s thinking. Like Colby, Thompson was critical of the role 
played by the U.S. military in South Vietnam after the Americanization of the 
conflict, believing that its heavy use of firepower alienated the population. Mean-
while, the United States had shortchanged the only thing that could ultimately 
give them an exit strategy from the conflict: nation building. In a book published 
in 1969, Thompson wrote that “the problem in Vietnam was, and still is, that of 
government in its broadest sense and of organization, both in the military and 
civilian administrative structure.” It was a problem, he claimed, that the Ameri-
cans had hitherto “refrained from tackling.”20 Thompson viewed the Revolu-
tionary Development program and its parapolitics as a “pathetic” gimmick that 
ignored the need to reform the regular GVN bureaucracy.21 Although he had 
an authoritarian streak, Thompson agreed with the necessity of involving the 
rural population in the effort rather than simply imposing outside solutions on 
them. During his time in Malaya, Thompson had believed that a nation-building 
effort had “to involve the people” as well as government institutions.22 Similarly, 
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in Vietnam, he believed that only the South Vietnamese villagers themselves 
could bring about victory. But an administrative “machine” had to be created 
in the villages to discipline their efforts and lead them there, just as the Com-
munists created their own organizational machine to both mobilize and control 
the population.23
In Thompson’s view, there were three main components to the U.S. effort in 
Vietnam. The most important was “nation building,” which was the “offensive 
constructive programme” that strengthened the GVN and eventually set the con-
ditions in which U.S. withdrawal could take place. Military operations, the second 
component, were defensive in nature and designed to hold off the military forces 
of the Communist movement while nation building proceeded. “The programme 
which linked these two together was pacification,” he remarked, “because on the 
one hand it was designed to restore governmental control throughout the coun-
try and to establish a permanent link between the central government and the 
villages and, on the other hand, to destroy the hold which the Vietcong’s politi-
cal underground organization had on the population.”24 Pacification—the third 
component—allowed for the clearing away of the organizational infrastructure 
of the Vietnamese Communists. It also brought the GVN into contact with the 
rural population. But pacification alone was not enough. Nation building meant 
building permanent links between the GVN and its citizens. The strengthening 
of village governments, local militias, and village police would allow the GVN to 
organize and control the population and preclude the Vietnamese Communist 
movement from doing the same. Thompson believed that it was this nation-
building element that the Americans had given short shrift, as they had been too 
focused on the mere territorial control implied by “pacification.”25
Other European writers agreed with Thompson, particularly veterans of 
France’s war in Indochina.26 Bernard Fall was a prominent French war corre-
spondent and academic who had arrived in French Indochina in 1953 to carry 
out research into the war there. Fall likewise saw a stark difference between “paci-
fication” and the establishment of durable ties between the central government 
and the rural population. Noting that “to the last breath a government will try 
to collect taxes,” Fall had checked village tax rolls in areas of the Red River Delta 
that the French claimed were pacified and found that most of the population 
of the delta was not paying taxes. He similarly discovered that although village 
schoolteachers were supposedly assigned by the central government, there were 
large areas in which they were not present. Even though the entire area was inside 
a large French military cordon, he concluded that the central government could 
not be said to have an administrative presence in about 70 percent of the delta. 
This lack of administrative and political links between the central government 
and the villages was what allowed the Viet Minh “to take over a country under 
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our feet” by bringing the rural population under its own administration. As he 
wrote in a U.S. military journal in 1965, Fall believed that “when a country is 
being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered.” If the 
Americans were going to avoid losing in Vietnam, they would have to avoid the 
same fate. “The question in my mind is this,” wrote Fall. “Can we in Viet-Nam, or 
anywhere else, save (or improve) the administrative or governmental structure?” 
Only by extending government administration into the villages, where the bulk 
of the population resided, could the Americans win the war.27
Fall in turn drew on the works of Roger Trinquier, a veteran of the French wars 
in both Indochina and Algeria. In 1962, Trinquier published his book Modern 
Warfare, in which he synthesized the experiences he and many other French offi-
cers had drawn from these two conflicts. Like Colby, Thompson, and Fall—who 
wrote the introduction to an English translation of Modern Warfare—Trinquier 
was critical of the traditional military establishment. He wrote that “our military 
machine reminds one of a pile driver attempting to crush a fly, indefatigably 
persisting in repeating its efforts.” The key to winning what he termed mod-
ern wars—by which he meant counter-guerrilla campaigns that required nation 
building—was not firepower but the organization of the populace. It was not 
necessary, he held, to have “the sympathy of the majority of the population in 
order to rule them. The right organization can turn the trick.” He believed that 
groups like the NLF derived their success from a “specially adapted organization” 
that allowed them to mobilize the population to provide them with manpower, 
supplies, and intelligence. Neither Thompson nor Trinquier was myopic enough 
to totally dismiss the fact that groups like the NLF enjoyed popular support. But 
they believed that a more salient factor was that the government had ceded con-
trol of village organization and administration to the insurgents.28 Like Thomp-
son, Fall and Trinquier advocated spreading central government control over 
rural areas, uprooting the local infrastructure of the Vietnamese Communist 
movement, and then building up a pro-government infrastructure from below. 
They referred to this process by the French term quadrillage, or “gridding.”29 Only 
by dismantling the enemy’s political and administrative infrastructure and con-
structing a “similar organization” on the government side could the GVN hope 
to triumph.30 This required the establishment of a governmental presence in the 
villages and the mobilization of the population into pro-government militias and 
political organizations.
This all implied a renewed focus on the village itself. South Vietnam was a uni-
tary state whose constitution provided that power was vested in the villages in a 
manner of the central state’s choosing. The village was the lowest rung of the GVN 
that was allowed to make a budget, levy taxes, and own property, and was there-
fore considered by the GVN to be “the basic echelon of rural administration.”31 
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This legal standing made it able to become the basis for a lasting devolution and 
decentralization of power.32 As the GVN’s 1969 pacification plan explained, this 
would “ensure lasting success.”33 The cornerstone of the village system was “a 
decentralization of some degree of power to the population in order to stimulate 
them and invite them into . . . participation.”34 In turn, this was based on the 
idea of the “three selfs.” Through “self-government,” villagers would be able to 
elect their own village leaders. “Self-development” entailed the provision of cen-
tral government material aid to the village administrations so that they could, at 
least in theory, respond to the need of their constituents. “Self-defense” programs 
aimed to raise local militia who would defend the village against small Commu-
nist units and free up the ARVN to take the place of departing American forces. 
The village system tied together numerous strands of American nation-building 
thinking—the materialist, the security-oriented, and the participative.
The focus, though, was definitely on the latter. The self-government, self-
defense, and self-development programs were designed to create a mesh of orga-
nizations in each village that would structure and direct the energies of the popu-
lation in the service of the GVN and against the NLF. In 1969, Thompson had cri-
tiqued the nation-building effort to date for allowing the GVN’s “administrative 
organization . . . to decay while the corresponding Vietcong asset was allowed to 
flourish.” This had allowed the Vietnamese Communist movement greater suc-
cess at “harvesting the surplus energy, manpower and production of the South 
Vietnamese people.”35 The village system was designed to change that. Just as 
Thompson, Fall, and Trinquier recommended, the pro-government administra-
tive structure at village level would match and—it was hoped—ultimately dis-
place the NLF’s own structure. Summing up the new American nation-building 
thrust in 1969, McManaway wrote that “the PSDF [People’s Self-Defense Force], 
village self development, and village administration programs are directly aimed 
at building an organizational structure within which political activity can flour-
ish. Our ‘rural political strategy’ . . . is to get as many people as possible affili-
ated in some kind of organization—whether para-military, economic, social, 
youth, or political—using self-interest as the incentive.”36 Just as CORDS used 
the GVN’s own self-interest in mobilizing rural resources to persuade Saigon 
to adopt reforms, so the reforms themselves aimed to use the decentralization 
of power to villagers to convince them that their own self-interest lay with the 
Saigon government.
Building up the capacities of the GVN in the villages also meant progress on 
another issue on which Colby and the European theorists were in agreement: the 
importance of reducing the military’s role. From the vantage point of a memoir 
written decades later, Thompson would criticize the United States and the GVN 
for a tendency to militarize civil functions, and contrast the situation unfavorably 
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with Malaya. “In Malaya the army supported the civil power during an ‘emer-
gency,’ ” he wrote, “but in Vietnam the civil power, where it existed, supported the 
army in a war.”37 Trinquier, Fall, and Colby also believed that large-unit sweeps 
and heavy firepower were counterproductive. Instead, the village system was 
designed to eventually allow the burden of the war to be shifted onto locally 
raised militias and village governments. As Vann explained, overreliance on the 
military led to what was effectively an “occupation” of rural areas by a GVN and 
ARVN administration imposed from the outside. This was not only unlikely to 
elicit the active support of the population, but also inevitably allowed the NLF to 
reemerge when government forces moved on.38 “Without an overt commitment 
from the population in favor of GVN objectives,” read policy guidance written in 
1971, “pacification is hardly distinguishable from military occupation.”39
Though the military occupation of rural areas and the driving out of large 
Communist units constituted a first step, the village system was designed to 
translate these short-term gains at pacification into durable nation building. 
According to Vann, “the willing cooperation of the people with their government 
because they believe it will be in their own self-interest,” along with the rejection 
of the NLF, would allow the GVN to withdraw its military forces from an area 
sometime after the initial “occupation.” This was a vital facet of the village system 
at a time when Vietnamization was reducing the number of U.S. forces who were 
able to provide a security shield behind which nation building could take place, 
meaning that the ARVN would have more tasks to accomplish with declining 
resources. By contrast, the active participation of the population meant that “a 
relatively smaller number of armed men, more centrally located, can respond to 
the warnings or ‘intelligence’ given by a watchful loyal population.”40
The opportunity to implement the village system arose in part because declin-
ing violence across South Vietnam between 1968 and the Easter Offensive led to 
a vast improvement in the country’s refugee situation. The number of internally 
displaced persons recorded in official statistics in South Vietnam peaked in early 
1969 at nearly 1.5 million before declining thereafter. In 1969, just over half a 
million of these refugees returned to their original homes, and another 586,388 
were paid resettlement allowances by the GVN to allow them to move some-
where else.41 At the same time, the practice of forcibly relocating civilians during 
military operations was increasingly discouraged by both the United States and 
Thieu. In January 1968, Westmoreland had noted that the allies had two basic 
options to isolate the civilian population from the NLF. “Either the communists 
and their political control must be driven from the populated areas and secu-
rity provided to keep them out,” he wrote, “or the people must be relocated into 
areas that will facilitate security and prevent communist control apparatus from 
re-entering the community.” While the first course of action was “preferred,” it 
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was also “time-consuming and expensive.”42 Civilians had therefore often been 
forcibly moved to areas of GVN control from the time of the Strategic Hamlet 
Program under Diem. The resentment and disruption this caused undermined 
attempts by the GVN to build a positive relationship with its rural citizens. Rec-
ognizing this, from 1969 onward Thieu and Colby repeated the mantra that secu-
rity should be brought to the people rather than the people to security.43 As GVN 
territorial control spread and the pace of military operations in populated areas 
declined, huge numbers of rural citizens returned to their villages. This made it 
possible for the village system to be implemented on a scale that would have been 
impossible during the chaotic and fluid environment before the 1968 offensives.
In the context of wider U.S. policy under Nixon, the village system represented 
the civil side of Vietnamization. In fact, as one briefer noted in 1971, CORDS had 
been involved in a process of Vietnamization ever since its creation in 1967.44 Offi-
cial policy guidance on Vietnamization sent out by Colby and General Creighton 
Abrams in 1971 asserted that “the nub of the policy is assistance and support of 
the Vietnamese constitutional structure to build the strength necessary to sus-
tain itself in the future against the external and internal problems it will face.”45 
Vietnamization also placed new pressures on the GVN. The U.S. involvement in 
South Vietnam was now time-limited, subject to political pressures in the United 
States. GVN leaders likewise realized that they would increasingly have to rely on 
their own resources to run South Vietnam and keep the Communists at bay as 
American forces and monetary assistance were withdrawn. As an American gov-
ernment economist who studied South Vietnam intensively for USAID argued, 
since 1965 the GVN had pursued a policy of relying on foreign resources to fight 
the Communists rather than mobilizing domestic assets.46 Both the American 
combat troops fighting for Saigon and the American aid dollars flowing into its 
coffers attested to this. With the onset of Vietnamization, Thieu and his allies in 
Saigon realized that there was a need for their government not only to spread 
its control of the rural population but also to harness the assets of rural South 
 Vietnam—its manpower and economic resources—to bolster itself for a time 
when it would have to rely much more on its own resources.
The GVN and the Village System
The village system represented a blending of American and Vietnamese think-
ing on political organization and revolutionary war in South Vietnam. But the 
Vietnamese figures whom Americans like Colby and Vann had learned from were 
not mainstream ARVN province chiefs or GVN politicians, but mavericks and 
outsiders like Chau. In turn, Chau had based his thinking on the example of the 
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Vietnamese Communist movement and his own time in the Viet Minh. Much 
of what he taught went against the entrenched interests and worldview of the 
urban class who staffed the ARVN officer corps and served as provincial and 
district officials. CORDS advisers who tried to bring about the implementation 
of the village system were hence always working with and simultaneously against 
the GVN.
The fate of Chau and Major (later Colonel) Nguyen Be, his successor as head 
of the Vung Tau center, illustrated the problem. Both were eventually jailed by 
Thieu, who disliked their independent streaks, opposition to the GVN hierar-
chy, and closeness to the Americans. A former Viet Minh battalion commander 
like Chau, Be shared his distaste for the typical province chiefs who were dis-
tant from the rural population. Be once told a visiting Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey that the majority of district chiefs in South Vietnam were corrupt, 
raising eyebrows from Washington to Saigon.47 Training GVN cadres at Vung 
Tau, he preached about the evils of landlordism and official corruption in the 
Vietnamese countryside, as well as the danger of the Communist movement. 
As can be imagined, these views did not endear him to his fellow officers who 
staffed the lower levels of the government bureaucracy. Be believed in creating 
a genuine village democracy, but feared that his program would be diluted or 
destroyed by entrenched interests in rural government. Thieu was wary of Be, 
and remarked on at least one occasion that “better educated and more patriotic 
people—Army people” ought to be put in charge of the RD cadre program that 
Be was now running.48 Only the fact he was highly regarded by the Americans 
protected Be from Thieu’s wrath, and Bunker had to head off at least one attempt 
to fire him.49 Criticizing his own countrymen while enjoying the protection of 
the Americans placed Be in a tricky position. When American advisers had all left 
following the Paris Peace Accords, Be was promptly accused of embezzlement, 
fired, and replaced by a Thieu loyalist.50 Chau, meanwhile, had entered politics as 
a legislator and become highly critical of Thieu. After being accused of making 
contact with his brother who was serving in the NLF—hardly an unusual act, 
given how political loyalties had fractured families across South Vietnam—Chau 
was imprisoned following a controversial trial.51 Neither example encouraged 
the emergence of other crusading reformers from within the ARVN or the GVN.
CORDS’s activities in the final years of the conflict involved a complex dance 
of negotiation and compromise with the GVN at all levels, from Thieu and his 
ministers in Saigon down to the province and district chiefs with whom field 
advisers worked. Colby and his lieutenants in Saigon were successful at persuad-
ing Thieu and officials in the Ministry of Rural Development to adopt the tenets 
of the village system, at least in principle. A series of decrees promulgated by the 
GVN, including a major circular on the reorganization of village government in 
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April 1969, laid the groundwork for the village system.52 Each year afterward until 
the American withdrawal, ministries in Saigon promulgated large strategic plans 
that provided instructions for priority rural reforms and the implementation of 
the village system over the coming year. These documents reflected CORDS’s pri-
orities well, not least because CORDS officials had a heavy hand in writing them.
These plans continued to run into problems when passed to local officials for 
implementation, reflecting the entrenched difficulty of bringing about reforms 
at the local level. Some Vietnamese officials such as “Anh” were in sympathy with 
the aims of the village system and its de-emphasis of the military role. As early as 
1967, Anh complained about the pattern of occupation followed by withdrawal 
that typified “pacification.” Military units would move in, order the people to 
cooperate with government forces, then “before the village is strong enough they 
move to another place because they are understrength . . . leaving the village to 
the VC again. After such an experience, you can never expect to be successful 
if you come back the second time.”53 But while NIA-trained officials like Anh 
were more likely to support the village system, the military-trained province and 
district officials and corps commanders who held most sway in the countryside 
would ultimately decide whether implementation of it would be successful. Anh 
and most civilians like him never rose to the position of province chief, which 
remained mostly a military prerogative. There was only so far Thieu was able—or 
wanted—to go in imposing the village system on the military officers who still 
staffed most of the GVN. Thieu had consolidated his position following the 1968 
offensives and had been able to replace a sizable proportion of local leadership. 
But it was very tricky for him to carry out what amounted to a revolution in local 
governance while relying on the very officials whose power the revolution would 
undermine to both carry it out and to keep fighting the war. In the paraphrased 
words of an American officer, Thieu did not have the luxury of destroying the 
GVN in order to save it. Nor, as his treatment of Be and Chau showed, was he in 
total sympathy with the aims of the reformers.
From the 1969 plan onward, the GVN stressed the need to capitalize on 
the improved security environment to carry out reforms. “We are now stron-
ger than we have ever been, and the enemy is at his weakest period,” exulted 
the 1969 plan. “Presently, our resources ready to be used in the Pacification 
Program are larger than ever before.” In rhetoric that echoed Colby’s words 
about the need for correct technique, it warned that “we may repeat the same 
mistakes of the past if we do not learn and apply the important Principle of 
the Community Spirit.” This principle, which recurred frequently in GVN dis-
course on nation building, called for “cooperation among the people, coopera-
tion between the people and the Government, and cooperation among Gov-
ernment organizations.”54
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Although the Community Spirit Principle was compatible with the Ameri-
can concept of the “three selfs,” it tended to stress the responsibility of citizens 
toward the GVN more than the reverse. In private remarks, top GVN officials 
also consistently placed more emphasis than CORDS on the fact that the bargain 
between people and government did not just involve resources and rights flowing 
downward to the people, but also demanded that they actively assist the GVN. 
“The important factor here is to instill in the people a sense of responsibility for 
their community for it is the people themselves who must actively combat the 
Communists,” Thieu explained in early 1969. “The people must participate in all 
activities to defend and develop themselves.”55 Along with the Americans, Thieu 
felt that “the people must be held under GVN control from a political and ideo-
logical point of view, not just administrative.”56 Yet it is interesting that he talked 
of ideological and political control rather than democracy and participation, as 
the Americans did. According to his aide Nguyen Tien Hung, Thieu and his close 
advisers believed that Vietnam was not ready for democracy and went along with 
liberalizing ideas only to maintain American support.57 This made him unwilling 
to risk too much of his support from the military for the sake of ideas of whose 
usefulness he was not convinced. Nghiem Dang, the head of the NIA, also placed 
a greater accent on the control of the population rather than seeking spontane-
ous commitment. “Whether interest groups are spontaneous or co-ordinated or 
whether they are organized for the purpose of public control or for population 
regimentation,” he wrote, “the very fact of their existence shows the extent to 
which citizens participate in administrative activities.”58 Prime Minister Huong 
likewise stressed the responsibility of citizens, saying that “the guiding princi-
ple of the program was that the people would do more for themselves and that 
the government would support them.”59 The 1970 plan also took up his theme, 
stressing on its first page: “All people must understand their mission, their private 
responsibility, and support the government.”60 As Vietnamization advanced, this 
point remained pertinent. In fact, it amounted to a matter of the GVN insisting 
that the burden of Vietnamization would fall on the country’s rural citizenry. 
With the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, the need for the GVN to enlist the 
cooperation of its local citizens in national defense only grew stronger. The result 
was that, as the 1971 plan explained, “a greater share of the burden of defense 
must be borne locally, by the villagers themselves.”61
On the other hand, Thieu realized that the reforms CORDS pushed were a 
logical response to Vietnamization because they helped enlist the GVN’s citizens 
in the common defense. He also appreciated the value of keeping the Americans 
onside for as long as possible. As Colby explained, Thieu had a particular way of 
dealing with his American advisers, realizing that “to handle their enthusiasm it 
was not appropriate to challenge them directly . . . but it was sensible to accept 
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their ideas rather than reject them and then try to adjust them to make them 
more practical.” In this way he channeled CORDS’s ideas “to what could practi-
cally be accomplished in the real world of Vietnam.”62 Of particular relevance 
to Thieu was that the village system chimed with his own need to expand the 
coercive reach of the GVN throughout the South Vietnamese countryside. Thieu 
and his principal subordinates could see the benefits of enacting reforms in local 
government to enable them to enlist South Vietnamese citizens in militias and 
police forces that would help with this goal. Their priorities for the implementa-
tion of the village system reflected this. After the war, ARVN chief of staff Cao 
Van Vien remembered CORDS’s role in raising local militias and police as “by far 
the most important and outstanding among US contributions” to what he called 
“pacification.”63 Thieu and many other generals could see the benefits of changes 
to rural governance that promoted pacification.64 But this did not necessarily 
mean they had embraced a vision of participative nation building.
Nor did it mean Thieu had become a mere puppet of the Americans. Thieu 
and his principal allies in the GVN might see the benefit in the broad outlines of 
the village system, but they were by no means prepared to go along with a clean 
sweep of rural administration. Like every South Vietnamese leader since Diem 
who had stacked the localities with his own allies, Thieu’s consolidation of power 
gave him an interest in protecting the structure he had established. By 1970, he 
was becoming less susceptible to American advice about the hiring and firing of 
province chiefs.65 Frank Scotton, who during these years was working for Colby 
on the case files of officials suspected of corruption, could not remember one 
case, from 1970 to 1972, of the United States managing to have a senior official 
removed.66 Thieu’s growing distrust and paranoia as the war wound down made 
him seem increasingly distant in the final years of the American presence. On 
Kissinger’s first visit to South Vietnam, he met with opposition leaders as well as 
making a trip to the Presidential Palace, which Thieu took as a disturbing indica-
tion that Washington was still keeping eggs in more than one basket. According 
to Hung, he even put forces on alert against a possible coup. Thieu also sug-
gested that Americans whipped up debates against his regime, claiming, “Any 
time the American ambassador came to see me and asked me to do something 
and I refused, you could count two weeks before the demonstrations erupted.”67
Yet it was clearly out of the question for Thieu to break with the Americans, 
and he sought to pursue what he called a “long haul / low cost” strategy to keep 
the United States engaged as long as possible.68 In different ways, Vietnamiza-
tion and the village system both allowed for the GVN to reduce the cost of U.S. 
involvement in the conflict, thus allowing the United States to engage for a lon-
ger period. The support of CORDS, which had aimed from the beginning to 
build the capacities of the GVN to the point that it could exist independently 
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of American support, was naturally vital to this process. Thieu’s goals were to 
squeeze as much support out of the Americans as possible while keeping one eye 
on the time when the Americans would be gone and he would have to rely on his 
own political base to stand up to the Communist movement. “I know that you 
are going to go, but before you go, you have to leave something for us as friends,” 
he told Nixon at Midway. “Leave something to help me out.”69
From Pacification to Nation Building?
The first major post-Tet initiative undertaken by CORDS was the Accelerated 
Pacification Program (APC). As Komer later explained, the APC was a “highly 
simplified” program whose purpose was to get GVN forces back out into the 
countryside to reestablish a minimal government presence. The aim was to orga-
nize pro-GVN militias, install a GVN hamlet government—preferably by elec-
tion, but by appointment if the security situation did not permit it—and to carry 
out one local development project in each target hamlet. Over thirteen hundred 
hamlets were eventually targeted.70 The APC benefited from close coordination 
with large U.S. military units and their heavy firepower, which operated to screen 
target hamlets from overt attack and separate cadres and guerrillas from villag-
ers. At Colby’s insistence, the APC focused on the Mekong Delta, where some six 
million South Vietnamese lived. It was also the area where MACV believed that 
the NLF was still at its strongest, an anomaly given that 70 percent of the enemy’s 
combat and combat support strength in South Vietnam was assessed as being 
NVA by early 1969.71
CORDS officials conceived of the APC as the first step before they could 
move to implement the village system. It was the necessary pacification, or 
“occupation,” element of establishing control over the countryside before genu-
ine nation building could be attempted. Vann, now head of CORDS in the delta, 
saw the APC as a process of a “fast and thin” expansion of GVN control aimed 
at “unwrapping the GVN from around the province and district flagpoles they 
had clustered to during the 1968 Tet offensive.”72 Colonel Robert M. Montague, 
Komer’s military aide, later described the APC as a “once-over-lightly” whose 
goal was “to show the government’s flag.”73 CORDS officials also hoped that 
the APC would focus the minds of GVN local government on the problem of 
expanding control of the rural population. Under the plan, district chiefs were 
required to visit target hamlets once a week, and village chiefs were required to 
visit them three times a week.74 Furthermore, in Colby’s words, “the arrival of 
government force and authority was accompanied by some immediate impact 
project such as a school.” Although in the past these material projects had 
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FIGURE 8. Deterioration in pacification in eight provinces as measured by HES, 
August 1970–August 1971. Thomas C. Thayer, ed., A Systems Analysis View 
of the Vietnam War, 1965–1972, vol. 9, Population Security (Washington, DC: 
OASD(SA)RP Southeast Asia Intelligence Division, 1975), 251.
usually been assessed as having little impact on villager loyalty or motivation (a 
fact Colby did not mention, but was aware of), it was hoped they would “give an 
immediate visible indication of government presence, benevolence, and inten-
tion to stay.”75
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TABLE 3. Percentage of population living in hamlets with security rated “A” or 
“B” by HES, 1968–1971
DEC. 1969 (%) DEC. 1970 (%) DEC. 1971 (%)
TOTAL CHANGE 
(% POINTS)
I Corps 63.3 76.5 84.4 +21.1
II Corps 63.2 63.1 71.7 +8.5
III Corps 86.8 89 94.7 +7.9
IV Corps 60.1 68 81.6 +21.5
pp. 157, 266
Measuring the impact of such intangibles was difficult, but the APC inaugurated 
a period of almost uninterrupted gains in government control of the countryside, 
which lasted until the Easter Offensive of 1972. According to Hamlet Evaluation 
System (HES) figures, some 1.6 million more Vietnamese were living in rural areas 
classified as secure when the APC came to an end at the beginning of February.76 
Elections were held in 41 percent of the targeted hamlets, and 170,000 weapons 
were distributed to local militia.77 While the number of weapons distributed was 
easy to measure, CORDS officials were more cautious about the other figures. 
Given pressures to succeed and the subjective nature of the HES figures, Colby was 
careful not to read too much into them. “Some of the statistics . . . we thought were 
fairly soft, to put it mildly,” Colby later wrote. He considered reports of 1.1 million 
recruited to the People’s Self-Defense Force, with four hundred thousand trained, 
to be particularly risible.78 Bunker cabled Washington that while the HES num-
bers were “sometimes questioned,” their value lay in giving a “definite reflection 
of the trend.”79 One reason to believe that the figures were at least useful for estab-
lishing a trend was that HES ratings had tracked sharply downward following the 
Tet Offensive, showing that the system also measured setbacks.80 The HES system 
also continued to measure localized setbacks despite the broad pattern of increas-
ingly positive results between 1968 and 1972. By the summer of 1971, the HES 
system was showing some 77 percent of South Vietnam’s population were living 
under government control, but also showed that a sharp deterioration had taken 
place in eight provinces since the previous summer. This deterioration, depicted 
in figure 8, vindicated HES’s usefulness as a tool that measured setbacks as well as 
trumpeted victories, but also carried an underlying warning about the fragility of 
apparent gains in the face of increased enemy activity.81 Top CORDS officials such 
as Colby were aware of this, and therefore treated the overall HES trends (shown 
in table 3) with skepticism. In the words of Willard E. Chambers, a high-ranking 
CORDS official in Saigon, South Vietnam in late 1971 was “pockmarked with 
areas where both advisors and their counterparts are suffering from a euphoria 
which the VC could negate overnight.”82
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Even if the impressive HES figures in table 3 are taken at face value, Colby and 
his team knew they did not necessarily represent a success at the more intangible 
task of nation building. This was clear even in the immediate aftermath of the 
APC. In September 1969, CORDS’s Pacification Studies Group (PSG) carried 
out an assessment of security in a village in Phu Yen Province whose HES ratings 
indicated it was secure. They found that the RD cadre and territorial forces who 
were supposed to be keeping the village free of enemy influence were in fact “sub-
missively cowed to the point where contact is avoided when possible.” The lack 
of security incidents in the village was due to the fact that the enemy forces who 
dominated it did not want to draw attention to the village and have their freedom 
of movement disrupted.83 Vann had warned earlier in the year that large areas of 
the Mekong Delta may have appeared more secure than they were because the 
NLF was quietly governing areas and harnessing their resources in ways that fell 
below the GVN and U.S. radar.84 As we saw in the last chapter, the Nixon White 
House had reached similar conclusions about the limited optimism that could be 
derived about the true progress of nation building from a mere absence of vio-
lence. For Colby, the Phu Yen report reinforced what he had long known. “When 
we started the APC we said that our objective was to expand government author-
ity ‘thin and fast,’ ” he wrote in response. “It is quite apparent that that is exactly 
what occurred. The government presence in this area is a thin veneer indeed.”85 
It was clear that establishing a governmental presence in the countryside under 
the APC was only the beginning of nation building; establishing mutual bonds of 
obligation between the GVN and the people, and thus transitioning from “occu-
pation” to true nation building, was longer and more nebulous work. As MACV 
believed that the lack of serious enemy opposition had been the main reason the 
APC has been successful, nation building would also be reliant on continued 
cooperation by the enemy.86 The serious deterioration that took place in Phu Yen 
shortly afterward (see figure 8) showed what could occur when such cooperation 
was not forthcoming.
As GVN control of the rural population spread, CORDS advisers and higher 
officials in Saigon began to grapple with the much thornier problem of imple-
menting the village system. As one of Vann’s subordinates in the Mekong Delta 
argued in a think piece he wrote for his boss, now that the GVN was in “direct 
contact with the six million people of the Delta” it was time to capitalize on 
the “momentum in military security” and “parallel that effort with a political 
effort.”87 This political effort was intended to move beyond the mere “occupa-
tion” of rural South Vietnam and instead to implement the “three selfs.” This 
proved a far more difficult task. The shift from quantitative targets based on 
improving security to qualitative ones based on political development raised a 
host of problems that advisers had to struggle with. In a candid assessment for 
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Bunker in July 1970, Colby said that “the novelty and excitement of expand-
ing into new territories” had been “followed by the comparative drudgery and 
inconclusiveness of improving performance, remaining alert, and wrestling with 
fundamental economic and social problems.”88 These thorny problems would 
consume the efforts of American nation builders until the end of U.S. involve-
ment in South Vietnam.
149
7
IMPLEMENTING THE VILLAGE SYSTEM
The strength of the GVN in the final years before American withdrawal in 1973 
has long been in dispute. Some contemporary observers believed that the Com-
munist movement in South Vietnam had been fatally undermined during these 
years. People who could remember the insecurity and destruction of the first 
phase of the war were particularly bewitched by the apparent calm that had 
spread over the countryside. “The most dramatic event taking place thus far in 
the 1970s is the increase in security in the South Vietnam countryside,” wrote 
Allan E. Goodman, a seasoned observer of the South Vietnamese scene, in 1971. 
“For most of the 1960s the debate over security centered on how to measure the 
little that existed.” By the early 1970s, the amount of security achieved was “no 
longer a subject of official debate.”1
Many other observers were similarly bullish. Sir Robert Thompson later wrote 
that by 1970 the fruits of pacification and Vietnamization were “unassailable.” 
The Brit had shifted from leveling stark criticisms of the U.S. effort during the 
Johnson administration to now warning that the main threat under Nixon was a 
“comprehensibility gap.” The public simply did not understand how well the war 
in South Vietnam was now going.2 William Colby has likewise stated that “we had 
won the guerrilla war” by the time of the Easter Offensive in 1972.3 John Vann—
never one to shrink from telling truth to power—gave his own upbeat assessment 
of the security situation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970. Vann 
by this point headed CORDS in the entire Mekong Delta, the most populous area 
of South Vietnam. The area saw a “rather tremendous improvement in security” 
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over 1969, he claimed, and it was now possible to drive safely to any provincial 
capital during the daytime.4 Cao Van Vien remembered after the war that “con-
ditions in the countryside radically improved and prospects for the future were 
never so bright” as in the years after 1969.5
Even officials in the British Embassy in Saigon, who had often been skeptical 
of American claims of progress, felt change blowing in the wind. In May 1969, 
the British defense attaché reported that the military position of the Communists 
in the Mekong Delta was “weak,” allowing pacification “to continue its progress.”6 
A review of events in South Vietnam during 1971 prepared by the British Embassy 
noted that at year’s end the two southern military regions—which contained Sai-
gon and the Mekong Delta—“were, broadly speaking, secure.” The report con-
cluded that for South Vietnam, 1971 was a “good year” in which “a tolerable level of 
security” had been achieved.7 A reply sent back from London gave South Vietnam 
“a sporting chance” of survival.8 All of this seems to lend some credence to Lewis 
Sorley’s claim that the war “was won” at some point in “late 1970.”9
But in guerrilla warfare and nation building, surface appearances can be 
deceiving. As Goodman noted as early as 1971, the debate over the extent to 
which apparent security had been achieved in South Vietnam gave way to 
another debate: what exactly this appearance of security meant, and whether it 
was significant.10 The question rested on the distinction between pacification and 
nation building that Thompson, Vann, and others had noted in their criticisms of 
the war effort in earlier times. Pacification could bring apparent security through 
a military occupation of the rural areas by South Vietnamese and American 
forces, but nation building was much more nebulous. While many contempo-
rary observers and subsequent historians have focused on the apparent calm that 
spread across South Vietnam during these years, this chapter instead probes the 
extent to which the GVN put down durable roots among its population.
Crucial evidence of the GVN’s failure to do so comes not only from American 
observers but also Vietnamese. During the final years of the war, a branch of 
GVN inspectors produced “pacification research reports” based on surveys of 
dozens or hundreds of rural villagers on a particular issue. Vietnamese inspectors 
would enter hamlets and villagers incognito, unaccompanied by any American, 
and question the locals about their views toward issues such as taxation, the draft, 
and corruption. They were often able to elicit a great deal of criticism toward the 
GVN, which was more revealing of rural attitudes in the final years of the war 
than the surface calm that pervaded South Vietnam. Taken with other evidence, 
these surveys call into question any claim that the GVN had carried out success-
ful nation building in the latter years of the war.
After the 1968 offensives, the GVN’s control and administration of the coun-
tryside via a network of province and district chiefs were much more secure than 
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they had been during the period of high-intensity warfare from 1965 to 1968. Yet 
the failure to engender enthusiasm toward the GVN throughout the villages of 
South Vietnam called into question whether CORDS’s nation-building strategy 
could work even in the absence of large-scale violence or enemy activity. CORDS 
officials had hoped that they would be able to foster what they called a “friendly 
infrastructure” in each village that, much like the NLF’s infrastructure, would act 
as GVN partisans and oppose the Vietnamese Communist movement actively 
without the need for an “occupation” by the ARVN. But on the eve of the Easter 
Offensive, by which time CORDS had nearly been dissolved and the U.S. pres-
ence in South Vietnam was in its final months, this dream still seemed far away.
Theory and Practice
Before the creation of CORDS, training for American nation builders had been 
limited or nonexistent. Some of the Tigers had picked up at least some Vietnamese 
language ability from previous service in the country, whether it was with an NGO 
or in the military. But Fraleigh and Phillips had placed more emphasis on a can-do 
attitude than on local knowledge, and they had frequently sent recruits into the 
field essentially unprepared. One American was dispatched to Kien Hoa after only 
one hour of language training.11 Fraleigh and Phillips had hence sent the Tigers 
off with a broad remit to improve the social, economic, and political life of the 
rural population by making GVN local government more effective and responsive 
to popular needs, but without extensive formal training. The lack of training not 
only meant that the Tigers would have difficulty understanding either Vietnamese 
rural society or their counterpart, but also meant that they had a wide degree of 
autonomy and were not working according to some centralized plan or program.
As a large bureaucracy that prized central direction and unity of purpose, 
CORDS had more intensive training needs. In April 1967 the Vietnam Train-
ing Center (VTC) had been inaugurated in Washington to provide a standard-
ized education to Americans from various agencies who would soon become 
part of CORDS. Some two thousand Americans passed through the VTC during 
the course of its existence.12 As part of the Foreign Service Institute, the VTC 
provided courses up to ten months long in which future province and district 
advisers took classes in Vietnamese language, history, and culture, the theory and 
practice of countering revolutionary war, and their role within CORDS. It was a 
testament to the scale and significance of the American nation-building effort in 
South Vietnam that an educational institution dedicated to understanding this 
one country was founded. Nothing of its kind has existed before or since in the 
American foreign policy establishment.
152      CHAPTER 7
The purpose of the VTC was to equip trainees to understand Vietnamese rural 
society, the Vietnamese Communist movement, and the government they would 
be aiming to shape. Course attendees read texts on the culture and history of 
South Vietnam and received lectures from luminaries such as Thompson and 
Fraleigh.13 In theory, trainees could also learn about the province to which they 
would be assigned by talking to personnel who previously served there and read-
ing province-specific literature. In reality, however, trainees often did not find out 
their assignment until they arrived in-country, making this aspect of the course 
of dubious use. “I believe it is a basic mistake to regard Vietnam as an homog-
enous area for which detailed directives and procedures can be established at 
central level and stipulated to be applicable throughout,” remarked James Megel-
las, leader of CORDS in II Corps in 1970. “Even within any specific CTZ [Corps 
Tactical Zone] the individual provinces have enough differences to preclude this 
type of direction being feasible at regional level, much less on a country-wide 
basis.”14 If the new advisers were lucky, they might overlap with their predecessor 
long enough to pick up information on the local situation from him, but this was 
not always the case. Given the differences between provinces in terms of their 
social and economic condition, the quality of the local GVN government, and 
the disposition of the local NLF organization, there was a steep learning curve for 
advisers. Yet during their training, advisers often had no idea whether they were 
going to be deployed to an almost entirely peaceful province like An Giang or a 
raging war zone adjacent to North Vietnam.
Reactions to the course were mixed. Although language training was a large 
part of the course, few advisers were able to engage in much more than small 
talk when they arrived in South Vietnam. Many province chiefs spoke English 
or French, but advisers without facility in the Vietnamese language were unable 
to speak with the ordinary villagers whom they were supposedly there to under-
stand and help.15 Nor was the language training always in the appropriate dialect. 
“Johnny” described the “shock” he had arriving in Quang Tri Province in 1965 
and discovering that the locals spoke “such a rude rural central dialect.” General 
Thi’s regionalist uprising that broke out in early 1966 must only have heightened 
his discomfort at speaking the dialect of the capital.16 Given that it was techni-
cally possible for advisers to get by speaking to their counterparts in English or 
French, it was rarely possible for them to be spared from their jobs long enough 
to develop fluency in the Vietnamese language. Even the legendary John Paul 
Vann requested to take leave to develop his poor Vietnamese language skills in 
1971—and had his request denied.17
In the view of “Brad,” a USAID official who was embedded directly in the 
staff of a GVN agency in 1966 and thus saw the relationship from the other side, 
the poor standard of English spoken by GVN officials often led their American 
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advisers to view them as intellectually inferior.18 One Saigon-based adviser 
who traveled many provinces as a program auditor reported being “terrifically” 
impressed in the mid-1960s that “you could go to practically any province and 
you found people who spoke English.” While urbane GVN officials like Nguyen 
Duc Thang were accorded respect for their linguistic skills, those Vietnamese 
who could not match them were looked down upon.19 This naturally piqued 
their South Vietnamese counterparts, for whom speaking good English had lit-
tle obvious connection to their aptitude at navigating their own country. “The 
Americans tended to have greater confidence in those of us who spoke good 
English,” remarked Tran Van Don, adding that this was “hardly a qualification for 
military command or denoting special ability, courage, or integrity.”20 Even the 
language with which Americans were trying to influence their Vietnamese coun-
terparts was thus politicized and charged. Thomas Barnes, the head of CORDS 
in the populous Mekong Delta in 1971, even felt it necessary to issue a directive 
banning advisers from speaking in pseudo-English “baby talk” to their counter-
parts because it demeaned the relationship.21
Another problem was the fact that being unable to speak Vietnamese meant 
that the range of local perspectives advisers were exposed to was limited to 
those of English-speaking or perhaps French-speaking Vietnamese, who tended 
to be highly educated and from urban backgrounds. With rare exceptions, this 
meant that the ease with which advisers could converse with the Vietnamese was 
inversely proportional to the degree of connection of their interlocutor to rural 
society. Vien believed that all province and district advisers “should have been 
required to speak the language too, because this was the only means of obtaining 
the insight in the local problems of pacification and developing the kind of rap-
port with the local people that was conducive to success.”22
Although the Vietnamese language element of a VTC education was wanting, 
some trainees emerged believing themselves to be fluent in the language of revo-
lutionary warfare. A rural development adviser who attended the course in 1967 
remembered it as his first introduction to the idea that insurgencies had politi-
cal causes and needed political solutions. Despite his recent introduction to the 
topic, he felt that “if a person took any interest in the course at all that it became 
clear to him fairly soon what causes an insurgency and how you must deal with 
it.”23 Others found arriving in province for the first time to be hugely discom-
bobulating and soon had a more modest view of their capabilities. One PSA who 
served on the central coast in 1968 found that he had not really been able to 
imagine the reality of “what you’re going to be doing in Asia” from the comfort 
of a classroom.24 An assistant province adviser who had received six months of 
training, including five months working on the language, remembered: “When 
you first get out to a province you are bewildered, you don’t know what on earth 
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you’re going to do. You really haven’t been told, except in a general sort of way, 
exactly what it is you’re supposed to do.”25 Some advisers complained of more 
quotidian experiences of culture shock of the sort that American travelers abroad 
have long voiced. “Felix,” a naturalized Filipino American, found he could not 
distinguish between the various provinces of South Vietnam upon arrival “since 
they all seemed to have similar names.” He also complained of being serviced 
by “shoeshine boys” and obliged to pay them whether he wanted to or not.26 
Although Felix felt that his previous experience of living in the Philippines had 
helped cushion him from the culture shock of arriving in South Vietnam, most 
American recruits had not had similar preparation.
Some of the Tigers had worked in the same province for years and gained 
an understanding of Vietnamese language, culture, and history. CORDS instead 
operated on the principle that older individuals with no experience of Vietnam 
could be taught the necessary minimum. “Johnny,” the adviser who only discov-
ered he spoke the wrong dialect upon arriving in Quang Tri, replaced a Tiger who 
had been in the province for three and a half years.27 Fraleigh had believed that 
young minds were the most adaptable to new cultures and less prone to be pre-
scriptive and rigid in their view of what was to be done to aid GVN local govern-
ments. By contrast, many of the inductees to the VTC were already experienced 
professionals whose worldviews were more difficult to mold through several 
months of training. For instance, although experts in “cross-cultural communi-
cation” were retained in teaching positions, many course attendees believed they 
had little to be taught in this area.28
An example can be found in the VTC’s attempts to mold trainees’ view of 
the Vietnamese peasantry. During training, advisers read a document titled “The 
Vietnamese Peasant: His Value System.” The document was full of sweeping gen-
eralizations such as the supposed fact that “the peasant . . . likes war movies, 
perhaps because he can identify with them.” Given the suffering and disloca-
tion that the war had inflicted on many parts of rural South Vietnam, this state-
ment served only to illustrate the distance between the authors of the document 
and their subject. The overall thrust of the document was that peasants lived in 
a harmonious if primitive society before the advent of the Communist move-
ment, and even since then they were uninterested in any ideological commit-
ment or higher concern than their own physical safety and prosperity. It reflected 
USOM’s materialist view of peasant motivations, perhaps unsurprisingly, given 
the VTC was operated by USAID. Trainees were told that “the greatest major-
ity of people will go to whichever side they believe will give them a better deal.” 
The idea that peasants might make a positive commitment to the ideals of the 
Communist movement—or even its front organizations—was disregarded. The 
document encouraged trainees to view peasant grievances as manufactured by 
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the Communist movement, as “normally there is little friction between the peas-
ant and the landlord,” a statement that reflected the idealistic and ignorant view 
of rural society taken by many urban South Vietnamese.29 Even had the docu-
ment avoided inaccurate generalizations, its usefulness would have been limited, 
as can be seen by imagining an analogous document titled “The American Town 
Dweller: His Value System.”
While some advisers seemed to internalize this stock portrait of the Vietnam-
ese peasant, others proved resistant.30 This was not necessarily an advantage, 
as many advisers seemed to believe that no special knowledge of Vietnamese 
culture or history was needed to understand its people. One took comfort by 
assuring himself that the Vietnamese farmer “probably wants the same thing that 
the farmer in Georgia or Alabama wants.”31 Another adviser thought it fruitful 
to consider that the Vietnamese were akin to “American Jews” rather than the 
“Negro or Mexican sub-cultures” because the Vietnamese were merit oriented.32 
Such analogies between Vietnamese society and the American society that advis-
ers were more familiar with often became absurd. An assistant province adviser 
not fluent in Vietnamese even went so far as to claim that because America was 
a “basically democratic society” without class distinctions, there was a wider gap 
between Vietnamese villagers and GVN officials than there was between U.S. 
advisers and those same villagers.33
It was certainly convenient for Americans to believe they understood the 
villagers without the need for communication, given that the vast majority of 
advisers could not speak Vietnamese. Still others drew more realistic conclusions, 
and developed a healthy appreciation of the limits of their own knowledge. One 
U.S. Army officer with three years of experience as a PSA by 1971 rejected easy 
generalizations about the Vietnamese and felt that true wisdom lay in knowing 
what you did not know. “Show me a person who says he understands the Viet-
namese,” he commented, “and I’ll show you a person who only thinks he does.”34 
“Earl,” a trainee who held less-than-progressive views on race relations in the 
United States, espoused careful sensitivity to the worldview of the Vietnamese. 
“I haven’t had any cross-cultural problems myself. I realize that the Vietnamese 
act and react differently than we do,” he explained. “If you go from Mississippi to 
Indiana you will find people act and react differently. I think if your idea is to go 
over there and help these people and you’re really interested in people, you’re not 
going to have these problems.”35
Some advisers avoided the generalizations that lumped all villagers together 
either as simple farmers akin to their American cousins or as devious and self-
ish egotists, instead gaining an appreciation of the complex social and political 
structure of the villages and provinces in which they worked. The most sophis-
ticated of all realized that this complex structure often had no overlap with the 
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official GVN power structures with which they interacted. In 1970, a deputy PSA 
in Phu Yen lamented that “there are many undercurrents and back room politics 
that brew within the Province that no American really knows about or under-
stands.” He considered it difficult to know what the people really thought of the 
GVN, because all he saw was “what the Vietnamese wants us to see.”36 Edward 
Lansdale, who served in various roles in South Vietnam between 1954 and 1968, 
believed that most American advisers did not have a sufficient understanding 
of the “rather highly organized” informal political structure that existed in each 
district and village. While Americans tended to interact with GVN officials more 
than anyone else, there was often little overlap between the formal structures of 
GVN power and the traditional community leaders in the village.37
Lansdale had spent many years in South Vietnam to develop this understand-
ing, but the short tour of the typical adviser provided little scope in which to do 
so. South Vietnamese officials themselves complained that the tours of American 
advisers were far too short to gain a comprehensive understanding of the country 
and its problems. According to Vien, “not only was Vietnam a totally alien coun-
try, the nature of the war being fought was also unfamiliar to American military 
experience.” One year was not long enough for advisers to acquire the experience 
necessary to operate at maximum usefulness, and Vien would have preferred they 
came back for multiple tours—preferably in the same area.38 But with problems 
attracting and retaining personnel, CORDS was never able to institute such a 
system.
When combined with the problems, explored in previous chapters, of influ-
encing their counterparts, the difficulty of understanding rural South Vietnam 
meant the typical CORDS advisory tour was confusing, confounding, and short. 
Advisers faced innumerable problems both in understanding their environment 
and influencing it. The learning curves involved in communicating with the Viet-
namese, learning about the local area, and building a rapport with their counter-
parts often meant advisers were never able to become even minimally effective in 
a one-year tour. Given CORDS’s need for relatively large amounts of personnel 
and the limited time available in which to train them, there was only so much the 
VTC could do to alleviate these problems. In attempting to implement the village 
system in the final years of the war, the limitations of what individual American 
nation builders could accomplish became obvious.
Self-Government
The first of the “three selfs” that advisers were supposed to implement in rural 
South Vietnam was self-government. In line with the general thrust of CORDS 
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and GVN policy between the Tet and Easter offensives, the push for self-govern-
ment involved not just a decentralization of power from the central GVN but 
also a mobilization of people and resources from below. A village government 
with an elected chief was, in theory, at the center of these reforms. Under Colby, 
CORDS sought to persuade the GVN to carry out a broad democratization of 
the village level of government while simultaneously investing more power in it. 
This meant institutionalizing the “village system” whereby villages would raise 
more taxes, direct their own local security operations, and carry out development 
projects. CORDS’s view was that the new breed of village governments should be 
given latitude to make mistakes, and that if they did, then their constituents could 
vote them out. The emergence of village governments with a mandate from their 
people would allow popular aspirations to be met and finally, it was hoped, allow 
the people to identify with at least one organ of GVN governance.
Such a sweeping change did not go unchallenged. Province and district offi-
cials who were used to controlling the security forces and resources that were 
now to be devolved to village chiefs did not always give up such control grace-
fully, and the central GVN in Saigon likewise had doubts about some aspects of 
CORDS’s passion for decentralization. And while CORDS and the GVN orga-
nized an industrial-scale training effort for hamlet and village officials, several 
years was clearly too short a time in which to revolutionize previous patterns of 
governance in rural South Vietnam. By the time the Easter Offensive struck in 
1972, causing a significant backsliding in the name of security needs, the results 
of the push for self-government were fragile.
U.S. officials had long seen the GVN’s weakness at village level as a key 
impediment to nation building. Although the ravages of war—along with the 
economic opportunities the war bought to the cities—had created an unprec-
edented degree of mobility among the rural population, most villagers had little 
experience of any political unit larger than their home village. The province and 
even the district were remote, alien institutions—and Saigon much more so. As 
a handbook for CORDS advisers explained, “It is the village/hamlet official, not 
a faraway district or province chief, who personifies the Government of Vietnam 
to the rural citizens.”39 What experience most villagers had of the direct hand of 
Saigon was limited to marauding bands of security forces controlled either by the 
province chief or the local ARVN division commander, and against whom local 
village and hamlet officials had little redress. Empowering these local officials 
would allow them to respond to local needs and give them a voice that might 
be levied against the ARVN and higher levels of the GVN in response to villag-
ers’ needs.40 CORDS accordingly wanted to use the village level of government 
as a vital intermediary between the rural people and Saigon.41 “We should sort 
of complete the circuit between some form of Vietnamese government and the 
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people it serves as well as governs,” one adviser explained. “Until we provide some 
evidence that the government’s concerned about its constituents, I think we’ll 
just have an open circuit. So we’re trying to plug this in and make it a flow of 
information, a flow of loyalty.”42
Vann hoped that the new hamlet and village authorities would stand up for 
the interests of villagers and in so doing come into conflict with the central GVN, 
forcing it to “mend its ways.”43 As we saw in the last chapter, this focus on con-
structing a pro-government village administrative structure as an intermediary 
between the people and the central government accorded with the thinking of 
many European theorists. As Thompson described in 1969, the “needs of the 
people” should come up through the village administrative machine “while the 
benefits went down.”44 GVN documents likewise talked of the need to free the 
rural people from “venal and tyrannical officials” by restoring “the vital forces 
and prestige of the villages and hamlets through the democratic activities carried 
out by the local people.”45
These were the views that individuals like Chau and Nguyen Be had been 
advocating within the GVN for some time, and under the village system they saw 
them come closest to implementation. On April 1, 1969, Thieu rearranged village 
government by issuing Decree 45. Village and hamlet governance had previously 
been governed by a decree set forth in late 1966 that provided for a significant 
degree of higher-level control over village affairs. Villages could not make loans, 
spend money on development projects, set tax rates, or control any security 
forces within the village. The village council could not even move its office with-
out the permission of a ministry in Saigon.46 On the basis of this earlier structure, 
elections were held in 939 villages and 5,450 hamlets in South Vietnam during 
the spring of 1967, constituting less than half of those in the country.47 NLF 
terrorism and the 1968 offensives subsequently killed many officials or drove 
them to seek refuge in the government-controlled cities. Before the APC, only 
sporadic replacement elections were held. The expansion of security and govern-
ment control from late 1968 onward was followed both by the reform of village 
powers in Decree 45 and a renewed push to hold elections. By early 1970, 95 per-
cent of villages in the country had elected administrations, and by January 1972 
there were only sixty-six villages out of 2,162 that did not have an elected govern-
ment in residence.48 Decree 45 also gave village administrations new powers in 
the realm of security and development.49
These measures—especially the control of security forces and access to devel-
opment resources—were an unprecedented grant of authority to villages. Village 
councils would face the judgment of the electorate every three years on whether 
they had used this authority wisely. Copying the Communist movement’s prac-
tice of “communalism,” the GVN also sought to educate and shape its community 
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leaders to serve its own ends, while staying in touch with their own people. An 
intensive training course was set up at the National Training Center (NTC) at 
Vung Tau, still run by Nguyen Be. Village and hamlet officials took their place at 
the center alongside other “GVN infrastructure cadre” for a course that included 
both technical and political education.50 Copying the language of the Commu-
nist movement, Colby described this as the process by which the GVN’s cad-
res were “indoctrinated.”51 Over four weeks, officials were trained in leadership, 
paramilitary organization, and self-defense and given an overview of a variety of 
technical topics such as rural electrification, how to run post offices, and how to 
organize the village budget. Political education covered such topics as “what is 
democracy?” “the role of the Allies in the RVN struggle,” and “Communist plots 
regarding the cease-fire, peace-talks and counter-measures to be taken.”52 Some 
31,000 officials and cadres received training at the NTC during 1969, and a fur-
ther 37,322 in 1970.53 They then returned to their home villages and hamlets to 
become the backbone of the GVN “friendly infrastructure.”
Yet from the time of the promulgation of Decree 45, the GVN proved unwill-
ing to push this policy of decentralization too far. Nor was it easy to force province 
and district chiefs to give up their prerogatives. While the village chief ’s power 
and prestige appeared strong under the new system, in reality he was hemmed 
in by powerful deputies who were appointed by the province chief. The village 
chief ’s command of the local militia ran through both a deputy for security and 
a military commissioner, and he did not have a free hand in appointing either. 
While the village chief nominated an individual for the position of deputy for 
security, in reality he served at the pleasure of the province chief.54 Meanwhile, 
implementing instructions sent to province chiefs some time after the promulga-
tion of Decree 45 and without CORDS input mandated that the village chief had 
to appoint the senior militia platoon leader as military commissioner. These old 
hands, who had close ties to the district and province chiefs who had formerly 
appointed and commanded them, retained operational control of their units 
while serving as commissioners. “In summary,” a CORDS report complained, 
“this arrangement seems likely to change the outward appearance while preserv-
ing the status quo.”55 Two months after Decree 45 was promulgated in 1969, the 
head of the Pacification Studies Group warned that village control of local secu-
rity forces remained “mythical.”56
Nor did the GVN’s implementing instructions extol the virtues of decen-
tralization. Instead they pointed out to province chiefs that villages had already 
“enjoyed a liberal grant of authority” under earlier decrees and now needed 
only to be made “more effective.”57 By making the issue the effectiveness of local 
administration rather than portraying decentralization as an inherent good, the 
GVN left a substantial leeway for province and district officials to rationalize 
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their own continued involvement in village and hamlet government. Colby 
remembered how one village chief whom he met at the National Training Center 
listened “with near disbelief” to the idea, expounded by Nguyen Be, that a village 
chief should have the authority to decide on the expenditure of development 
funds. “The idea,” Colby wrote solemnly, “brought tears to his eyes.”58 Yet in real-
ity, district and province chiefs often did not give up their powers so easily. Many 
retained the paternalistic view of villagers typical of their class—and also, as we 
have seen, typical of American training documents—and refused to decentralize 
power. Conversely, a more centralized system was certainly effective for at least 
one group of people—namely, the province and district officials who were able to 
benefit from the corruption that it enabled. This gave them another disincentive 
to enthusiastically pursue the implementation of the “village system.”
Corruption remained endemic throughout South Vietnam, even at the height 
of CORDS’s influence. While it is impossible to determine its exact scale, espe-
cially insofar as it was carried out in petty ways at province level and below, there 
is reason to suspect it was very widespread indeed. Measures against petty cor-
ruption were less than impressive, and most CORDS advisers did not consider 
it a proper subject of their attention. “The American attitude seems to be based 
on the assumption that corrupt practices are part of their way of life and must 
be accepted,” stated one long-serving official, “Frank,” in 1967. “Objections are 
based not upon kind but degree. A certain level is permissable [sic], but more 
than this calls for corrective action. I subscribe to this view myself.”59 Frank saw 
10 percent of cash or 25 percent of construction materials as an unacceptable 
level of corruption, whereas others saw 10 percent cash as acceptable.60 Such 
views were widespread, and advisers routinely normalized corruption. A hand-
book for advisers noted in 1971 that corruption was the “pervasive vice” of Viet-
namese administration and was not to be dealt with through “denunciations and 
counter-denunciations.”61
Vann, a key architect of the village system, differentiated between “good cor-
ruption” and “dirty corruption.”62 Many other American advisers drew a distinc-
tion between “necessary” corruption and that which aimed at making individu-
als conspicuously wealthy.63 This distinction underlay the words of a USAID 
employee in 1968, who stated that corruption was a “cancer” but also “the 
lubricant by which everything moves.” Remove the lubricant, he warned, and it 
“would be like removing all of the grease from a machine.”64 Several structural 
factors encouraged this view. The first was the extremely low level of salaries for 
GVN officials, combined with the high rate of inflation that afflicted South Viet-
nam during the war years. A 1968 study found that the average province chief had 
a monthly deficit equivalent to 18 percent of expenses, while for district chiefs the 
figure was nearly 29 percent. Thieu had himself explained corruption as a result 
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of low salaries, providing a justification from the top for officials to engage in it.65 
This gave rise to a second structural cause of corruption, which came in the form 
of demands placed on officials lower down the GVN food chain to supplement 
the income of their superiors. Recalling the period of U.S. escalation, one former 
province representative said: “The District Chief was like a little god in these 
districts and they were not above lining their pockets at anybody’s expense.”66 
Playing god was not an easy habit to get out of, and village and hamlet officials 
who attended the training course at Vung Tau frequently complained that district 
chiefs demanded money out of their budgets. This, in turn, required that the vil-
lage officials engage in corruption of their own, for instance by charging for the 
issuance of documents that were supposed to be free.67
Vietnamese officials, even the honest ones, often bristled at sweeping accusa-
tions of corruption that implied it was somehow an ingrained Vietnamese trait. 
Instead, they pointed to the structural factors that made it unavoidable for many 
officials. They also blamed the Americans for having a corrupting influence on 
Vietnamese society and government. “What creates corruption?” asked “Anh,” 
the NIA-trained official. “The Americans,” he answered. Anh pointed to the twin 
impacts of high inflation caused by the U.S. presence and the “new demands” for 
luxuries like air conditioning that the Americans had brought with them to the 
country. Vietnamese officials, he said, are “underpaid” and had to “steal some-
where to survive and to raise their families.” On the other hand, there were also 
those—mainly high-ranking officials—who “steal to live very luxuriously,” which 
in turn made “average people ambitious or jealous and want to be equal.” Only 
systemic reforms could stop corruption, and in the meantime Americans had 
to be aware of its causes and stop casting aspersions on the average Vietnamese 
official. “What we cannot accept is the distance and the distrust,” he complained. 
“I cannot. Many of my friends cannot.”68
Yet as inflation continued to run rampant in South Vietnam, this source of 
distrust remained, and it was still common in 1971 for province and district offi-
cials to demand money from village budgets to meet their own costs—legitimate 
and otherwise.69 Advisers who were aware of factors such as these tended to see 
corruption as a practical rather than a moral issue. Yet the money to keep the 
system of official corruption oiled had to come from somewhere, and it was the 
rural population who eventually bore the costs via myriad forms of petty graft. 
As inflation continued to run rampant throughout the final years of the war 
without commensurate salary increases, the problem remained. Given these fac-
tors and the limited options that American advisers had to respond to instances 
of corruption, it is little wonder that one of the last CORDS advisers to leave 
the country in 1973 warned that corruption was still a problem across the delta. 
There had been only “lip service” paid to corruption, he complained, and now 
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he wanted to see “heads roll.”70 Yet with CORDS closing down imminently, the 
chances of the United States providing the pressure that would fulfil his wishes 
seemed remote.
Pacification research reports produced by GVN surveyors underlined the 
pervasiveness of corruption even after years of efforts by CORDS advisers and 
attempted reforms of the village system. In the wake of the Easter Offensive, 
opportunities for corruption increased as villagers attempted to escape renewed 
draft calls. A report in the province of Chau Doc in 1972 found that security 
agencies would falsely certify villagers as undercover agents so they could avoid 
the draft, or simply take money from draft dodgers to look the other way. The 
GVN surveyor concluded that the corruption situation in the province was 
“grave” and added: “The people feel the present government is bad, since all dis-
trict or province authorities are more or less corrupt.” Because the proceeds of 
corruption were shared equally between low and high officials, who were “tightly 
organized,” the system seemed impossible to break. According to the surveyor, 
central government inspectors sent to address the situation would only have their 
heads turned by “wine, nice girls or expensive gifts.”71 Another survey in Bac Lieu 
after the Easter Offensive noted that many respondents believed that corruption 
was still driving villagers into the arms of the NLF, especially those who could 
not afford draft deferments.72
The persistence of corruption was one example of how CORDS had not been 
able to fundamentally transform the attitudes of individuals at all levels of local 
government. The structural changes that had been introduced with the “village 
system” worked only if they were observed in the localities, which they often were 
not. The problem of “interference in village affairs by higher echelons of govern-
ment” remained in 1970, with precious little time left to tackle it.73 The effort 
to indoctrinate hamlet and village officials in their new duties and powers also 
began to lose steam after an initial push in 1969. Despite a U.S. preference that 
ever-increasing numbers of local officials attend the Vung Tau training center, 
nearly 50 percent of those picked to attend in 1971 chose not to go. Many saw 
their positions as community leaders imperiled by spending a long period away 
from the village. Local loyalty came above the duty owed to the GVN, which 
still seemed an alien and faraway institution. By carrying out its recruitment, 
training, and indoctrination locally, the Communist movement was hence not 
only at a practical but also a symbolic advantage. Village and hamlet chiefs from 
Annam, much of which was a stronghold of the Communist movement and 
where regionalist suspicion of Saigon was widespread, had particularly poor 
attendance records at Vung Tau.74 The areas that had long had the worst record 
of integration with the GVN and high levels of Communist support remained 
the most untouched by the self-government program.
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In such circumstances, it was not clear that CORDS’s post-Tet programs had 
produced anything more than surface change in either the quality of local gov-
ernment or its responsiveness to the people. It was difficult for advisers, few of 
whom were equipped to truly understand the political situation in the villages in 
their area of remit, to even tell. Lansdale believed that most American advisers 
did not have a sufficient understanding of the “rather highly organized” infor-
mal political structure that existed in each district and village. While Americans 
tended to interact with GVN officials more than anyone else, there was often 
little overlap between the formal structures of GVN power and the traditional 
community leaders in the village.75 Lansdale made his comments in 1968, before 
village and hamlet elections had been held in most areas. Yet given that district 
chiefs retained tight control over who was eligible to stand in these elections, in 
many areas the informal and formal power structures continued to have little 
crossover. In the most insecure areas, such as Binh Dinh Province, local govern-
ment was still little more than the facade Colby had considered it shortly after the 
APC. “Underneath this smattering of government,” noted CORDS officials who 
spent ninety days evaluating the situation in Binh Dinh in mid-1971, “is a society 
basically in enemy hands.”76
Even where security was better, high-level CORDS officials did not think that 
the GVN’s “friendly infrastructure” had genuinely won over the rural populace. 
In 1970, a deputy PSA in Phu Yen noted that it was difficult to know what the 
people really thought of the GVN because all he saw was “what the Vietnamese 
wants us to see.”77 This meant that American advisers were reliant for informa-
tion on the implementation of the village concept from the very same GVN offi-
cials at district level and above whose own prerogatives were threatened by it. 
This only became more of a problem as American eyes and ears were withdrawn 
from the provinces. In late 1971, a briefer from CORDS told a committee that 
had gathered to consider the organization’s future that the GVN was still not 
“stuck together” at village, hamlet, and province level. Whether it ever would be 
“depends on how fast the GVN moves.” CORDS officials who worked on local 
government believed they needed to remain into the post-hostilities period.78 But 
with CORDS quickly being wound down, the organization had already passed 
the peak of its influence.
Consequently CORDS’s success in implementing self-government was spotty 
at best. District and province chiefs who were drawn from the ranks of ARVN 
officers and appointed to areas they knew nothing about continued to retain 
a great deal of control over village and hamlet affairs. The idea of introducing 
elected province chiefs was opposed by Thieu, and American officials also took 
the view that placing these local jobs in the hands of civilians could drastically 
weaken security and the effectiveness of the government at lower levels.79 Hence 
164      CHAPTER 7
even elected village and hamlet officials were hemmed in by military men from 
a vastly different social class appointed to positions above them. Unlike in the 
Communist system, the careers of these village officials were sharply delimited, 
and they were unable to rise above the position of village chief. Rather than being 
seen as the most important rung on a ladder from which power flowed from 
the bottom up, they remained essentially the local tools of a top-down, distant 
regime. For as long as ARVN officers with little experience of civil affairs but 
a great deal of experience in benefiting from corruption retained such power 
at district and province level, this situation was not likely to change, as efforts 
to implement the other two parts of the village system—self-defense and 
self-development—showed.
Self-Defense
One of the ways in which self-government was supposed to be actualized was 
through the idea of local self-defense. As seen by CORDS, the program had two 
main goals. The first was to spread security throughout rural South Vietnam 
at a time when regular military resources in the country were declining rap-
idly with the withdrawal of U.S. forces. By enlisting South Vietnamese citizens in 
the defense of their own provinces and villages, the self-defense program freed 
up the ARVN to take on the mobile offensive role in which the United States 
had previously taken the lead. The second goal of the program was political. It 
aimed to strengthen the ties of commitment between the people and the regime 
by enlisting the former in a national effort. The military training and equip-
ment the regime gave the people symbolized its trust in them. Taken together, 
these political and military goals aimed “to confront and supplant the enemy’s 
political/military organization in every village with a deadly rival—a ‘friendly 
infrastructure.’ ”80
The value of this infrastructure would lay in its overt commitment to the 
GVN and equally overt rejection of the NLF. As a CORDS study noted of the 
People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF) in 1969, “the political value of the program 
stems from the degree of commitment represented by the PSDF member at the 
time he chooses to join the PSDF for his self-defense.”81 Vann also agreed that 
the primary purpose of enlisting villagers in the PSDF program was not “for the 
expectation of having them fight the enemy,” but to have them “overtly commit-
ted to the side of the government.” The organization of a pro-GVN militia in a 
village symbolized the overt rejection of the NLF and made it more difficult for 
the latter to gain control, not least because they might have to shed the blood of 
a grassroots organization, as opposed to the ARVN, to do so.82
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FIGURE 9. Female “volunteers” of the People’s Self-Defense Forces patrol 
Kien Dien, a hamlet fifty kilometers from Saigon. Some PSDF participation was 
more voluntary than others.
National Archives identifier 541865, Miscellaneous Vietnam Photographs, Record Group 306, National Archives 
II at College Park, Maryland.
The organization was also intended to have a transformative impact on its 
participants. As Colby explained to a military audience: “They were pretty poor 
soldiers. They lost a few of the weapons and didn’t fight very hard, but they 
began to participate. They took that gun as a symbol that somehow the govern-
ment both trusted them and looked to them to use the weapon in their own 
defense and not just to carry out the directives of the local authorities.”83 Once 
166      CHAPTER 7
again, Colby’s words sounded rather like they could have come from Thompson’s 
mouth. The Brit had likewise felt during the Malayan Emergency that armed 
opposition to the Malayan Communists could not be left solely to the military 
and police, but also had to involve the people. He had been a key proponent 
of efforts to arm the Chinese population in Malaya, noting that the point was 
“not that these units would make a great military contribution to the defeat” of 
the guerrillas “but that the readiness of the Chinese to commit themselves to an 
armed role and the Government’s trust in them would be a major factor” in the 
guerrillas’ “political defeat.”84 Roger Trinquier likewise had written that “for the 
inhabitant to elude the threats of the enemy, to cease to be an isolated target that 
no police force can protect, we must have him participate in his own defence.”85
Thompson and Trinquier were not the only ones to agree. Of all the nation-
building programs that CORDS encouraged Saigon to embark upon, the expan-
sion of territorial forces was the one in which GVN officials could see the clearest 
benefits. While they were concerned about inadvertently arming and training 
individuals who would eventually turn their guns on the GVN, the government 
stood to gain a much-bolstered security position from the program. The GVN’s 
preference for this aspect of nation building above all others was a natural result 
of its preference for measures that increased its control of the rural population. 
For CORDS too, it was logical to place great emphasis on measures that pro-
moted security, which had been proven to be a prerequisite for reform measures. 
The self-defense program seemed to promise a way to provide security while 
avoiding the “occupation” of rural areas by outside forces that the architects of 
CORDS saw as the hallmark of previous pacification efforts. Now, the people 
themselves would provide security against the NLF’s local guerrillas, freeing 
main-force units to battle the enemy’s own large formations, preferably far from 
population centers.
The task of self-defense fell primarily on the shoulders of three separate forces 
in South Vietnam. Two of them—the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces 
(PF)—were formed in 1964 to replace the Diem-era forces known as the Civil 
Guard and Self-Defense Corps. However, it was only in the changed conditions 
after 1968 that they began to make a sizable contribution to the war effort. The 
third force, the PSDF, sprang up informally on a small scale during the Tet Offen-
sive and then was formalized with the GVN’s Mobilization Law of June 1968.
The three forces had different roles and missions, but they shared certain 
characteristics. First, they were recruited from the areas in which they served. As 
well as increasing the morale and motivation of the forces, this was designed to 
bolster the GVN’s nation-building goals. Local forces were considered less likely 
to perpetrate abuses against the civilian population, and they also had less fire-
power and therefore were not as prone to causing collateral damage. Shifting the 
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provision of security for population centers to territorial forces was designed to 
minimize the harm that came from the deployment of ARVN and U.S. forces in 
such roles. If this did not actively encourage people to identify with the GVN, it 
could at least avoid having them alienated by large combat operations. On the 
other hand, serving in the territorial forces was supposed to represent a posi-
tive commitment to the GVN on the part of those serving, bonding them to 
the government in a relationship that was both transactional and ideological. 
From a transactional perspective, they received payment in both cash and in kind 
for doing their jobs, and they received weapons with which they could defend 
their local communities. Those serving also received ideological indoctrination 
designed, in the spirit of “communalism,” to create a mental link between their 
service to their local communities and the greater national cause. Conversely, 
the GVN demonstrated its trust in rural citizens by arming them. The territorial 
forces were under the command of officials in the GVN’s civil chain of com-
mand, running from the province chief down to the district chief and, in theory, 
to the village chief. This meant that they supposedly would act in ways more 
attuned to the needs of the rural population than would either ARVN or U.S. 
main-force units.
For many years, the RF and the PF had been outgunned by the local NLF 
forces they were supposed to contend with. The territorial forces remained out-
matched by the NLF during the 1968 offensives, with only 53 percent of RFs 
and 44 percent of PFs having firepower equal to or greater than the enemy units 
they faced in the second quarter of 1968.86 The parlous security situation and 
their own poor state of readiness inculcated a cautious mentality in the territorial 
forces from 1965 until the 1968 offensives, at which point many units were with-
drawn from the countryside entirely to defend urban areas. Following this nadir, 
the United States embarked on a major program of modernization to increase 
both the equipment and training of the RFs and PFs. By mid-1969, 84 percent 
of RFs and 77 percent of PFs had equivalent or greater firepower than their local 
antagonists.87
Local security was also augmented by the new force created during 1968, 
the PSDF. The PSDF were civilians who were enlisted in the direct defense 
of their own hamlet, mainly by acting as lookouts and to deter the surrepti-
tious movement of small groups of guerrillas at night. They received only the 
slightest training and were armed with the obsolete weapons that the RF and 
PF were in the process of swapping out for more modern armaments. Colby, 
who had been involved in running a similar program during the Diem era, had 
long favored the distribution of weapons to local militias in this manner, as 
had Vann.88 The opportunity to urge this program on the GVN came during 
the 1968 offensives, when groups of citizens—primarily but not entirely in the 
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cities—began to request that the GVN arm them so that they could defend 
themselves against attack by the Communists. Many high-ranking GVN offi-
cials—led by Prime Minister Huong—were opposed to the large-scale dis-
tribution of weapons to citizens, believing that they would not be employed 
effectively and might fall into the hands of the enemy. Colby and Komer man-
aged to overcome this resistance by pointing out that the NLF already had far 
superior weapons to the arms that they were proposing to give to the militia, 
and by focusing on the essentially political aspect of the program. They agreed 
with Huong that the militia would not be effective enough to battle the NLF, 
but that was not the point. As a CORDS document later explained, the point 
of the program was for both citizen and government “to make a public com-
mitment to the other.”89
This commitment, however, was not necessarily to be voluntary, as the GVN’s 
law implementing the program made clear. Huong having been won over, in 
June 1968 the GVN passed a Mobilization Law mandating that all citizens ages 
sixteen to seventeen and thirty-nine to fifty were to be enlisted into what became 
known as the PSDF.90 By 1972, some 3.5 million people—both men and women—
were registered in the PSDF, of whom one million were classed as “combat PSDF.” 
The remaining 2.5 million “support PSDF” were trained in first aid, firefighting, 
and similar functions. Of the combat PSDF, only about half were armed.91
The mandatory nature of this mobilization already undermined the politi-
cal goals that CORDS had envisaged for the program. For the GVN, the rapid 
expansion of territorial forces was mainly about meeting a pressing security 
need, given U.S. troop withdrawals. From 1969 onward, the ARVN had to shoul-
der a greater part of the main-force war because of the progressive withdrawal 
of U.S. forces. In addition, as the GVN expanded its presence throughout South 
Vietnam between late 1968 and 1972, it was faced with the task of controlling and 
defending a larger population than ever before. In an environment of decreasing 
U.S. resources, the GVN would not have been able to establish an armed presence 
throughout all the country without enlisting greater manpower. A reliance on 
territorial forces was therefore central to the GVN’s security planning from 1969 
onward. As Thieu explained in late 1970, the idea was that “local communities 
will care for themselves against local threats.”92 Within a limited zone around 
populated areas, RFs conducted offensive operations or assisted in static security, 
according to the wishes of the province chief. The PFs had a more static role, 
focusing on the security of their own villages while also contributing to defend-
ing important roads, waterways, and bridges. Finally, the PSDF remained within 
secure zones, where they acted as the eyes and ears of the other units. If con-
fronted by an overwhelming force, they hid their weapons and acted like normal 
civilians, just as the NLF cadres would do.93
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Judged against their first goal of generating more manpower to secure rural 
South Vietnam and allowing the ARVN to replace departing U.S. forces, the “self-
defense” forces performed admirably. Territorial force strength exceeded that of 
the ARVN by an average of just below 19 percent from 1970 to 1972.94 Casualty 
figures indicate that the territorials were bearing an even heavier share of the 
war than the ARVN in these years, with the combined losses of the RFs and PFs 
between 1968 and 1972 standing at 69,291, versus 36,932 for ARVN regulars.95 
These figures reflect the Communist movement’s decision to place an emphasis 
on attacking the emerging grassroots infrastructure of the GVN, and also their 
success in doing so. Reflecting their own understanding of the way that politi-
cal power was built from the bottom up and was most effective when rooted in 
rural communities, the movement had long placed a great emphasis on stopping 
the GVN from building its own “friendly infrastructure.” As one cadre told his 
captor after Tet: “If the GVN loses a province chief, it will appoint another to 
replace him. If it loses the Seventh Division, it will send in another one. At the 
grass-roots level, the hamlet chiefs, the interfamily group chiefs, and the secu-
rity agents should all be swept away, and replaced by the Front’s own base-level 
organizations in order to gain the initiative.” As the historian David Elliott notes 
in citing this quote, this illustrates the view that grassroots officials and organiza-
tions rooted in a local community were both more valuable to the government 
and dangerous to the movement.96
The enlistment of so many rural citizens into pro-GVN paramilitaries and 
militias had concrete results in terms of making it much harder for the NLF to 
operate in some areas, and in freeing up the ARVN to replace U.S. forces. One 
of the main successes of the self-defense program was in getting large units of 
ARVN and U.S. forces away from populated areas and thus preventing them from 
alienating the population through their actions. This accorded with CORDS’s 
general goal of attempting to shift away from a situation in which the GVN was 
viewed as an occupying military force. As the GVN’s nation-building plan for 
1970 stated, “The Vietnamese villager fears military forces of both sides, since 
their operations constitute a threat to the safety of him and his family.”97 This 
recognized that for many villagers, “security” did not consist of the absence of 
the forces of the Communist movement but a general protection from physical 
harm.
The military campaign in support of the APC in 1969 had brought some of 
the most sustained violence of the war to populated rural areas. One example 
was Operation Speedy Express, which was launched by the U.S. Ninth Division 
in the Mekong Delta in late 1968 and early 1969. The Ninth Division was com-
manded by Major General Julian Ewell, who relentlessly pressured his subordi-
nates to achieve a high body count.98 During the operation, the division claimed 
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10,889 enemy killed while recovering only 748 weapons. It also achieved a highly 
unlikely kill ratio of 45:1. After the war, Ewell published a book titled Sharpen-
ing the Combat Edge, which explained that his division had operated on what he 
called the “constant pressure concept.” Small units engaged in relentless patrols 
accounted for 80–90 percent of the division’s kills, and many of them came dur-
ing airborne operations. Many also occurred at night. Given the ease with which 
small units of NLF or NVA could conceal themselves or their weapons and thus 
avoid contact, this mode of operations gives further reason to suspect that many 
of the dead were civilians.99 Vann, who took over as DepCORDS in IV Corps in 
April 1969, estimated that twice as many civilians were being killed and wounded 
from air and artillery operations than were members of the NLF. The “relaxed” 
rules of engagement operating in the Mekong Delta had turned “very large areas 
of the country” into “free fire zones, whether or not announced as such,” he 
added. When it was time for the Ninth Division to withdraw from the delta, Vann 
was “absolutely delighted.”100 By 1970, RFs and PFs made up 80 percent of total 
allied strength in IV Corps, meaning main-force units had largely withdrawn 
from the delta.101 The result, according to Vann, was that civilian casualties were 
a “fraction” of what they had been during the intense fighting of mid-1968.102 It 
was only the recruitment of territorial forces on a large scale that made this pos-
sible, and which largely—although by no means entirely—reduced the threat to 
villagers from allied firepower.
The territorial forces helped to make this transition away from “occupation” 
possible. Although the dramatically reduced tempo of combat in populated 
areas certainly made life safer for the majority of the country’s population, it is 
less clear that the goal of actively stimulating pro-GVN sentiment was achieved. 
Nor was Colby’s vision of autonomous self-governing villages that ran their 
own affairs, including security, much more than a pipe dream. Few village chiefs 
welcomed the responsibility of commanding the disparate militias, recognizing 
that they lacked the military experience and that diluting the civilian character 
of their role might make them the target of NLF assassination or abduction. 
According to the ARVN general who first commanded IV Corps and then had 
overall responsibility for territorial force development, the contribution of vil-
lage chiefs to local defense was in fact “marginal.”103 Both U.S. and GVN officials 
believed that the continued effectiveness of the territorials depended on their 
being commanded by leaders with military experience of their own, which meant 
in reality they continued to be directed by the district chiefs. When the ideal of 
self-government conflicted with the best possible security arrangements, the lat-
ter retained priority.
Thus, although the territorial forces might not maraud around villages or call 
in air strikes on populated areas in the manner of U.S. and ARVN main forces, 
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they were still controlled by outsiders. This was especially so in the case of the 
RF. As Vietnamization continued, and manpower was in even greater demand to 
conduct large operations aimed at countering the NVA’s own big units, the RFs 
increasingly morphed into regular infantry who were deployed farther and far-
ther from home. They were in this way deprived of their local character as Viet-
namization proceeded.104 As early as May 1969, only 25 percent of them operated 
in or adjacent to their home village. While the figure for PFs was 80 percent, they 
were still often viewed as outsiders, because they answered to the district chief 
and not the village authorities.105 By 1971, PFs were also increasingly serving far-
ther away from home. The sense of detachment of villagers from territorial forces 
that this could encourage was apparent by an incident investigated by the United 
States in Kien Hoa in May 1970. Following an audacious attack by up to two bat-
talions of NLF—rare at this point in the war—a battle ensued in which twenty 
civilians and various ARVN and territorial forces were killed. Although the dis-
trict chief and two PFs perished, they were “not considered as local losses” by the 
villagers—they were outsiders.106 In this case and many others like it, the GVN 
and its representatives continued to be seen as part of a system imposed by the 
regime from the top down and not a bottom-up expression of the community.
Even in the case of organized units of PFs and PSDFs serving in their home 
village, support for the GVN was often much lower than it appeared on paper by 
looking merely at the size of these forces. After the GVN’s Mobilization Law, eli-
gible individuals in GVN-controlled villages faced the choice of serving either in 
the ARVN or the territorials. Volunteering for the latter would mean they stayed 
closer to home. “What we’re really doing is recruiting, by god, the local VC squad,” 
General George Jacobson explained to a skeptical Abrams in October 1969, as 
the force was undergoing rapid expansion. “And they want to stay home so bad 
that they’ll join the . . . PF to do it.”107 Bumgardner said as late as October 1971 
that “there are a great many PSDF that are the enemy’s forces.”108 A Communist 
Party province leader in the delta confirmed this, telling his superiors that “over 
half the posts in the zone had secret contact with us, and the remainder, except 
for a few cruel tyrants, were passive and watched over the bricks [of their post] 
while drawing a salary.”109 That joining the GVN’s territorial forces was seen as 
an alternative to both the ARVN and the NLF can be seen by the example of 
Bac Lieu Province, where villagers who could not afford to bribe their corrupt 
local officials to avoid the ARVN draft and join the territorials instead fled to 
join the guerrillas.110 Where territorial forces were not simply just enemy forces 
incognito, apathy in the ranks was often the order of the day. In late 1971, the 
head of CORDS’s Territorial Security Directorate reported that the rapid expan-
sion of territorial forces had led to a problem with motivation, especially the 
need for territorials to “identify” with the GVN if the program was to be deemed 
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FIGURE 10: A Popular Forces militia member stands guard at the village gate 
in 1968. Such flimsy defenses were easy for the NLF to infiltrate.
National Archives identifier 532459, General Photograph File of the U.S. Marine Corps, Record Group 172, 
National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
successful.111 The lack of such a feeling of identification suggested that although 
the self-defense program had helped to bolster security across South Vietnam, it 
had not succeeded in its political aims.
Another factor that made the large number of territorial forces less impres-
sive than it appeared was that, as Truong noted, many villagers were “induced” to 
join the territorial forces.112 In areas where this happened—often meaning that 
former NLF members or sympathizers were dragooned into service—they could 
not be relied upon. One such chief in Binh Dinh said that only 30 percent of the 
local PF could be counted on to fight, and the PSDF could not be trusted at all 
because of their “close relationships” with the NLF.113 Although the extent of such 
accommodation cannot be reconstructed, it is indicative that throughout 1968 
and 1969, only about half of PF platoons were considered by CORDS advisers as 
sufficiently aggressive in engaging the enemy.114 One Pacification Studies Group 
officer who spent a yearlong tour traveling the country assessing the performance 
of territorial forces concluded in February 1970 that the RF and PF remained 
“self oriented” and “extremely reluctant to engage the enemy.” The PSDF were 
even worse, especially considering their essentially political purpose. “If the 
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intent of the program is to produce large rosters and represent these people to 
be supporters of the Government, then the program is a success,” he noted. “If, 
on the other hand, the intent is as avowed, then the program is a failure. There is 
very little commitment to the Government in the program and all too frequently 
resentment is the case.”115
In an attempt to strengthen the political aspects of the program through 
indoctrination, training courses were established for senior officers and cadres 
in the territorial forces. Abrams had joked that “if they’re just recruiting the local 
VC squad then maybe you don’t need to send them to the training center at all.”116 
But as with other individuals whom the GVN aimed to make part of its “friendly 
infrastructure,” this training was much more political than it was tactical. PSDF 
leaders, for instance, received seven hours of training on village development, 
and six hours on “Communist plots during peace-talks and cease-fire and coun-
ter-measures to be taken.” By contrast, only two hours were spent on the subject 
of patrolling.117
Yet as with the course for village and hamlet leaders, there was a limit to how 
much an individual’s outlook could be changed in a training course that averaged 
four to six weeks in length. Truong conceded that despite indoctrination, most 
RFs and PFs “lived far removed from central authority and were seldom conscious 
of the national cause,” but claimed that “being simple soldiers with rural origins” 
they were “easy to influence.” Yet even he believed that in the last analysis, most 
territorials fought “not for any political philosophy but for the practical reason 
that they did not want anyone to harm their wives, their children, their parents, 
or violate the properties that they had helped build over the years.”118 He could 
have added that often this harm came from ARVN forces—forces that might stay 
away from the villages after militia were established, providing another incen-
tive for villagers to join. If this assessment by a high-ranking GVN general who 
oversaw the territorial forces is accurate, then it suggests that the political aims of 
the territorial force program went unrealized. Villagers who joined because they 
were forced to do so by local officials or because of a desire to be left alone with 
their families were not likely to be made into ardent supporters of the GVN by a 
short visit to a training center. Many PSDF leaders, supposedly standard-bearers 
for the GVN in their communities, refused to attend the training center at all.119
Pacification research reports carried out by Vietnamese personnel confirmed 
that the self-defense program had failed in its political goals. As late as July 1972, 
a survey of An Giang Province found that the vast majority of respondents did 
not consider it their duty to join the ARVN and instead sought out positions in 
territorial units so they could stay close to their families. Corrupt local officials 
helped draft dodgers become PSDF members for a price, and those who could 
not afford it went into hiding. Given that An Giang Province was considered 
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a showcase of pacification with a weak Communist organization, this lack of 
willingness to serve the government and success at evading military service even 
here was a sign of how far the GVN still had to go in achieving genuine nation 
building. Only police operations, much resented by the local population, were 
successful at hoovering up recruits for the ARVN, a sign that the GVN was still 
relying on force rather than cooperation to achieve its aims.120 A survey of sixty-
eight respondents in Ba Xuyen in the same month found that only fifteen were 
willing to either join the ARVN or have family members do so. Many villagers saw 
an inherent tension between serving their families and the GVN, which would 
require them to travel far from home and abandon their local responsibilities. 
The PSDF by contrast was seen as a way to “serve both the country and family,” 
meaning members opted for the most limited form of support for the GVN that 
was compatible with being left alone by draft enforcement officers.121 Numerous 
GVN surveys attested to a large increase in corruption as a result of renewed 
attempts at manpower mobilization after the Easter Offensive. This represented a 
double blow. As well as illustrating that the GVN had not been successful in mov-
ing to a paradigm of willing cooperation between the rural population and the 
government, it showed that the need to squeeze more manpower and resources 
out of the villages as American assets were withdrawn would only drive a larger 
wedge between the government and its citizens. While those who could afford it 
could buy their way out of their obligations to the government, the poor were 
forced to unwillingly shoulder them—or to flee to join the NLF.
Truong believed that the motivation of most members of the PSDF came 
from the fact they were simple villagers who were “adverse to anyone who dis-
turbed the comfort of their natural surroundings.”122 But given the Communist 
movement’s method of building political power from the ground up, the GVN 
remained much more of an outsider in most villagers than the NLF was, as illus-
trated by the GVN’s continued difficulties at mobilizing manpower. Although 
the GVN had managed to gain physical control of much of the countryside, it 
had done little to move beyond the paradigm of “occupation” as the architects 
of the village system intended. This would have required both a great popular 
upswell of pro-GVN sentiment and a genuine system of local control of security 
forces. Neither of these occurred. Villagers knew it was wise to join the territorial 
units to avoid getting drafted into the ARVN, especially if the creation of PF and 
PSDF units kept friendly firepower away from their villages. Yet even Truong only 
claimed that “hundreds of thousands” of people had actively volunteered for the 
PSDF as opposed to being dragooned into service. In light of the fact that most 
U.S. advisers considered the total number of people the GVN claimed to have 
enrolled in the PSDF to be highly inflated, even this was a dubious assertion.123 
Exactly what it meant to volunteer in a situation where service was known to be 
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mandatory is also questionable. Widespread cases of PF and PSDF units refus-
ing to engage the enemy, or reaching accommodations with them, attest to this. 
In areas known for their long allegiance to the NLF, the GVN’s territorial forces 
simply became a way for guerrillas and cadres to bide their time while drawing a 
government salary. All of this helped to bring quiet and security to the country-
side in the period between the 1968 offensives and the Easter Offensive. What it 
did not do was amount to genuine rural nation building.
Self-Development
The Village Self-Development Program (VSD) was, along with territorial secu-
rity, the flagship of the CORDS nation-building effort between 1969 and 1972. 
Both were designed to be the means by which self-government was actualized, 
and to have benefits that went beyond their surface security and economic ben-
efits. The VSD offered monetary assistance to villages to conduct small develop-
ment projects if they could match the funds offered with contributions of their 
own. The contributions could come in the form of either cash, goods in kind, or 
labor, the latter being all that many of the poorest peasants who were thought to 
be the most open to NLF inducements possessed.
The projects included agricultural, fishery, and animal husbandry improve-
ments through to the construction of schoolrooms, dispensaries, roads, 
bridges, and housing. But as far as CORDS and the central GVN were con-
cerned, what mattered much more than the projects embarked upon was the 
process by which villagers planned and implemented them. For the ultimate 
goal of the VSD was to teach Vietnamese villagers what Alexis de Tocqueville 
called “the art of associating together.”124 At the start of every year, groups of 
villagers were encouraged to form pressure groups in favor of certain projects 
and make a case for how it would benefit the village. They then put their cases 
to the elected village council, which would ultimately decide which projects to 
pursue. Yet the purpose of the program was not the delivery of the aid projects 
per se, but rather to build a political connection between village governments 
and their constituents. The program was based on the idea that the peasantry 
was naturally apathetic and lethargic and had to be prodded by outsiders into 
bettering themselves. The VSD was designed as a “pump-priming” interven-
tion in village affairs, necessary “since spontaneous local development is rare 
in developing countries and external stimulus plays a major part in the pro-
cess.”125 Once the villagers got used to the idea that they could band together 
to solve economic and social problems with the help of their government, the 
process would repeat itself naturally.126
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Giving village governments the resources with which to respond to the 
demands of their constituents was equally as important a process as seeing that 
these demands were expressed in the first place. Colby claimed that “to be given 
an actual right to determine how money would be used in the local community 
was quite startling and quite effective with the local population.”127 As with the 
PSDF program, the aim was to advance the GVN’s “Community Spirit principle” 
and foster ties of mutual obligation between the people and the government. 
“The primary purpose of self help is to involve the rural Vietnamese population 
and the Government of Vietnam in a joint effort which will create an associative 
identity of the people with the government,” explained one CORDS document. 
Development projects were merely the “medium” through which this occurred.128 
According to another document written by U.S. planners in Saigon, the program 
aimed at nothing less than “creating and developing in the rural population . . . a 
new set of attitudes, awareness, and responses that eventually will lead to a class 
that is democratically and politically active.” This would be in contrast to how the 
authors of this document viewed the workings of a “traditional” village, in which 
the interests of individuals and groups were “not effectively articulated” because 
of the “pressure of custom and conformity.”129 While such “traditional” villages 
were controlled by local notables who did not take account of the aspirations 
of most villagers, the “village concept” called for a different type of leadership. 
“Projects provided a means for local officials to be made visible, as GVN repre-
sentatives, to the general populace,” said a CORDS retrospective on the program. 
“People could literally see their government at work where previously, in many 
cases, there had been a void.”130
Such a program was highly ambitious and, at least in theory, had the poten-
tial to undermine the authority of traditional rural power brokers. The GVN’s 
centralized bureaucracy had tightly controlled development spending prior to 
the VSD. If a province wanted to construct even a single new village school-
room, it needed Saigon’s approval, and there was little to no chance for even 
village or hamlet chiefs to have any input into development spending. The idea 
that mere villagers might know what was best for themselves was an alien one 
to most province chiefs. Even where province and district chiefs could be con-
vinced by this process that the villagers had legitimate desires that government 
had to meet, they did not appreciate losing control over the opportunities for 
graft and kickbacks that accompanied the management of development funds. 
When coupled with the fact that the formation of pressure groups and the 
process by which projects were decided upon were usually completely opaque 
to American advisers who neither spoke Vietnamese nor understood the intri-
cacies of village life, the results of the VSD were much less revolutionary than 
had been intended.
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The program’s negligible economic impact was not of primary concern to 
central CORDS officials, who stressed time and again that the purpose of the 
program was political. Yet while the economic impact was easy to quantify, mea-
suring the impact of VSD on nation building was much more difficult, as CORDS 
officials acknowledged.131 Given the goals of the program, the two key variables 
for measuring its success were the extent to which the VSD encouraged genuine 
responsiveness to local needs by village governments and the extent to which it 
encouraged local people to identify with the GVN and see it as the protector of 
their interests. These two factors of effectiveness and legitimacy were central to 
the idea of nation building. The VSD was in fact, as one CORDS document said, 
“the primary instrument of decentralization of government authority to the vil-
lage level.”132 Evidence on whether the program met these goals was necessarily 
partial and anecdotal, especially given the difficulty that advisers had compre-
hending the inner workings of village life and the GVN.
Yet CORDS assessments continually found that although the VSD was suc-
cessful in generating development projects, the political goals of the program 
were rarely met. Rather than causing whole new classes of villagers to emerge 
and line up behind a GVN that could finally promote their interests, the pro-
gram was instead adapted to existing modes of village governance. As they had 
with other CORDS programs, lower levels of the GVN warped the program and 
implemented it their own way, often with outcomes very different from those 
that CORDS had intended. As advisers lacked a detailed understanding of vil-
lage political dynamics, they tended to focus instead on the quantitative goal of 
establishing as many projects as possible without being able to understand or 
influence the underlying political dynamics.133 These political dynamics there-
fore remained largely unchanged.
One of the most glaring flaws in the VSD was that it required village officials 
themselves to educate the people in their village about the program and to over-
see its implementation. Given that a large part of the intent of the program was 
to encourage villagers to challenge their own government in perhaps uncomfort-
able ways—and then to vote it out of office if their demands were not met—this 
seemed unlikely to be achieved if the entire process was under the control of 
that same government. Central to the VSD was the idea that citizens would form 
together into project groups to lobby the village government to spend devel-
opment funds in a certain way. The groups, a document for CORDS advisers 
said, “could be defined simply as that group of individuals who having the same 
occupations, interests or problems are united together to lobby for and carry 
out a desired project.”134 Yet the reality was far different. U.S. evaluators found 
that the process of citizens forming into groups was rarely spontaneous and was 
instead usually overseen by village and hamlet officials, who would come up with 
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projects and then corral citizens into groups who ostensibly supported them for 
the purposes of acquiring funds.
A team of U.S. and Vietnamese evaluators who visited four provinces to assess 
the VSD in mid-1970 found that the “popular groups” were in fact “largely paper 
exercises” and “neither active nor spontaneous.” Projects were “often selected by 
village and hamlet or other officials rather than by the people.”135 Surveys of 
villagers elsewhere in 1969 and 1970 backed up these findings. When the 1969 
program was coming to its end in December of that year, a survey found that a 
third of respondents still did not believe or know that VSD funds had been made 
available to their hamlet. Surveys in the last three months of the 1969 program 
in III and IV Corps found that on average only 19.5 percent of respondents felt 
they had “enough opportunity” to participate in decisions about the spending 
of VSD funds. Only just over 14 percent felt it was “the people of the hamlet” 
who decided what projects would go ahead, as opposed to village, hamlet, or 
district authorities.136 In September 1970, another survey across the whole coun-
try found that only 29.6 percent of respondents who were in a project group 
reported that the group had been created spontaneously. That many villagers 
were excluded from these meetings and not allowed to participate in groups 
can be seen by the reasons given for nonparticipation in the same survey. Even 
though the VSD allowed contributions of labor in lieu of cash from villagers in 
an express attempt to extend the program to the poorest, 20.8 percent reported 
that they were too “poor” to join. An additional 23.8 percent said membership 
was “limited to small groups of people.” Only 4 percent of respondents felt that 
it was the people themselves who were supposed to decide which projects their 
groups would request approval for.137
The VSD was a subject of particular interest for the surveyors who produced 
pacification research reports, and dozens of assessments were made of it in the 
early 1970s. Few of them found the program operating as intended. One GVN 
survey found that “proper regard is not being given to the ideas of the villagers in 
the selection of projects,” with local authorities instead mandating what projects 
would be carried out.138 A survey in Quang Ngai found that only 20 percent of 
respondents were aware of the program, and that local officials simply decided 
how to spend the extra money themselves without organizing popular groups or 
involving villagers in “any decision making processes related to the projects.” The 
surveyor suggested that the provincial government intervene to explain the pro-
gram to the villagers—but given the involvement of provincial officials in profit-
ing from corruption associated with the program, this was unlikely to happen.139
None of this suggests a program that was successful in either organizing the 
population into effective decision-making groups as the NLF did, or at creat-
ing pressure on local governments to respond to the desires of their citizens. 
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Rather than making village government responsive to the people, the program 
was warped to fit into the traditional rural GVN mold of making the people 
responsive to the government. While many villagers undoubtedly benefited 
from the economic aspects of the program, GVN officials continued to use it 
primarily to further their own ends and not to further nation building. This 
included novel methods of corruption. In Quang Tri Province, 9.47 percent of 
the money sent from Saigon for the 1969 program somehow disappeared en 
route to the province treasury.140 District chiefs often lurked in the background, 
pressuring village chiefs to select certain projects and then employ certain con-
tractors so they could earn kickbacks or profit from padded contracts.141 The 
fact that most villagers learned about the program from the same local officials 
who benefited from manipulating it for their own profit made this possible, as 
the GVN minister responsible for the program noted in late 1970.142 Although 
the exact scale of corruption in the VSD is impossible to determine, its existence 
meant that projects were not always benefiting their ostensible recipients. For if 
villagers were corralled into project groups by officials and then forced to con-
tribute cash and labor to complete them, the program in fact became a means 
of extracting resources from villagers in the name of “self-development.” Some 
American advisers were aware of this problem, such as a PSA from Khanh Hoa 
who reported in 1971 that “many hamlet people are forced to involve themselves 
against their will; they do not like or understand that.” It had been official policy 
since the start of the program that the groups be truly voluntary, but the practice 
of forced involvement continued until its end.143
The ability of CORDS advisers to remedy these problems was limited. Many 
viewed corruption as a natural part of South Vietnamese society, so long as it 
was kept below a certain level. The funds that went missing from Quang Tri, for 
instance, were eerily just short of the 10 percent threshold commonly cited by 
advisers as an unacceptable level of corruption. Yet corruption in the case of the 
VSD was about more than the skimming off funds—it cut right to the core of 
why it remained in the interests of GVN officials to maintain their control over 
the VSD program rather than encouraging the emergence of a genuinely demo-
cratic system of deciding how the funds were spent.
In fact, it cut to the core of why lower echelons of the GVN had an inter-
est in sabotaging the entire village system. Those advisers who did attempt to 
involve themselves in the formation of project groups faced chastisement for 
going against the spirit of the program, which aimed merely at creating the 
“proper environment” for project groups and responsive village governments to 
flourish.144 Here, as in so many cases, CORDS officials ran up against the prob-
lem of leverage—they ultimately could not achieve their aims if they sharply 
diverged from those of their GVN counterparts. Advisers were told never to work 
180      CHAPTER 7
around the existing government structure, because this could only weaken and 
not strengthen it. With the program’s ability to promote the reform of the GVN 
so limited, it is little wonder that even villagers who benefited from it saw it pri-
marily as an economic giveaway rather than understanding and appreciating the 
VSD’s political intent.145
Although it was the flagship development program from 1969 until its termi-
nation in 1972, the VSD was not the only one. From 1970 onward, several other 
programs were also launched in an attempt to bring socioeconomic reform to the 
villages. The first was the Land to the Tiller (LTTT) initiative, which was signed 
into law by President Thieu in March 1970 after years of wrangling between 
South Vietnamese and USAID officials. The post-Tet pacification drive had 
already been accompanied by some reforms in land policy in areas newly (re)
occupied by the GVN. In late 1968 and early 1969, the GVN had announced that 
peasants living in such areas would not have their land confiscated and returned 
to its original owner, as had happened in the past. The government also froze 
rents, first in newly pacified areas and then across the whole country. In many 
cases, this meant that the Saigon regime was acknowledging that NLF land dis-
tribution was a fait accompli. Nevertheless, such a policy was hard to enforce at 
the local level where the landlords actually lived. It also placed the GVN in the 
position of recognizing the legitimacy of NLF redistribution without having any 
positive program of its own to offer.146
The entry into force of LTTT was designed to change this. The law mandated 
that ownership of land had to pass from landlords to those who farmed it. Fami-
lies in the Mekong Delta would receive plots up to a maximum of three hectares 
(7.4 acres), and those in the Central Lowlands one hectare. Landlords, who could 
keep only fifteen hectares for direct cultivation, were to be compensated by the 
government in a mixture of cash and bonds for the land they lost as a result of 
the law. The internal GVN politics that led to the passage of the GVN law are 
murky, but it is clear that Thieu pushed it through the legislature against sig-
nificant opposition from landlords and with the enthusiastic backing of many 
Americans. Shortly after the law was passed, the New York Times lauded LTTT as 
“probably the most ambitious and progressive non-Communist land reform of 
the twentieth century”.147
Although LTTT was not an integral part of CORDS’s village system, its fate 
intersected with it. As with so many other GVN initiatives, implementation at the 
local level became the key sticking point. This was particularly the case in north-
ern parts of the country and the Central Lowlands, where it was common for 
village officials to also be landlords themselves and hence to resist implementing 
the program. Officials and tenants feared that if they initiated a claim under the 
law, they would face the wrath of powerful local landlords. This was a particularly 
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acute problem given that both the compensation of landlords and the distribu-
tion of land titles became the subject of massive delays, increasing the time in 
which “irate landlords, including a few gun-toting Military officers” might take 
out their frustration on their tenants. Peasants in northern areas of the country 
were said by American observers to have little faith that the GVN could protect 
them against such retaliation.148
In the Mekong Delta, where only 10 percent of village officials were esti-
mated to also be landlords, the program proceeded more effectively.149 This was 
important, because most of the land eligible for redistribution lay in this region. 
By the end of 1971, land titles had been legally awarded to 375,250 individuals 
nationwide, for a total of 1.14 million acres of land, with 73 percent of these 
titles actually having been distributed by the GVN bureaucracy.150 The lack of a 
reliable cadastral survey makes it hard to estimate the percentage of tenant farm-
ers affected, but a 1970 estimate placed the number of tenant families in South 
Vietnam at six hundred thousand and the area of land they worked at 3.2 million 
acres.151 Even allowing for an overstatement in the official figures compared to 
the land reform actually achieved in practice, the impact of LTTT on reduc-
ing tenancy was significant. By July 1974, the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam 
claimed that tenancy in the country had been “virtually eliminated,” although 
by this point U.S. officials were not present in sufficient numbers to verify that 
such claims corresponded to the reality on the ground.152 Nevertheless, surveys 
of villagers in areas of the Mekong Delta that had benefited from LTTT in the 
early 1970s reported widespread awareness of the program and appreciation of 
its benefits.153 The implementation of the program in the delta was particularly 
impressive because it was administered at the local level by village officials, whose 
autonomy and effectiveness had been so limited in the other areas discussed in 
this chapter.
The LTTT law was the most impressive rural reform that the GVN carried 
out, both in its impact on the ground and the fact it showed the Saigon regime’s 
rural apparatus to be capable of driving through major social change. But it was 
also too little, too late. The law responded to a social reality in the delta that the 
NLF had largely created, first through its own land reform and second by forcing 
landlords to flee the insecurity of the countryside to the cities. Once there, many 
had become cut off from their land and involved in more profitable ventures, 
meaning they lacked the ability or interest to contest the law’s implementation. 
This dilution of the power of the landlords and NLF achievement of land reform, 
which it would have been politically disastrous for the GVN to reverse, explains 
why LTTT was politically possible at this time rather than earlier in the war. Its 
implementation was also reliant on the decision of the Communist movement to 
shift to preparing for the major offensives of 1972 and subsequently 1975 at the 
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expense of contesting territorial control in the delta. Perhaps if it had come ear-
lier, LTTT would have done more to prepare the Saigon regime to meet this chal-
lenge, which depended on the ability to mobilize fiscal and manpower resources 
as the Americans withdrew. But the frustrated progress of other aspects of the 
village system demonstrated that LTTT did not do enough in these final years to 
change the apathetic or hostile attitude of a sufficient portion of South Vietnam-
ese villagers toward their government. It was a reform that had been wrung out 
of the government by the NLF, rather than representing a fundamental change in 
the dynamics of GVN rule. As one American skeptic put it in 1972, “Land reform 
is nice icing, but it will not help if the cake is rotten.”154
The aptness of this comment becomes apparent if we consider the final major 
plank of rural government reform in the latter years of the war: an attempt to 
improve village fiscal autonomy known as the Local Revenue Improvement 
Program (LRIP). The LRIP focused on mobilizing resources via taxation at the 
village level. Although villages had tax-raising powers under the 1967 constitu-
tion, before 1969 these powers were sharply circumscribed. In late 1967, revenues 
from agricultural land taxes had been assigned to the village budget, potentially 
giving villages the opportunity to tax up to one-half of South Vietnam’s pri-
vate national income.155 With the spread of territorial security during and after 
the APC, a stable environment was created to finally collect it. Recognizing this, 
Decree 45 provided for a village tax commissioner charged with increasing rev-
enue. As well as improving security, another factor driving change was that the 
South Vietnamese national budget felt the pressure of Vietnamization strongly. 
As a USAID paper stated, Vietnamization “carries the clear indication that gov-
ernment administration, at both central and local levels, must prepare to shift for 
itself without extensive external assistance.”156
With U.S. aid set to decline in the future, Saigon finally began to look seri-
ously at how to finance its own expenditures. This was vital, given that other 
aspects of the GVN’s strategy of rural reform such as VSD and the LTTT cost 
rather than generated revenue. In particular, LTTT had undercut the fiscal viabil-
ity and autonomy of villages by mandating the transfer of communal lands that 
had previously allowed villages to generate rent. In response, the LRIP merged 
the goals of encouraging overall GVN fiscal sustainability and maintaining local 
autonomy. Colby saw measures to increase village tax collections as both a way of 
tapping the resources of the rural population to support the GVN and a way of 
strengthening the “village system” of autonomous village governments. As with 
other aspects of the village system, this extra grant of government authority also 
came with the expectation that it would encourage rural South Vietnamese to 
share the burden of defeating the insurgency. “At this time of national crisis,” 
a paper presented to the GVN by CORDS stated, “when the need for sacrifice 
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is paramount, local government is failing to obtain an adequate share of local 
wealth for the common effort.”157 The central GVN had paid the salaries of village 
officials since 1967, constituting a significant burden on its finances. If villages 
could improve local tax receipts to cover even just this item, it would remove a 
significant cost from the national budget. An improvement in local revenue col-
lection would also allow local development activities to continue after the termi-
nation of U.S. funding for the VSD, putting local development on a sustainable 
and democratic local basis. Hence the LRIP served two purposes—advancing 
the cause of decentralization, and decreasing the GVN’s overall reliance on the 
United States as part of Vietnamization.
As in so many areas of the American nation-building effort in South Vietnam, 
the LRIP achieved some apparent progress but fell far short of expectations and 
failed to achieve its political objective. It was an effort that was particularly dif-
ficult for American advisers to involve themselves in, given both the political 
sensitivities involved in raising taxes and the arcane nature of tax administration. 
By the beginning of 1972, a CORDS progress report found that U.S. influence 
on the improvement of tax collection had been “almost negligible.”158 As USAID 
had warned, the LRIP demanded “knowledge of how to collect taxes from peo-
ple who voluntarily won’t pay taxes.”159 Even had CORDS advisers possessed the 
technical knowledge, they did not have the necessary knowledge of village life 
and economics. Their numbers were anyhow dwindling. This meant that the 
impetus for the program would have to come from the GVN. Yet the GVN also 
lacked personnel trained in local tax administration and faced enormous politi-
cal obstacles in increasing revenues from a population that was still highly resis-
tant to paying GVN taxes. The LTTT had been accompanied by a substantial tax 
holiday because the GVN had feared that villagers would resist applying for land 
titles if they believed it would lead to an increased financial burden.160 This had 
been necessary to encourage peasants to apply for the legal rights to land they 
had in many cases received de facto rights to from the NLF without having to pay 
GVN taxes. Saigon’s lack of political will or ability to make higher fiscal demands 
on its population took on a tragicomic hue when the GVN refused to pay the 
relatively small salaries of technical cadres who were supposed to travel around 
villages helping them improve their tax administration. Rather than shoulder-
ing the costs itself, the GVN felt the United States should pay for the cadres. 
As USAID noted, this was hardly an encouraging start to a program aimed at 
making the GVN self-sufficient.161 On the eve of the Paris Peace Accords, around 
25 percent of villages were reported to be at least 95 percent self-sufficient in 
terms of operating expenses. This figure was also difficult to verify, since the 
few American advisers remaining still lacked access to budget data.162 Even more 
significantly, the fact that 75 percent of villages could not even cover their own 
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operating expenses meant that when the VSD terminated, these villages would 
have no funds for development projects. Of the total funds being expended in the 
localities in 1971, only a sixth was locally raised—and the half of the remainder 
made up by U.S. development support was about to be terminated.163 This placed 
the future of the village system in a perilous condition, as its cornerstone was the 
availability of local assets to respond to local needs. If village governments had to 
squeeze their populations even just to cover their own operating expenses, they 
seemed to face an uphill struggle in the broader battle to establish constructive 
links with the population. As the last CORDS advisers left the country, this con-
tradiction remained unresolved.
All of this suggested that the GVN had failed to establish ties of mutual obli-
gation with its own citizens at the village level, which would vastly complicate 
its attempts to continue to battle the Vietnamese Communist movement. This 
was the case whether Hanoi stuck to a strategy of conventional attacks or moved 
to reenergize its guerrilla campaign. Despite successes in a hugely belated land 
reform program, the GVN’s failure to move from what Vann and Colby consid-
ered a form of occupation to a paradigm of joint effort between the government 
and its citizens was symbolized by the failure of the LRIP. Lacking the legitimacy 
and administrative prowess to raise taxes to a level that would allow even for the 
self-sufficiency of village governments, much less to pay for the huge national 
military and other institutions necessary to combat the Communist movement, 
Saigon instead allowed resources to continue to be embezzled and coerced from 
the rural population as part of a pervasive and abusive system of corruption. The 
corps commander system had ultimately not been broken, and it seemed that an 
even greater level of exploitation would be needed as U.S. aid declined further 
after the Paris Peace Accords. Faced with all this evidence of the GVN’s failure to 
put down durable and sustainable roots despite enjoying years of relative calm 
in the villages, it is hard to disagree with the claim by Douglas Blaufarb, a former 
CIA official in South Vietnam, that GVN control might best be likened to Mark 
Twain’s description of the River Platte: “an inch deep and a mile wide.”164
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The Communist offensive of 1972—known in the West as the Easter Offensive—
was the beginning of the end for South Vietnam. Since the failure of the 1968 
offensives, the Communist movement had carefully husbanded its armed 
strength and avoided provocations that might have slowed the U.S. withdrawal 
or led to a widening of the war. In 1972, hundreds of thousands of NVA 
soldiers with Chinese equipment and armored vehicles surged across the DMZ 
and the South Vietnamese borders with Laos and Cambodia. In the midst of 
the supposedly highly “pacified” Mekong Delta, the Communists managed to 
seize the provincial capital of Ben Tre. Just as Nixon and Kissinger’s Vietnam 
Special Studies Group had predicted, the reentry of NVA divisions of regiments 
into the war swiftly changed the balance of forces, and the GVN was unable 
to respond effectively. The ARVN grimly held on, supported by an enormous 
wave of U.S. airpower. But it would not be able to rely on the saviors in the 
sky much longer. Meanwhile, the Communist movement took advantage of 
its momentum to reconstitute its administrative and political apparatus in the 
populated areas, especially the Mekong Delta. Assailed from all sides, the GVN 
was forced to cannibalize territorial units to make up the losses in its main forces, 
only weakening its grip on the rural areas further. Just as its inability to mobilize 
the resources and manpower to combat the Communists had led to American 
escalation ten years earlier, the GVN again lacked the effectiveness or legitimacy 
to organize an effective resistance. Nation building had failed.
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CORDS had reached the peak of its influence between 1968 and 1971. Barely 
had a generation of advisers begun to grapple with nation building before they 
began to be withdrawn from 1971 onward. Many had begun to take a more 
hands-off approach to their job in the final years anyway. “The day is past when 
advisors walk hand-in-hand with counterparts across the ride paddies and 
through the weeds,” said one adviser who served in 1971. “We should not be 
required to bolster courage and leadership at the small unit level. That day is 
past. If we haven’t imparted those techniques as yet, we never will.”1 By Octo-
ber 1971, Everett Bumgardner, executive assistant to the head of CORDS, said 
that “most” province chiefs no longer looked to their counterparts for advice.2 
Some fought back against the withdrawal. After serving on a task force in 1971 
that eventually decided—against his wishes—to scale back and ultimately dis-
solve CORDS, former I and II Corps official Willard E. Chambers quit in dis-
gust in November 1972, issuing a parting blast at “the leadership and philosophy 
being applied” to the nation-building effort.3 Far from believing the war was 
“won” or that nation-building was complete, many CORDS advisers believed 
they needed five to ten more years. But with public support for the war in the 
United States exhausted, the clock had run out.
CORDS had failed despite its attempt in the latter years of the war to emulate 
the successes of the Vietnamese Communist movement through the village sys-
tem. While this was only the latest in a series of efforts to do so, it was certainly 
the most comprehensive. Through the village system, CORDS had abandoned 
the attempt to build rural support on the basis of an imagined community of the 
South Vietnamese nation, and instead had shifted to the idea of “communalism,” 
which the Communists had used so successfully. By attempting to tap into the 
village autonomy and identity, which had been the building block of Vietnamese 
rural life for centuries, they had moved far beyond the crude focus on physical 
control that had characterized earlier “pacification” efforts. Despite nation build-
ing being taken over by the military, the approach favored by many civilians—
foremost among them Colby—had won out.
But it was precisely the political content of CORDS’s programs, and its 
attempts to forge a network of pro-GVN village communities, that failed. The 
GVN never managed to become effective enough at mobilizing rural support or 
legitimate enough to demand the sacrifices needed to win the struggle against the 
Communist movement. The “friendly infrastructure” that CORDS had hoped 
to nourish was unreliable and uncommitted until the end. The village system 
offered limited local empowerment and some sense of belonging and advance-
ment to pro-GVN militiamen and officials. But its architects never managed to 
replicate the true keys to the success of the Communist movement—its deep and 
organic local roots, its offer of fundamental social and economic change, and 
the prospect of advancement through a political structure that stretched from 
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the remotest village to the Politburo in Hanoi. Never able to truly understand or 
trust its rural citizens, the GVN could not deliver the decentralization, empower-
ment, and ideological vision that might have made the village system meaningful. 
As outsiders both in understanding and in influence, American nation builders 
could hardly do so either.
Nor could the Americans, or their forward-thinking allies among the South 
Vietnamese, bring about wholesale reform of the GVN in a way that might have 
made its rural nation-building efforts more likely to succeed. There was ulti-
mately only so far the GVN could be pushed. Time and again—from Robert 
Komer’s decision to work within the existing corps commander system in 1966, 
to the rejection of Major Nguyen Duc Thang’s proposals to reform it in 1967, and 
the quiet shelving of Operation Shock in early 1968—U.S. officials opted for evo-
lution over revolution. Historians such as James McAllister have suggested they 
should have acted more forcefully.4 Yet this book has shown that U.S. freedom of 
action was always constrained by its desire not to unleash chaos of the sort that 
had followed the coup against Diem. Nor could the Americans ignore nationalist 
sensitivities. The key assumption underlying Operation Shock had been that as 
Saigon was unable to claim all the attributes of sovereignty without American 
assistance, it was reasonable for the Americans to ask for that sovereignty to be 
conditioned and limited according to American demands for reform. Yet fearing 
a complete collapse in the Saigon regime’s legitimacy if it was seen to be taking 
orders from the Americans, CORDS continued to attempt to operate behind the 
scenes and indirectly. The result was, for the Americans, the worst of both worlds: 
the influence of American advisers was sharply limited, but their very presence 
continued to provide the Communist movement with a propaganda boon.
Their evolutionary approach meant that the reforms favored by those Ameri-
cans most concerned with nation building were very slow to be implemented. 
The tardiness was on the U.S. side as well as the Vietnamese. Even though the 
military and civilian agencies like the CIA and USOM had been attempting to 
strengthen the GVN for nearly a decade by the time of the Americanization of 
the war in 1965, it took two years from the arrival of the first U.S. combat units 
to the creation of CORDS. A semblance of political stability in the GVN arrived 
only in late 1966, whereas Thieu managed to consolidate power and put an end 
to factional squabbles at the top of the GVN only during 1968. As the VSSG 
studies produced in the Nixon White House had pointed out, the surface stabil-
ity and security that allowed for the attempted implementation of the village 
system from 1969 onward was itself dependent on the Communist movement’s 
decision to lie low and engage in an economy-of-forces strategy while the U.S. 
withdrawal continued. The limits of American leverage and its dependence on 
events over which the United States had no control meant that even if American 
nation builders had possessed a perfect understanding of South Vietnam and 
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a clear vision for how to achieve nation building, the conditions in which they 
operated made it impossible to do so. In reality, they possessed neither of these 
things anyway.
Despite the questionable wisdom of their efforts, the American experience 
of attempted nation building recounted in this volume does challenge claims 
by some historians that the Americans were totally indifferent to the existing 
state of South Vietnamese politics and society or that their approach was domi-
nated by assumptions from modernization theory.5 On the contrary, this book 
has shown that some American nation builders from Saigon down to the villages 
were keenly interested in understanding and influencing the intricacies of South 
Vietnamese rural life. They also devoted attention to studying the successes of 
the Vietnamese Communist movement and attempting to replicate them, learn-
ing heavily from former Viet Minh fighters such as Tran Ngoc Chau and Nguyen 
Be. Nation-building efforts from the RD program through to the village system 
showed their heavy imprint. Recognizing that they were faced with the same tasks 
of political organization and mobilization that the Communist movement had 
carried out so effectively, Americans and South Vietnamese attempted to repli-
cate the very movement they were attempting to save South Vietnam from. Their 
efforts were also in accord with the conventional wisdom of contemporary theo-
rists of revolutionary and colonial warfare. American nation building in South 
Vietnam was shaped by many influences.
By providing an analysis of how these ideas played out in practice, this book 
has presented the most detailed account yet of the failure of U.S. nation build-
ing in the latter years of the war. It has moved beyond orthodox accounts of U.S. 
nation building in Vietnam that focus on structural reasons for its failure while 
neglecting the evolution of U.S. nation-building policy or the agency of the actors 
involved, especially in the later years of the war. By coloring between the histori-
cal lines laid down by these accounts, this book has aimed to deprive revisionists 
of the space in which to make claims about the successes of U.S. nation building 
in the later years of the war. This book has shown that there is little evidence the 
GVN had built a base among its own people that would have justified continued 
U.S. support in 1974–1975 and afterward. The eerie peace that settled over much 
of South Vietnam in the early 1970s might have been testament to successful 
pacification, but it certainly did not amount to nation building. It also took place 
in a security environment that was permissive largely because of a change in 
Hanoi’s strategy. Had the U.S. militarily intervened to defend South Vietnam in 
1975 when Hanoi again took the offensive, the GVN may have stumbled on for 
several more years, but it would have been no closer to overcoming the legacies 
of ineffectiveness and illegitimacy that dated back to 1954. Nation building in 
South Vietnam had produced a regime highly dependent on American support 
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and unable to survive without it. That support was now gone. “Having given us 
the needles,” as the Vietnamese American novelist Viet Thanh Nguyen has the 
protagonist of his novel The Sympathizer remark, “they now perversely no longer 
supplied the dope.”6 Nor was the Saigon regime showing any serious signs of 
getting over its addiction to American largesse. No counterfactual “what if” can 
escape the fact that by the time of Hanoi’s final offensives, nation building had 
not been achieved and did not look likely to be achieved anytime soon, despite 
twenty years of American and South Vietnamese efforts. Meanwhile, the U.S. 
public’s appetite for continuing to support Saigon had run out. A strategy reliant 
on a level of public support that evaporates before victory can be achieved can 
hardly be considered a winning one. Hearts and minds at home matter, too. This 
was not a “lost victory.”7 It was simply a defeat.
The American experience of nation building in South Vietnam hence ought 
to be a humbling and sobering lesson for would-be nation builders. Too many 
adherents of nation building, and indeed of counterinsurgency, focus on tech-
nical issues of implementation rather than acknowledging the immense struc-
tural barriers in the way of their goals. One example is the concept of “unity of 
command,” the idea that ever-closer coordination between the military, other 
agencies, and their equivalents among the host government is the key to success. 
Sherard Cowper-Coles, a former British ambassador to Afghanistan, described 
this idea as “snake oil.”8 CORDS had the greatest unity of command of any U.S. 
attempt at nation building in history, and yet still it failed. When we consider the 
immense time and effort required from the presidential level down to assure that 
this unified, if ultimately futile, effort was established in the first place, we begin 
to see the magnitude of the challenge facing would-be nation builders. CORDS 
boasted thousands of personnel, unity of command, a sophisticated operating 
concept based on an understanding of its main antagonist, theoretically close 
integration with the host government, and even a training institute dedicated to 
producing personnel skilled in understanding the country in which it operated. 
Still it failed. No doubt in the future there will be those who say they can succeed 
in its stead, but they ought to have to reckon with its failure all the same.
The story told in this book also has much to teach us about the relation-
ship between pacification, which is now often called counterinsurgency, and 
true nation building. While counterinsurgency doctrine has progressed since the 
time of the Vietnam War, it still suffers from an unclear relationship to strate-
gic victory. Just as the endless churn of pacification operations in Vietnam did 
little to address the fundamental weaknesses of the GVN and the rural socio-
political structure, so today’s “population-centric” counterinsurgency often 
fails to address the root causes of a conflict.9 This has led one contemporary 
critic to deride counterinsurgency as a “strategy of tactics,” an echo of Colonel 
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Harry Summer’s famous labeling of U.S. strategy in the Vietnam War as a “kind 
of grand tactics” because it provided no route to strategic victory.10 But as the 
relationship between pacification and attempts at more sophisticated forms of 
nation building in Vietnam shows, the link between counterinsurgency and stra-
tegic victory—at least in theory—is nation building. In practice, without achiev-
ing true nation building, the gains of pacification are likely to prove ephemeral, 
and counterinsurgency is indeed doomed to be little more than a “kind of grand 
tactics.” By demonstrating the difficulty of carrying out the sort of deep political 
and socioeconomic change called for by nation building in South Vietnam, the 
site of the most ambitious and energetic attempt by the United States to date, this 
book ought to give pause to those who in the future see in nation building the 
key to strategic victory. A clear-eyed understanding of the failure of U.S. nation 
building in South Vietnam is more useful than fantasies of a “lost victory.”
This study also teaches us to be wary of the metaphor of “nation building.” 
Policy makers who embark their countries on such ventures should be aware of 
how little control they will have over either the finer details of implementation or 
the prerequisites for success. Once the process has begun, high-level policy mak-
ers are only able to intervene with broad brushstrokes rather than with regard 
to the finer detail. Leveraging reform from an allied government whose officials 
have also to look out for their own political interests is highly challenging, how-
ever cleverly the scaffolding of influence is constructed. While the metaphor 
of “nation building” seems to promise tractability and predictability, in reality 
the process is influenced by myriad actors with divergent agendas, of whom the 
intervenor is but one. Nation building is ultimately an activity that privileges 
local knowledge and action and is hostile to grand designs.
The temptation to go chasing after grand designs is an expression of what 
Hannah Arendt, writing just as the anti-Diem popular uprising was about 
to burst forth in South Vietnam in the late 1950s, called the gravest political 
sin—that of hubris.11 Many of the Americans who worked against the odds to 
strengthen the Saigon regime and ensure its survival in the face of the Vietnamese 
Communist movement were guilty of it. But even more so were the policy makers 
in Washington who embarked on a war that was dependent on such an improb-
able task being accomplished. Nation building was an unavoidable condition of 
victory for the United States in the Vietnam War. It was also, given the legacies of 
Vietnamese history and the unfolding course of the war, almost certainly preor-
dained to be impossible to achieve. Thus does U.S. strategy in the Vietnam War 
stand guilty of the sin of hubris, and thus did it fail.
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